1. Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Responsible Retailing: Brad S. Krevor, Ph.D. Schneider Institute for Health Policy, The Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University The application of game theory to predict outcomes among cooperating and non-cooperating parties as a paradigm for Responsible Retailing

2. 2 I. Game Theory “Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making in the sense that those involved are affected by their own choices and by the decisions of others.” ~ Larry Samuelson

3. 3 I. Game Theory “Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making in the sense that those involved are affected by their own choices and by the decisions of others.” ~ Larry Samuelson “Games are the theoretical models of conflicts of interest” ~ C. Thomas

4. 4 I. Game Theory “Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making in the sense that those involved are affected by their own choices and by the decisions of others.” ~ Larry Samuelson “Games are the theoretical models of conflicts of interest” ~ C. Thomas Game theory analyzes interactions between agents and formulates hypotheses about their behavior and final outcomes

5. 5 I. Game Theory “Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making in the sense that those involved are affected by their own choices and by the decisions of others.” ~ Larry Samuelson “Games are the theoretical models of conflicts of interest” ~ C. Thomas Game theory analyzes interactions between agents and formulates hypotheses about their behavior and final outcomes Game theory can be used to study how parties will behave...... or how parties should behave

6. 6 I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory Games may be “co-operative” ( in which players work together; or players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative”

7. 7 I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory “Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e. they will choose outcomes which are in their own best interest Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative”

8. 8 I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory Players may act “co-operatively” (doves) or non- cooperatively” (hawks): but even when acting co- operatively, players are acting individually rationally, i.e. are motivated by self-interest Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative” “Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e. they will choose outcomes which are in their own best interest

9. 9 I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory Players may act “co-operatively” (doves) or non-cooperatively” (hawks): but even when acting co-operatively, players are acting individually rationally, i.e. are motivated by self-interest “Utility” or “Pay-off” are the value of an outcome measured in units Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative” “Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e. they will choose outcomes which are in their own best interest

10. 10 I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory Players may act “co-operatively” (doves) or non-cooperatively” (hawks): but even when acting co-operatively, players are acting individually rationally, i.e. are motivated by self-interest “Utility” or “Pay-off” are the value of an outcome measured in units Games may be zero-sum (winner/ loser) or non zero-sum Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative” “Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e. they will choose outcomes which are in their own best interest

11. 11 II. Examples of Games Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice: TV version

12. 12 II. Examples of Games Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice: TV version Original version: a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get the minimum” (payoff= -5)

13. 13 II. Examples of Games b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplice confesses, you will be convicted and receive the maximum sentence ” (payoff= -15) Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice: TV version Original version: a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get the minimum” (payoff = -5)

14. 14 II. Examples of Games c. “If you both confess, then you both will be convicted but not receive maximum sentences” (payoff= -8) Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice: TV version Original version: a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get the minimum” (payoff = -5) b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplish confesses, you will be convicted and receive the maximum sentence” (-15)

15. 15 II. Examples of Games d. “If neither of you confesses, then you will be convicted of possessing stolen property and will receive a certain conviction” (payoff= -1) Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice: TV version Original version: a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get the minimum” (payoff = -5) b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplish confesses, you will be convicted and receive the maximum sentence” (-15) c. “If you both confess, then you both will be convicted but not receive maximum sentences” (-8)

16. 16 II. Examples of Games Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice: TV version Original version: a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get the minimum” (payoff = -5) b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplish confesses, you will be convicted and receive the maximum sentence” (-15) c. “If you both confess, then you both will be convicted but not receive maximum sentences” (-8) d. “If neither of you confesses, then you will be convicted of possessing stolen property and will receive a certain conviction” (-1) Best payoff (-1) is not to confess (d) but this risks payoff of –15 (b). Confession brings payoff of either –5 (a) or –8 (c) but avoids –15 (b)

17. 17 II. Examples of Games (cont.) Stag Hunt: Killing a stag, which requires 2 players, has a high utility (payoff = 10). A hare can be captured by only 1 player but has a low utility (payoff = 2). If 2 players attempt to trap a hare, however, the hare will be scared off and escape.

18. 18 II. Examples of Games (cont.) Stag Hunt: Killing a stag, which requires 2 players, has a high utility (payoff = 10). A hare can be captured by only 1 player but has a low utility (payoff = 2). If 2 players attempt to trap a hare, however, the hare will be scared off and escape. Both players agree to hunt the stag and separate in search of the stag. Each then has the opportunity to stick with the plan (dove) or deviate from the plan (hawk). Is it in the interest of either player to deviate from that agreement and hunt the hare?

19. 19 II. Examples of Games (cont.) Stag hunt: Killing a stag, which requires 2 players, has a high utility (payoff of 10). A hare can be captured by only 1 player but has a low utility (payoff of 2). If 2 players attempt to trap a hare, however, the hare will be scared off and escape. Both players agree to hunt the stag and separate in search of the stag. Each then has the opportunity to stick with the plan (dove) or deviate from the plan (hawk). Is it in the interest of either player to deviate from that agreement and hunt the hare? If one player chooses to deviate (Hawk), it in the interest of that player that the other player not know of the deviation, since the hare will escape if both players try to capture it.

20. 20 Nash Equilibrium A “Nash Equilibrium”: A collection of strategies, one for each player, that are mutual best replies in the sense that each agent’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other agents

21. 21 Nash Equilibrium A Nash Equilibrium is a collection of strategies, one for each player, that are mutual best replies in the sense that each agent’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other agents A Nash Equilibrium demonstrates that no player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy given that the other players don’t deviate

22. 22 Game Theory Applications

23. 23 II. Economic Applications Convenience Store Game Store A is considering entering a market (or introducing a product) which is served (or produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either acquiesce or retaliate.

