1. The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

2. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 2 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Topics We Are Not Winning the Security Challenge Convergence – All Media IP – Will Bring New Challenges Rethink the Approach: Design - Build Trusted Communications Networks An Opportunity: Design In Now or Retrofit Later

3. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 3 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Lots of Data Telling Us…The Current Approach is Not Working: Faster, Stealthier Exploits Mths Dys Wks 200320042005 Avg. exploit in 2005 5.8 days. Sources: CERT/CC, Symantec, NVD, OSVD DDOS on the Rise SPAM: 8 in 10 emails

4. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 4 | Engineering Society | May 2006 The Challenge: Difficult, Multi-Dimensional, and In Flux Point Prods Point Roles Security un-manageable and no single situation awareness Weak Links Prevalent Inconsistent security applied to network components – un-trusted pieces make… Lack of Universal Standard That addresses security in a comprehensive way – so very difficult to integrate security Data Control & Integrity Data exchange requires better security controls Sophisticated Cyber Crime From phishing and spyware to DDOS and Network Penetration Attacks Reacting to infinite possible sources Ex: polymorphism Blacklist Defenses Ineffective Increasing Network Complexity Increased vulnerability Ex: firewall VOIP sessions Exploitation Window Zero-Day Threat occur faster than we can detect and respond before it impacts business Data Flooding SPAM – SPIT – SPASMS tough to separate wanted info Data Leakage More personal data is online – uncertain protection

5. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 5 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Convergence – Many Benefits, Many Risks Consume RF b/w Battery drain Identity theft SPIT Scams Deperimiterization Data theft Scams Compromised system integrity Intersection of threats…beyond the reach of the law… Content theft Compromised privacy Scams

6. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 6 | Engineering Society | May 2006 We Have a Window of Opportunity Design Trusted Communications Networks Now

7. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 7 | Engineering Society | May 2006 It Will Take A Multi-Disciplined Approach Network & Data Integrated Security Eco-System Defenses Design End-to-End Security System (Standards) Hardening Imbed Integrity Attestation

8. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 8 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Design-Build Secure Systems & Services ISO 2700X and X.805/ISO 18028 Standards-based approach Security as a systematic, rigorous process Applied to all network elements - system In the Product Development Lifecycle System (Standards) Hardening ISO 2700X Provides the what X.805 & ISO 18028-2 …provides the how details

9. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 9 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Trust Can Be Required… My company can only do business with ISO 2700X certified businesses … Are you certified?

10. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 10 | Engineering Society | May 2006 System Hardening – Standards Based Bell labs Security Framework – Instantiated in ITU/T X.805, ISO 18028 InfrastructureServicesApplications End User Control / Signaling Management Layers Planes MODULE 1MODULE 4MODULE 7 MODULE 2MODULE 5MODULE 8 MODULE 3MODULE 6MODULE 9 Access Control Authentication Non-Repudiation Data Confidentiality Comms Security Data Integrity Privacy Availability The X.805 Security Standard

11. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 11 | Engineering Society | May 2006 ISO/IEC 27001 enhanced by ITU-T X.805 / ISO 18028-2 Security Policy Organizing Information Security Human Resources Security Asset Mgmt Physical & Environment Security Access Control Communications & Ops Mgmt Information Systems Acquisition, Development & Maintenance Information Security Incident Management Business Continuity Management Compliance ISO/IEC 27001:2005 Controls Specify acceptable use policy for equipment. Sub-controls: Access control, Authentication, Non-repudiation Restrict access to privileged information / applications to ensure service continuity. Sub-Controls: Authentication, Access Control, Non- repudiation Harden network element or system before deployment. Sub-Controls: Access control, Availability Maintain security of stored information. Sub-Controls: Access control, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non- repudiation

12. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 12 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Employee Database Enterprise Data Center Module 6: Management Plane of Services Layer Desktop and Laptop Support Help Desk Module 9: Management Plane of Infrastructure Layer Network Operations File System Maint. System Updates Patch Mgmt., etc. Corporate IT Employee Information is accessed for: Network Service Management Network Infrastructure Management Bell Labs Security Framework Dimensions Provide ISO/IEC 27001 Control A.10.9.2 ISMS Implementation and Operation Details ISO/IEC 27001 Controls and X.805 Applied to the Real-World Data Integrity - Use IPSec AH Communications Security - Use VPNs Data Confidentiality - Use IPsec ESP Data Integrity - Protect files w/ checksums Data Confidentiality - Encrypt files Access Control - Use file system ACLs

13. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 13 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Opportunity…Deliver Secure Systems & Services ISO 2700X and X.805/ISO 18028 Security as a systematic, rigorous process Applied to all network elements From device to system, to infrastructure Standards-based System (Standards) Hardening Imbed Integrity Attestation Integrity Attestation Apply integrity metrics Measure at point of Creation, Delivery and in Operation Access policy based on integrity score Perform in real-time

14. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 14 | Engineering Society | May 2006 The Issue of Integrity Drift Time Confidence IT system confidence degrades from boot time 100% Applications are installed Patches are applied Change and routine maintenance Reformatting and rebuilding from scratch The big unknown … when will it fail, what is the cause, what was lost? (by permission from SignaCert)

15. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 15 | Engineering Society | May 2006 What if We Could Measure the Integrity…Report it, and Act on It? Time Confidence Confidence is constantly maintained 100% System and Device-level Confidence and Trust Measured and Enforced Restoring to a known and trusted state is easy (by permission from SignaCert)

16. All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 16 | Engineering Society | May 2006 Summary We actually have the know-how to improve the state of security It is needed more than ever – especially as systems get more complex and we have greater dependency on these systems By applying the ISO 2700X with X.805/ISO-18028 standards and Integrity Measurements, we can: Baseline the state of security Have a consistent way to measure it Consistent application Completeness Repeatable Scales to size and complexity of present and future networks