1. GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt Dubay U.S. Coast Guard

2. 2 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Overview Background Action Plan Radionavigation Systems Task Force The Way Ahead

3. 3 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Background PDD-63 tasked DOT to assess vulnerability of transportation infrastructure relying on GPS Analyze civil aviation, maritime, and surface use to assess the ways each is impacted by GPS outage Steps to minimize impacts of GPS outages Safety, operational, environmental, and economic Overall Finding GPS key element of nation’s transportation infrastructure GPS is vulnerable to interference/disruption Independent backup systems/procedures needed in critical applications Study released the day before Sep 11 th

4. 4 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Background (cont’d) 16 specific recommendations to mitigate the impact on transportation systems Continue GPS modernization to include GPS III More civil signals/higher broadcast power Implement appropriate mitigation strategies For each individual mode, maintain appropriate backup systems or procedures Reflect impact of interference in application designs Monitor/report/locate sources of interference Applicability of military anti-jam technology DOT develop Navigation Infrastructure Roadmap for the future

5. 5 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Background (cont’d) Dec 01 - DOT Pos/Nav Exec Committee Operating Administrations concurred with report recommendations Endorsed proposed mitigation action plan March 02 - Secretary approved plan Department currently implementing DOT Positioning and Navigation Executive Committee overseeing implementation Task Force conducting Radionavigation Capabilities Assessment

6. 6 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Overview Background Action Plan Radionavigation Systems Task Force The Way Ahead

7. 7 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Action Plan Goals Ensure that GPS fulfills its potential as a key element of the nation’s transportation infrastructure Ensure that the vulnerabilities identified in the report do not affect the safety and security of our transportation system Contains 12 elements

8. 8 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Action Plan Elements Vulnerability Mitigation Ensure adequate backup systems/procedures Continue GPS modernization Continue spectrum protection Enhance interference location capabilities Risk Awareness Emphasize education programs Conduct periodic public outreach Send letters to industry, state/local DOTs Work with GPS Industry Council GPS Receiver Enhancement Facilitate transfer of DoD AJ technology Certify safety-critical GPS receivers Develop GPS receiver standards Future Direction Intermodal radionavigation capabilities assessment Make decision on the future of LORAN-C by end of CY02 Develop Roadmap for 2003 Federal Radionavigation Plan

9. 9 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Overview Background Action Plan Radionavigation Systems Task Force The Way Ahead

10. 10 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Radionavigation Systems Task Force Chartered to conduct a multi-modal capability assessment of radionavigation systems Complete assessment of the future mix of systems to meet all requirements of the U.S. Transportation infrastructure From both a capability and cost perspective Consider requirements of non-transportation users of Federal Radionavigation Systems Forward recommendation to Secretary to support a decision in early 2003

11. 11 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Technical Approach Identify requirements of transportation modes Define capabilities of different systems Conduct technical assessment of systems Capabilities vs. Requirements Develop alternatives of system mixes Reduce to 4-6 alternatives Criteria for evaluation of remaining alternatives Cost, performance, backup Political, impact to others Provide recommendation on best alternative To satisfy national need for positioning and timing services for at least the next 10 years

12. 12 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Assumptions 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) Baseline for radionavigation systems Include GPS capabilities only through GPS modernized Block IIF (i.e., 2 new civil signals) GPS III will be evaluated once system is defined Augmentations to GPS are not backup radionavigation systems for GPS WAAS, LAAS, and NDGPS (includes MDGPS) All depend on receiving basic GPS position If GPS position lost, value of augmentation lost

13. 13 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Evaluation Produced detailed matrices of requirements 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan GPS Operational Requirements Document (Feb 2000) Other validated requirements Produced detailed matrices of systems capabilities Evaluated Capabilities vs Requirements Integrity, availability, coverage, accuracy, and continuity

14. 14 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Alternatives Developed 12 alternatives from the baseline Based on assumptions and capabilities vs requirements assessment Guidance from the POS/NAV EC on several issues FAA Navigation and Landing Transition Strategy Forwarded to the DOT on Aug 21, 2002 Results integrated into Task Force evaluation Reduced to 4 for further evaluation Pros & cons for each alternative

15. 15 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Issues Should radionavigation systems in R&D be considered in current alternative mixes? LAAS Cat II/III (FAA); High Accuracy NDGPS (FHWA); enhanced Loran (FAA, Coast Guard); GPS III (DoD/AF); and Galileo (EU) Decision: Do not include R&D systems until completion of R&D Performance and lifecycle costs for systems are unknown at this time Modes continue investments in R&D systems Each R&D effort should assess feasibility to meet other mode performance requirements

16. 16 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Issues Can a single augmentation system (i.e. WAAS or DGPS) meet cross-modal transportation requirements? 1994 National Augmentation Study Field both the NDGPS and WAAS systems to meet individual mode requirements Coordinate all Federal augmented GPS systems Ensure optimal use of resources by maximizing commonality of system components Task Force validated 1994 Study Decision: Continue both WAAS and NDGPS FAA/CG examine co-location of future WAAS and NDGPS monitor stations

17. 17 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Issues What is decision path for Loran-C in 2002? Transportation requirements not met by Loran-C The POS/NAV EC examined three options Option 1: Terminate Loran-C Option 2: Complete enhanced Loran evaluation Option 3: Fully endorse enhanced Loran now Evaluation of enhanced Loran required to: Determine performance for non precision approach for aviation and harbor approach for maritime Will take until March 2004 and ~$10M to complete Based on current spending levels Does not include recapitalization costs thru 2008 Working toward decision in early 2003

18. 18 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Radionavigation Alternative Mixes Baseline Mix Satisfies user requirements for primary and backup systems May be viewed as failure to reduce proliferation of systems Mix 1 – Baseline w/Loran-C terminated Cost savings to Government w/termination of Loran-C Negative user and political impact May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report

19. 19 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Radionavigation Alternative Mixes (cont’d) Mix 2 – Baseline w/ optimizing future systems convergence, Loran-C terminated Some cost savings with termination of Loran-C Negative user and political impact May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report Mix 3 – Baseline w/ optimizing future systems convergence to include Loran Meets requirements for primary and backup systems Requires completion of enhanced Loran evaluation

20. 20 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Overview Background Action Plan Radionavigation Systems Task Force The Way Ahead

21. 21 ILA, 28 Oct 02 The Way Ahead Developing Decision Memorandum for Secretary on Loran-C Coordinating with Modal Administrators Evaluating remaining 4 mix options pending decision on Loran Forward recommendation to Secretary in early 2003 Establish foundation for development of 2003 Federal Radionavigation Plan

22. 22 ILA, 28 Oct 02 Summary Department concurs with all recommendations of the Volpe Study Critical infrastructure protection a continuing issue Department is implementing Action Plan Completing assessment of future radionavigation mix to maintain adequate backups in the future Working toward Loran decision in early 2003 Safety-critical transportation applications that use GPS currently have adequate backups in case of GPS disruptions Ensure maintained in future

23. GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   Michael Shaw U.S. Department of Transportation