1. Business Implications of the President’s Review Group Peter Swire Huang Professor of Law and Ethics Scheller College of Business Georgia Institute of Technology

2. Preface  Thank you for welcoming me to Scheller  A law professor, with business as well:  IT/privacy/cybersecurity  Housing finance & health care, including in government  Taught corporations, torts, antitrust, law & economics  Grew up in a family business and had real law clients  Look forward to getting to know more of you

3. Overview of the Talk  Intro to Review Group  Five business issues:  Business & economics issues into the IC calculus  US-based global businesses affected by IC decisions  Lean toward defense in cyber-security  Support better Internet governance  Upgrade against insider attacks  Two themes:  Same Internet for multiple purposes  Declining half life of secrets

4. Creation of the Review Group  Snowden leaks of 215 and Prism in June, 2013  August – Review Group  5 members  Diversity of backgrounds  Technology  Business  Insider status

5. Our assigned task  Protect national security  Advance our foreign policy, including economic effects  Protect privacy and civil liberties  Maintain the public trust  Reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosure

6. Our assigned task (2)  Protect national security  Advance our foreign policy, including economic effects  Protect privacy and civil liberties  Maintain the public trust  Reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosure  Q: A simple task for operations research maximization?  Focus today: implications for business/econ

7. Our Report  Meetings, briefings, public comments  300+ pages in December  46 recommendations  Section 215 database “not essential” to stopping any attack; recommend government not hold phone records  Pres. Obama speech January  Adopt 70% in letter or spirit  Additional recommendations under study  Organizational changes to NSA not adopted

8. Issue 1: Foreign Affairs/Economics  Major theme of the report is that we face multiple risks, not just national security risks  Effects on allies, foreign affairs  Risks to privacy & civil liberties  Risks to economic growth & business  Historically, intelligence community is heavily walled off, to maintain secrecy  NSA especially, signals intelligence, secret and dauntingly complex  Now, convergence of civilian and military/intelligence communications devices, software & networks  Q: How respond to the multiple risks?

9. Addressing Multiple Risks  RG Recs 16 & 17:  New process & WH staff to review sensitive intelligence collection in advance  Senior policymakers from the economic agencies (NEC, Commerce, USTR) should participate  Monitoring to ensure compliance with policy  RG Rec 19: New process for surveillance of foreign leaders  Relations with allies, with economic and other implications, if this surveillance becomes public

10. Issue 2: US-Based Cloud Companies in a Global Market  The issue: effects on US-based cloud industry  Understanding contrasting perspectives of IC and the IT industry  Intelligence community perspective:  Snowden a criminal; 0% say whistleblower  Substantial assistance to adversaries by ongoing revelations of sources & methods  E.g., reports on techniques for entering into “air- gapped” computer systems  IC Tradition of expecting secrecy over long time scale, so details of intelligence activities rarely disclosed and harms from disclosures rarely experienced

11. Tech Industry Perspective  Tech industry perspective:  Silicon Valley – 90% say whistleblower  Snowden has informed us about Internet realities  Tech industry libertarianism: “information wants to be free” and suspicion of government & secrecy  Anger at undermining encryption standards  More anger for stories that leased lines for Yahoo and Google servers were tapped  Microsoft GC: the US Government as an “advanced persistent threat”

12. What is at Stake for the IT Industry  Biggest focus on public cloud computing market  Double in size 2012-2016  Initial study estimated losses from Snowden at $21.5 billion/year  Cloud Security Alliance estimates up to $180 billion/year by 2016 – biggest effect from lower market share for new business  An opening for non-U.S. providers  Market currently dominated by US companies  Deutsche Telecomm and others: “Don’t put your data in the hands of the NSA and US providers”

13. The IT Industry Response  Focus of industry response: more transparency  Regular transparency reports already  One goal already had been to boost consumer confidence, especially overseas, such as for previous Patriot Act accusations  Lawsuit and lobbying to expand these reports  Industry opposition to non-disclosure (gag) orders for National Security Letters, etc.  Yahoo 2009 lost one then-secret challenge

14. Moving to More Transparency  RG Rec 9: OK to reveal number of orders, number they have complied with, information produced, and number for each legal authority (215, 702, NSL, etc.), unless compelling national security showing  RG Rec 31: US should advocate to ensure transparency for requests by other governments  Put more focus on actions of other governments  DOJ agreement with companies in January  More transparency, but not listed by legal authority  Ongoing debate, but companies want to stress this issue, to send message of security and public trust

15. Issue 3: Offense v. Defense for Cyber- security  The issue of trading off offense & defense:  NSA/IC offensive missions  Foreign intelligence surveillance  Title 10 – military authorities  US Cyber Command  NSA/IC defensive missions  Information Assurance Directorate of NSA  Protect government systems  Counter-intelligence  We use precisely one communications infrastructure for both offense and defense

16. Conflict between Offense & Defense Has Increased (1) Before: separate communications system behind the Iron Curtain; nation-state actors Now: same Internet for civilians, terrorists & military (2) Before: military protected its communication security within the chain of command Now: critical infrastructure largely civilian; tips to defense get known to attackers (3) Before: episodic flares of military action Now: daily & hourly cyber-attacks, to businesses and others, right here at home

