1. Remedial Action Schemes Reliability Subcommittee
Vahid Madani
Chair
Pacific Gas and Electric, Co.
WECC
PCC/OC/MIC Meeting
June 2004

2. Outline NERC Definition Application and Implementation
Design development Process
Standards and Compliance
Schemes Reviewed by Subcommittee
Subcommittee Function, Membership, and Benchmarking Efforts
Wide Area Monitoring and Challenges Ahead
Questions ??

3. Special Protection System (SPS)
NERC Defines SPS:
Automatic protection system (also known as a remedial action scheme) designed to detect abnormal or predetermined system conditions
Take corrective actions other than and/or in addition to the isolation of faulted components to maintain system reliability.
Actions may include changes in demand, generation (MW and Mvar),
System configuration to maintain system stability, acceptable voltage, or power flows.
Not included:
(a) Underfrequency or undervoltage load shedding
Fault conditions that must be isolated
Out-of-step relaying (not designed as an integral part of an SPS).

4. Planning, Application, and Implementation
Increased Transfers
Added Reactive Support
Utilizing Reactive Supports Elsewhere in the Region
Cascading Outages
RAS Failure would result in:
Bulk transmission system performance outside the limits of the WECC performance requirements.
Impact to the Interchanges, transfers capabilities
Impact to contractual agreements in terms of flows and reactive margins

5. Development Process Special Protection Scheme (SPS)
Definition and Need
Development Process
Design and Analysis Tools
Commissioning
Functional Results
Periodic Automated Maintenance
Operator Training
Smart Restoration Tools
Need
Development Process (Ease of expansion, Ease of troubleshooting, Ease of information sharing amongst control areas, automated testing)
Design and Analysis Tools (resource availability and tracking)
Commissioning
Functional Results
Periodic Maintenance (These types of schemes generally do not get many exercise to operate, the schemes are intended to be reliable)
Operator Training
Smart Restoration Tools (Tools to provide real-time information such as frequency and voltage, along with restoration information, effects of CLPU, etc.)

6. Design and Implementation Standards
Establish and Document Regional Review Process For Special Protection System (SPS) installations
Section III F (S1):
An SPS shall be designed so that cascading transmission outages or system instability do not occur for failure of a single component of an SPS which would result in failure of the SPS to operate when required
Section III F (S2):
Incorrect operation or unintended operation of an SPS when considered by itself and not in combination with any other system contingency shall meet the system performance requirements as defined under categories A, B, and C of Table I of the I.A. Standards on Transmission Systems

7. Compliance Requirements
Requirement to demonstrate that a failure of a single component of an SPS, which would result in failure of the SPS to operate when required, would not result in cascading transmission outages or system instability
For worst operating condition
Requirements that misoperation, incorrect operation, or unintended operation of an SPS, when considered by itself, shall meet the system performance requirements of Standard I.A. categories A, B, and C of Table I
Requirements for periodic review and Regional re-certification of the process document and database

8. Planning Standards (Section III)
Redundancy
Similar to Protection and Control Standards
Designed to allow equipment maintenance
Designed so that cascading transmission outages or system instability do not occur for failure of a single system a SPS component which would result in failure of the SPS to operate when required
The need for redundancy in SPS should be based on an evaluation of the system consequences for the failure of the SPS to operate and the need to maintain overall system reliability
To meet the system performance requirements of NERC standard I.A.
Standards on Transmission Systems and associated Table I

9. Which RAS should be reviewed?
WECC Reliability Criteria:
RAS required to be reviewed by RASRS are those schemes for which failure would result in bulk transmission system performance in a neighboring utility outside the limits of the WECC performance requirements
RAS for which failure may result in unacceptable bulk transmission system performance within the scheme owner’s system may be reviewed at the request of the owner of the scheme or as deemed necessary by other Regional technical committees

10. Subcommittee Function
Principal function:
Promote the reliability of remedial action schemes within the WECC region by providing multidisciplinary overview
Reviews, make technical recommendations, and approves proposals for implementation
With potential widespread cascading outages
Includes contingency N-1, N-1-1, N-2 type conditions
Focuses attention on major RAS within the WECC
Work is coordinated and draws on the information developed by other WG
Other PC and OC Subcommittee and Working Groups when necessary

11. Membership
Comprised of industry qualified members familiar with various aspects of RAS
Many are knowledgeable representatives with remedial action schemes within the region
Industry Participation Such as IEEE, IEC, CIGRE
Provides for reasonable geographic representation
Includes expertise in a variety of application and design disciplines (Engineering and Specialists)
Communication and Network systems
Information Systems
Control and Automation systems
Transmission planning
Operations engineering
Protective relaying systems engineering
Substation design

12. Some Industry Activities
CIGRE TF Defense Plans Against Extreme Contingencies
Design and Deployment of a Well Coordinated Overall Defense Plan
WECC RAS Reliability TF - Design and Implementation Standards and Review Criteria
CIGRE TF System Protection Schemes in Power Network
IEEE Power Systems, System Protection SC
Report on “Wide Area Protection and Emergency Control” (WG C-6) Special Protection Schemes, Survey on Implemented Scheme
Survey of Power System Protection Schemes (WG C-4)

13. Benchmarking Exercises
 Review of the Guide For Design of Critical Communication Circuits and Reliability Measures – Prepared by the WECC Telecommunication WG
FCC considerations for wider applications of 6GHz band - Update on Telecommunication WG
Requirements For a Well Planned and Implemented Scheme IEEE and CIGRE Efforts
Understanding of the European and NE outage US and Canada Outage
Review of NERC Recommendations and RASRS Actions

14. Sample of Schemes Reviewed April 2003- April 2004
IPC, Hells Canyon Runback Scheme
PNM, Import Contingency Load Shedding Scheme (ICLSS)
PG&E / SCE Path 26
SCE, High Desert Power Project (HDPP)
SCE, Pastoria Generation
BPA, Lower Snake RAS Presentation
SRP, PV-COI Mitigation RAS - Phase 1

15. Challenges Ahead Cyber Security Unobstructed Visibility
Standardization of min. requirements
Performance / Throughput timing may be affected
Unobstructed Visibility
Telemetry (Flow, Voltage, Watts, Reactive voltage)
Frequency
Voltage
Phase angles and differentials
Use of multi-function devices for combined protection and SPS / RAS functions
Centralized vs. Distributed Systems
Smart Restoration

16. Use of a device such as a relay shared for both protection and RAS functionality simultaneously
Different functional requirements and device set points
Different maintenance, testing and operating needs
Potential complications and confusion from operating and maintenance prospective when both RAS and protection using the same device
Different maintenance intervals and maintenance priority levels - Based on intended application and levels of redundancy
Availability of the devices for routine system testing (Isolation or unavailability of the wide area monitoring devices may not cause system limitations while may not be acceptable from the equipment protection prospective)
Communication network, interfaces, and routing are different between WAPC devices and those used for conventional equipment protection

17. Pat Wood, III - Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate November 20, 2003
We need to invest in:
Hardware and software that let operators manage the grid more effectively
Tools that improve system monitoring, evaluation, visibility, visualization and information sharing about grid conditions over a wide region …..

18. Thank You For Your Attention
Questions?