1. Plan for Today: Neoliberal Institutionalism & Concluding Liberalism 1. Complete group activity reporting. 2. Survey neoliberal solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 3. Compare neorealist and neoliberal views on likelihood of cooperation. 4. Evaluate liberalism as theory.

2. Small Group Discussion  Think as a group of 2-3 ideas of modifications to the PD game that might lead to greater cooperation. (5 minutes)  But still keep:  Actors as selfish utility-maximizers.  Players simultaneously deciding, so each can’t know what other will choose.  Payoff values for each possible outcome.  Leader report group proposals to class.

3. Prisoner’s Dilemma Numerical Payoffs (refer to Lipson for more details) Player 1 Player 1 Player 2 CooperateDefect Cooperate 3, 3 1, 4 Defect 4, 1 2, 2

4. Neoliberal Institutionalism  Institutional Modifications to Increase Cooperation (Lipson, Axelrod): 1.Repeated interactions. 1. Critical mass of “nice” players who start by cooperating and use “tit-for-tat” strategy  cooperation. 2. Reputation becomes important.

5. Neoliberal Institutionalism  Institutional Modifications to Increase Cooperation (Lipson, Axelrod): 2.Monitoring. 1. Agency that monitors who cooperates and who defects over time.

6. Neoliberal Institutionalism  Institutional Modifications to Increase Cooperation (Lipson, Axelrod): 3.Number of Players. 1. Fewer players  easier monitoring and punishment.

7. Neoliberalism  Institutional Modifications to Increase Cooperation (Lipson, Axelrod): 4.Interdependent Issues. 1. Cooperation can evolve if players meet repeatedly in varying kinds of issues.

8. Comparing Realists and Neoliberals on Cooperation 1. Focus on different issues.  Neoliberals tend to focus on economic issues.  Realists tend to focus on security issues.

9. PD in a Security World  Likely payoffs entirely different.  “Sucker’s payoff” = steeper loss and more immediate (i.e. battle loss or nuclear annihilation). Player 1 Player 1 Player 2 CooperateDefect Cooperate 3, 3 1, 4 Defect 4, 1 2, 2

10. PD in a Security World  Likely payoffs entirely different.  “Sucker’s payoff” = steeper loss and more immediate (i.e. battle loss or nuclear annihilation). Player 1 Player 1 Player 2 CooperateDefect Cooperate 3, 3 -10, 4 Defect 4, -10 -1, -1

11. Comparing Realists and Neoliberals on Cooperation 2. Relative Gains vs. Absolute Gains.  Neoliberals: states concerned with how much they can gain in absolute terms.  Neorealists: states concerned with how much they gain relative to other states.

12. Comparing Realists and Neoliberals on Cooperation 3. Fungibility of power.  Neorealists must believe economic power easily fungible (convertible) into military power.  Neoliberals must believe economic power not so fungible.

13. Summary: Neoliberal Institutionalism 1. Accepts realists’ assumptions about states-as- actors and their interests. 2. Focuses on opportunities to build regimes or institutions to overcome instances of market failure. 3. PD as illustration of market failure – introduces simple mechanisms for changing game to encourage more cooperation. 4. Disagreements between neorealists and neoliberals on cooperation: areas of focus, absolute vs. relative gains, fungibility of power.

14. Evaluating Liberalism as a Theory 1. Explanatory power: 1.Tells us a lot about how, when, why cooperation emerges. 1. Better in economic issues than security. 2.Loses explanatory efficiency (“parsimony”) by including far more actors. (except neoliberal)

15. Evaluating Liberalism as a Theory 2. Predictive power: 1.Better than realism at predicting institutional change. 2.Liberal interdependence: virtually no predictive power. 1. Too many actors with an infinite number of interests.

16. Evaluating Liberalism as a Theory 3. Intellectual consistency and coherence: 1.Neoliberals: Again, can we assume self-help from anarchy? 2.Other liberalism: Can’t be evaluated easily in terms of logical consistency as logic often not strictly specified.

17. Evaluating Liberalism as a Theory 4. Scope: Good. 1.Liberal interdependence: can say a lot more about more kinds of actors than realism. 1. E.g. How can realists explain international campaign to ban land mines?

18. Evaluating Liberalism as a Theory 5. Self-reflection and engagement with other theories: OK. 1.Neoliberal institutionalism itself came as response to identified weaknesses in liberalism. 2.Liberals have adopted some new constructivist lines of argument.