1. Vulnerability of Complex Infrastructure Systems Torbjörn Thedéen Safety Research, KTH

2. HAZARDS Nature-Acts of God: Earthquakes, Extreme floods, Thunder storms... Failures of material... Human lapses Organizational errors Hackers Terrorism War

4. Info Stairs Many data Classical statistical analysis Few data Logical model Reliability methods PRA Subjective Probabilities Bayesian methods Precursors, Incidents

5. Research Areas Terrorist Groups Motivation Religious, political, social, economic studiesConditional Power+possibilities Conditional Vulnerability Consequences given ´attacks´: Dams, transportation, power grids...

6. Vulnerability USA October 07 Vulnerability of Road Transportation Systems (Erik Jenelius KTH)

7. Conditional Vulnerability Road systems modelled as a connected graph Conditioned of one link is out, the consequences are estimated: The increased total traffic time The unsatisfied demand The most ´important´ or one link at random is taken out

8. Example Northern Sweden The average traffic is known The traffic for a disturbed net can be calculated

9. Figur 6

10. Figur 2

11. Figur 5

12. Vulnerability of Power Net Power Generation Power Transmission Power Distribution and Consumption

13. Power Generation Dam Safety and Security Safety analysis OK, but security antagonistic threats?? Nuclear Power Plants. PRA safety OK, Defense passive?

14. Power Nets - Vulnerability (Statistical Analysis of Collapses) Too few! Vulnerability analysis of empirical graph model – partly classisfied! Vulnerability analysis of idealized graph model (coupled branching processes)

15. Power law of large consequences, power grid

16. Power Net – Graph Model Power stations Transformers 400 kV 110 kV 220 V Consumers …………

17. Power generation Consumers Branching Process

18. Limiting result One link is removed at random. The proportion of unserved consumers has in the limit a distribution with a right tail of power type exponent – 1.

21. Vulnerability and Terrorism

22. Terrorism Motivation Terrorist groups Basis Common goal Cause fear, chaos and deaths!

23. TERRORISM AND DEFENSE Enemy infrastructure Critical infrastructure ? Partly knownKnown

24. Fighting Terrorism Knowledge or qualified guesses about probable terrorist groups, their goals and actions constitutes: Basis for our defence of infrastructures... Basis for our actions against terrorist groups

25. Fight Between Two Networks Our critical infrastructures: power, transportation, data, finance, water... KNOWN TO THE ENEMY! Enemy infrastructure: terrorist groups ALMOST UNKNOWN TO US!

26. Terrorist Network Known links and nodes Unknown links and nodes

27. Sampling Procedures Random sampling of nodes/links In time or in time periods Markov sampling Markov sampling with side conditions

28. Estimates – random sampling Link distribution Shortest path Sampling in many time periods – (N, p): ML estimates of p and N (Size of the terrorist population)