1. OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe David Coleman, University of Oxford david.coleman@socres.ox.ac.ukavid.coleman@socres.ox.ac.uk http://www.apsoc.ox.ac.uk/oxpop

2. Netherlands: foreign citizen and foreign – origin populations 1956 – 2003. Source: CBS.

3. Migration – a heterogeneous process. Many streams, many ‘causes’, many consequences. ‘Pull’ and ‘push’ factors; inequalities. Population pressures. Force, political instability and persecution. Environmental change. Labour demand and recruitment Opportunities for ‘betterment’. Chains and bridgeheads, family and marriage. Population ageing. Subversion, terrorism and crime. Policies in sending and receiving countries

4. Migration theory – rather a mess Economists’ ‘equilibrium’ models – supply and demand for labour and capital. Economic refinements – cost/benefit decisions; household investments; World systems theory, Global cities; Segmented or ‘dual’ labour markets. Networks, Cumulative causation. ‘transnational’ populations, non-economic movement. Recent rediscovery of policy.

5. Some components of gross immigration inflows to Western Europe (blue is family; OECD 2003)

6. Southern Europe and its neighbours

7. Turkey and Western Europe

8. Long-term trends of migration to a ‘country of immigrants’

9. Long-term trends to a ‘country of emigrants’

10. Net foreign immigration to the EU 1960-2005.

15. Migration can go down as well as up… (EU, Germany)

16. Consequences of migration Demographic change. Growth and decline, age-structure effects, depopulation. Salvation through migration? Economic change – who benefits? Replacement migration. Ethnic change

18. UK population 2003-2051 (1000s) : no decline imminent.

28. Sweden 2004-2050: projected total population, millions, standard and zero- migration assumptions.

30. Ethnic replacement: Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other. If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated. Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.

31. Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100

32. Probabilistic projections of the UK – average outcome for major groups (%).

33. Comparison of results of European foreign-origin projections

34. Conclusions Migration now a primary driver of population change in many low TFR countries. Not Far East, some CEE. Patterns, sources, causes and consequences highly heterogeneous Mixed economic consequences Can moderate, not solve ageing Possible ‘third demographic transition’