1. Finding our way back  The initial result of Descartes’ use of hyperbolic doubt is the recognition that at least one thing cannot be doubted, at least one thing is certain: that he exists  As was discussed, this does not seem like much; but Descartes does believe it is sufficient, as a starting point.  The next logical question is: but what am I?

2. Meditation 2  Descartes’ claim is that I, the “I” that is the subject of the “I think” or “I exist”, am a thinking thing (and only a thinking thing.) How does he arrive at this conclusion?  A: by eliminating from contention all those possible features of myself (of the “I”) which imply the existence of something of which, at this point, I cannot be sure.

3. Med. 2 (cont’d.)  Descartes wants us to conclude that the mind (as an essentially thinking thing) is more easily, more intimately known than any physical thing whatsoever (including one’s own body); and this seems very counterintuitive. After all, I can’t see my mind, I can’t sense it or touch it, it’s not (& by definition not) something physical.  Aren’t I more intimately acquainted w/ physical things (bodies)? A: no!

4. Med. 2 (cont’d.)  Descartes asks us to consider a case where we would be inclined to say that we have indisputable knowledge of something physical, of some physical object (not that it exists, say, but that it has this or that property or set of properties), and a case where we would not be bothered by some of the initial puzzles he presented, i.e. under optimal conditions

5. Med. 2 (cont’d.)  The case Descartes presents has been called ‘the wax example’, though any other physical object could have served as well.  We are supposed to imagine taking in our hands a piece of wax, and examining it under two different circumstances, one as, say, in a classroom at normal room temperature, and another which results when we bring the wax close to a flame; the situation can be summarized as follows:

6. The wax example  Wax at room temp. Smells of flowers Tastes sweet Feels rough Makes a ‘plunk’ sound Greenish colour 1 litre in volume  Wax near the fire Diminished or no smell No taste Smooth texture ‘splash’ sound Translucent > 1 litre in volume

7. The wax example (cont’d.)  All of the properties of the piece of wax have changed (or, at least, all of the properties which I can sense), and yet we are still inclined to say that the same piece of wax remains. Why?  Well…one thing hasn’t changed - that it takes up space (has ‘extension’), and while this may not be enough to identify it as wax, it is enough to identify it as a physical object

8. The wax example (cont’d.)  The conclusion we are supposed to draw is that, while we thought we were intimately acquainted with things like pieces of wax, upon examination we find that (on the basis of sensory information) we don’t perceive physical objects very well at all -- that, even if we were wrong to say “I see a piece of wax”, we wouldn’t be wrong to say “I think I see a piece of wax”, and therefore everything we say about physical objects is, in fact, better evidence for the existence of mind.

9. Med. 2 (cont’d.)  How does the previous follow from what Descartes has said?  A: what doesn’t change about the wax is its ‘extension’, that it is a ‘spatial’ thing. But this is something, supposedly, which we cannot adequately imagine (make a picture of to ourselves) but only conceive. What I think clearly about the wax, therefore, is not something physical but merely something abstract or mental.

10. What does that all mean?  1. We are aware of two, distinct kinds of thing: a) minds, and b) bodies or physical or material things;  2. These two, distinct kinds have distinct essential attributes: minds are thinking things, and bodies are extended (spatial) things’  3. These distinct kinds are distinct substances (Q: what is a substance?)

11. More on the meaning of all this  Substance =df. ‘that of which things can be attributed, but which itself can never be attributed to anything else’ (e.g. “Socrates is a man”; things can be attributed to Socrates, that he is a man, for instance, but ‘Socrates’ can never be attributed to anything else -- we can never say, for instance, that something is a Socrates; therefore, ‘Socrates’ is a substance) Q: what about “The teacher of Plato is Socrates”?

12. Still more  The mind is one substance, the body another substance; therefore, human beings are composites made up of two kinds; one part (the body) is divisible and ‘perishable’, the other part is indivisible, immaterial, and therefore ‘imperishable’; the “I” is identical with the mind (and personal identity over time = same immaterial mental substance)  N.B.: the mind is a substance, therefore it is not attributable to something else; the body is a distinct substance, no ‘mental’ attribute belongs to it (therefore, for instance, the brain doesn’t think)

13. Compare  Descartes: I am a thinking, immaterial substance  Locke: I am my present consciousness plus my memories  Hume: I am nothing at all  Q: any positions not covered here?