17. Institutional Changes for Defense  RG Rec 24: split leadership of NSA and DoD’s Cyber Command  RG Rec 25: split Information Assurance Directorate of NSA into separate agency  Would put leadership on the side of defense  Asymmetric incentives in agency between offense and defense  These recommendations will not be adopted now, for plausible factual reasons

18. Strong Crypto for Defense  Crypto Wars of the 1990’s showed NSA & FBI interest in breaking encryption (offense)  1999 policy shift to permit export globally of strong encryption, necessary for Internet (defense)  Press reports of recent NSA actions to undermine encryption standards & break encryption  RG Rec 29: support strong crypto standards and software; secure communications a priority; don’t push vendors to have back doors (defense)  No announcement yet on this recommendation – it is a tech industry priority

19. Zero Days & the Equities Process  A “zero day” exploit means previously unused vulnerability, where defenders have had zero days to respond  Press reports of USG stockpiling zero days, for intelligence & military use  RG Rec 30: Lean to defense. New WH equities process to ensure vulnerabilities are blocked for USG and private networks. Exception if inter-agency process finds a priority to retain the zero day as secret.  Software vendors and owners of corporate systems have strong interest in good defense  No announcement yet on this recommendation

20. Issue 4: Internet Governance  The issue: Snowden becomes a huge talking point against the US approach to Internet governance. Potential harms to business, including US-based business.  Bottom-up vs. top-down Internet governance?  Localization rules – split the Internet?  Confidence (re)building and fostering international norms

21. International Telecommunications Union  US & US industry position: Internet governance as bottom-up, tech-based, multi-stakeholder process. Outputs: innovation, growth, Internet freedom, democracy.  Russia & China: push for major ITU role. Governance by governments. Respect local norms (called “cyber- security” but meaning “censorship”). Oppose “chaos” of current approach.  Swing votes at the ITU: medium-sized economies pay more for Internet service than rich countries, lose inter- connection fees, don’t know how to have a voice in W3C & IETF.

22. How to Bolster Multi-stakeholder  US Internet Freedom agenda – secure communications by dissenters, democratic freedom, human rights.  Russia & China: Snowden shows US hypocrisy.  Response: legal checks & balances in US; First Amendment; emphatically not used for political repression  RG Rec 32: senior State Department official on these issues  RG Rec 33: support multi-stakeholder approach  Many RG recs: reinforce privacy & civil liberties & oversight in foreign surveillance  PPD-28: extend protections to non-US persons

23. Localization Proposals  Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia proposals to require storage locally  EU proposals to restrict data transfers to US; using T- TIP & Safe Harbor as bargaining chips for less US surveillance  RG: emphasize economic & other harms from localization/”splinternet”  Strengthen relations with allies  RG Rec 31: build international norm against localization  RG Rec 34: streamline multi-lateral assistance treaties (MLATs), so no need to hold data there, can get it in US

24. Issue 5: Insider Threats  The issue: if Snowden can happen to the NSA, is your company more secure than that?  Many RG recs to protect better against insider threats  Theme: system administrator as important threat  Snowden’s job was to move files  He did that  Response: separation of functions, reduce sys admin privileges  Theme: USG classified systems followed M&M model  Response: new access controls, auditing, and other measures within classified systems  Similar threats to business systems

25. The Lessons for Business  Business & economics issues into the IC calculus  US-based global businesses affected by IC decisions  Lean toward defense  Support better Internet governance  Upgrade against insider attacks

26. Broader themes: One Internet  The same communications infrastructure for numerous purposes – which should drive policy  IC and police have seen it as a surveillance Internet, after 9/11  Business sees it as E-commerce, for internal communications and to reach customers  Individual users – social networks, email, online shopping, much more  Political speech – a global engine for democracy and civil liberties  Global business & others will have to decide how to help build the Internet it wants

27. Theme: Declining Half Life of Secrets  The IC assumption was that secrets lasted a long time, such as 25-50 years  My belief – the half life of secrets has declined sharply  Electronic: “my goal is that leaks happen only by a printer”  No gatekeeper: Ellsberg needed NY Times; Manning has Wikileaks  Global dissemination: once it leaks, it’s gone  Crowd-sourcing – hard to penetrate massive networks at scale and not provide clues  Civil disobedience by younger techies

28. Implications of Declining Half Life of Secrets  Previously, the IC often ignored the “front page test”  Jack Nicholson & “you can’t handle the truth” in A Few Good Men  But, how many front page stories this year?  Declining half life of secrets means higher expected value of revelations – bigger negative effect if ignore the front page test  RG: effects on foreign affairs, economics, Internet governance, so USG should consider these multiple effects and not isolate IC decisions  For business, how well can you keep secrets if the NSA can’t?

29. Conclusion  Pessimists inclined to think that nothing will change  The RNC has endorsed ending 215 telephone program, plus many Democrats  Section 215 program quite possibly will end  DOJ agreed to the transparency agreement  EU privacy regulation seemed dead, but Snowden- related sentiments resulted this week in EU Parliament 621-10 in favor  We are in a period where change is possible here, even in Congress  I look forward to talking with you about what should come next