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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 ECON 338C: Topics in Grain Marketing Chad Hart Assistant Professor/Grain Markets Specialist chart@iastate.edu 515-294-9911
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Today’s Topic Homework #2, Reminder on Marketing Assignment, Contracting Grain, & New Generation Grain Contracts
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Homework #2 ACRE revenue guarantee = 90% * ACRE price guarantee * Expected state yield 90% * $4.15/bu. * 171 bu./acre = $638.69/acre ACRE actual revenue = Max(Season- average price, Loan rate) * Actual state yield per planted acre $3.50/bu. * 165 bu./acre = $577.50/acre
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 ACRE Structure ACRE Farm revenue trigger = Expected farm yield * ACRE price guarantee + Producer-paid crop insurance premium 171 bu./acre * $4.15/bu. + $22.61/acre = $732.26/acre ACRE actual farm revenue = Max(Season- average price, Loan rate) * Actual farm yield per planted acre $3.50/bu. * 190 bu./acre = $665.00/acre
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 ACRE Payments Payment rate = Min(ACRE revenue guarantee – ACRE actual revenue, 25% * ACRE revenue guarantee) Min($638.69 - $577.50, 25% * $638.69) = Min($61.19, $159.67) = $61.19 Payment rate depends on state-level data
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Prices Price spreadsheet due next week (you can either give me a printout or e-mail me the file) Also, remember you need to make your crop sales by the end of the month
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Contracting Basic Hedge-to-Arrive Basis Deferred Price Minimum Price New Generation Automated Pricing Managed Hedging Combination
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Hedge-to-Arrive Allows producer to lock futures price, but leaves the basis open Basis is determined at a later date, prior to delivery on the contract So the producer still faces basis risk and production risk (must produce enough crop to cover the contract) The buyer takes on the futures price risk
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Hedge-to-Arrive Why might you use it? Think basis will strengthen before delivery For the producer, the gain/loss on the contract is due to basis moves Available in roll and non-roll varieties
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Basis Contract Also known as a “fix price later” contract Allows producer to lock in basis level, but leaves futures price open Producer still faces futures price risk and production risk Buyer takes on basis risk
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Basis Contract Why might you use it? Expect higher futures prices, but possibly weaker basis Example On July 1, producer sells 5,000 bushels of corn for November delivery at 20 cents under December futures. On Nov. 1, Dec. futures set the futures price
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Deferred Price Contract Also known as “no price established” contract Allows producer to deliver crop without setting sales price Buyer takes delivery and charges fee for allowing price deferral Producer still faces all price risk and production risk (if contract is set before delivery)
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Deferred Price Contract Producer also faces counterparty risk If buyer files for bankruptcy, the producer becomes an unsecured creditor Why would you use it? Believe market prices are on the rise Takes care of storage Allows producer to lock prices at a later time Producer benefits from higher prices and stronger basis, but risks lower prices and weaker basis
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Minimum Price Contract Allows producer to establish a minimum price in exchange for a service fee and the cost of an option The final price is set later at the choice of the producer If prices are below the minimum price, the producer gets the minimum price If prices are above the minimum price, the producer captures a higher price
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Minimum Price Contract Removes downside price risk (below minimum price) and allows upside potential (after adjusting for fees) Producer looking price increases to offset fees Provides some predictability in pricing, can be set to be cash-flow needs
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 New Generation Contracts Ever evolving set of contracts established to assist producers and users in marketing crops Structured to overcome marketing challenges Inability to follow through on marketings Marketing decisions triggered by emotion Complexities and costs of marketing tools
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 New Generation Contracts Often broken into three categories Automated pricing Managed hedging Combination contracts Offered by several companies, each with its own twist on the contract I will highlight some available contracts (for illustrative purposes only, not an endorsement
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 New Generation Contracts The contract follow predetermined pricing rules Often sold in set bushel increments, like futures and options, with a specified delivery period Some have exit clauses (depending on price)
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Automated Pricing In its purest form, basically locks in an average price by marketing equal amounts of grain each period within a set time Could be daily or weekly Some contracts allow producers to pick the pricing period Can be combined with other pricing approaches (minimum price, etc.)
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Automated Pricing Examples Decision Commodities – Index Pricing E-Markets – Market Index Forward Cargill – PacerPro CGB – Equalizer Classic Variations CGB – Equalizer Traditional Cargill – PacerPro Ultra E-Markets – Seasonal Index Forward
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Automated Pricing Pricing period: Jan. to Mar. 2009 on Nov. 2009 soybean futures
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Automated Pricing Advantages Automates marketing decision, frees up producer time Removes concerns about additional costs (margin calls) Can be set to capture average price when seasonal highs are usually hit
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Managed Hedging Automated contracts that implement pricing based on recommendations from market analysts Example Cargill – MarketPros Producers can choose to follow CargillPros or Kluis Commodities recommendations
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Managed Hedging Has many of the same advantages as automated pricing Results are dependent on the performance of the market analysts Often has higher fees than automated pricing Automated pricing: 3-5 cents/bushel Managed hedging: 10-15 cents/bushel
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Combination Contracts Extend or combine mechanisms from various contracts Averaging pricing Minimum pricing Pricing based on market movements Opt-out clauses if prices fall significantly Come in many varieties, so producers can find one to fit their needs
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Cargill – DiversiMax Price is set by formula 75% of the price is determined by the average daily high futures price during a specified pricing period 25% of the price is determined by the highest price observed during the pricing period Can be linked to a commitment to market additional grain (the commitment reduces the fee charged) Source: http://www.cargillpropricing.com/contracts.html
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Decision Commodities Accelerator Pricing Markets bushels when prices exceed a floor price, but marketed quantities depend on price level For example, Source: http://decisioncommodities.com/products/ If the Nov. 2009 soybean price is Then we market < $8.000 bushels per day $8.00 to $8.50100 bushels per day $8.50 to $9.00250 bushels per day > $9.00500 bushels per day
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Decision Commodities Topper Pricing Markets bushels when prices exceed a floor price on days where prices have jumped sharply Example: Markets bushels when prices exceed $3.50/bushel on days where prices have increased by at least 15 cents/bushel Takes immediate advantage of market rallies Source: http://decisioncommodities.com/products/
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Decision Commodities Source: http://decisioncommodities.com/products/
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Decision Commodities Source: http://decisioncommodities.com/products/
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 FC Stone Accumulator Contract Versions for producers and consumers Key parameters: Accumulator price – price grain is sold (or bought) at Knockout price – price that terminates the contract Weekly bushel sales commitment Has acceleration function if price move beyond accumulator price Source: http://www.fcstone.com/content/agriculture/origtools.aspx
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 FC Stone – Accumulator Source: http://www.fcstone.com/content/agriculture/origtools.aspx Quantity marketed doubles Normal quantity marketed Contract ends
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 FC Stone – Consumer Accumulator Source: http://www.fcstone.com/content/agriculture/origtools.aspx Quantity bought doubles Normal quantity bought Contract ends
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Fear, Greed, and Ego Fear of making a bad decision -- Watching prices slip away as you wait Greed of expecting even higher prices -- Not taking advantage of good price opportunities Ego of wanting to claim you caught the market high -- “Lake Wobegon” marketing
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Greed Fear Ego New generation contracts are one way to remove emotion from marketing
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Econ 338C, Spring 2009 Class web site: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ338C/Hart/ See you next week! http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ338C/Hart/
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