24. 24 II. Economic Applications If A declines to enter, A’s payoff = 0 and B’s payoff = 4 Convenience Store Game Store A is considering entering a market (or introducing a product) which is served (or produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either acquiesce or retaliate.

25. 25 II. Economic Applications If A enters the market and B acquiesces, they share the market and each receives a payoff of 2 If A declines to enter, A’s payoff = 0 and B’s payoff = 4 Convenience Store Game Store A is considering entering a market (or introducing a product) which is served (or produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either acquiesce or retaliate.

26. 26 II. Economic Applications If A enters the market and B acquiesces, they share the market and each receives a payoff of 2 If A enters the market and B retaliates with severe price reductions, they each receive a payoff of –4 If A declines to enter, A’s payoff = 0 and B’s payoff = 4 Convenience Store Game Store A is considering entering a market (or introducing a product) which is served (or produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either acquiesce or retaliate.

27. 27 II. Environmental Applications The cost to a player (e.g., an industrial plant, a state or a nation) of abating the production of pollution is very high Applied to regional, national and international policies (laws or treaties) to reduce pollution, regulate fishing rights, etc. Freeloader phenomenon:

28. 28 II. Environmental Applications The cost to a player (e.g., an industrial plant, a state or a nation) of abating the production of pollution is very high However, the contribution of that player to the problem of the region (or country or world) is marginal; and the benefit to that player for abatement may be marginal or 0. Applied to regional, national and international policies (laws or treaties) to reduce pollution Freeloader phenomenon:

29. 29 II. Environmental Applications The cost to a player (e.g., an industrial plant, a state or a nation) of abating the production of pollution is very high However, the contribution of that player to the problem of the region (or country or world) is marginal – as may be the benefit to that player for abatement optimal payoff: the pollution-creating problem is abated... with other players absorbing all or a disproportionately higher percentage of the cost! Applied to regional, national and international policies (laws or treaties) to reduce pollution Freeloader phenomenon:

30. 30 II. Military Applications War Games intensive development following WWII zero-sum games: winners and losers non-cooperating game

31. 31 II. Military Applications War Games intensive development following WWII zero-sum games: winners and losers non-cooperating game M.A.D.: Mutually Assured Destruction -- a Nash Equilibrium: neither player has an incentive to deviate (i.e., use nuclear weapons) unless the other player deviates

32. 32 II. Military Applications (cont.) Nuclear treaties Freezing, or reducing, nuclear arsenals deemed to be desirable -- possible only if both sides act Mathematica group

33. 33 II. Military Applications (cont.) Nuclear treaties Rothchild and Waterloo: potential disadvantage of co-operation How does one signal information when communicating what you are willing to agree to in a treaty gives the other side a bargaining advantage?

34. 34 III. Structural Problems of Responsible Retailing What are the “Structural Problems” of Responsible Retailing – the obstacles at the national (and state) level, at the level of individual communities, and at the level of individual stores -- which impede efforts to prevent underage sales? Before applying game theory principals to Responsible Retailing:

35. 35 III. Structural Problems at the State (and National) Level

36. 36 Structural Problems: S tate/ National Advocates and Voluntaries Public Health Depts. Foundations CSAP AGs Enforcement Agencies Retailers Wholesalers and Distributors Producers 1. Divergent objectives of RR stakeholders

37. 37 Structural Problems: S tate/ National Advocates and Voluntaries Public Health Depts. Foundations CSAP AGs Enforcement Agencies Retailers Wholesalers and Distributors Producers 1. Divergent objectives: profit vs. public interest

38. 38 Structural Problems: S tate/ National 2. Perceived motives: motives attributed to some stakeholders (players) by other stakeholders (players)

39. 39 Structural Problems: S tate/ National “We are being asked to serve as agents of public health.” (e.g. “No Buts”; criticism of “We Card”) Retailers Wholesalers and Distributors Producers 2. Perceived by retailers

40. 40 Structural Problems: S tate/ National “We are being asked to serve as agents of public health.” (e.g. “No Buts”; criticism of “We Card”) “Tobacco and alcohol advocates are neo- prohibitionists.” Retailers Wholesalers and Distributors Producers 2. Perceived by retailers

41. 41 Structural Problems: S tate/ National Responsible retailing is only PR Advocates and Voluntaries Public Health Depts. Foundations CSAP AGs 2. Perceived by public health/ advocates

42. 42 Structural Problems: S tate/ National Responsible retailing is only PR to buy respectability RR always < marketing! Advocates and Voluntaries Public Health Depts. Foundations CSAP AGs 2. Perceived by public health/ advocates

43. 43 Structural Problems: S tate/ National Matt Myers, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids Advocates and Voluntaries Public Health Depts. Foundations CSAP AGs Responsible retailing is only PR to buy respectability RR always < marketing! 2. Perceived by public health/ advocates

44. 44 Structural Problems: S tate/ National Enforcement agencies aren’t really committed! Advocates and Voluntaries Public Health Depts. Foundations CSAP AGs Matt Myers, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids Ed Sweda, Jr. TCRC* Responsible retailing is only PR to buy respectability RR always < marketing! 2. Perceived by public health/ advocates

45. 45 Structural Problems: S tate/ National 3. Enmity and mistrust: Unwillingness to work together AMA “anonymous” researcher PA sales certification program

46. 46 Structural Problems: S tate/ National 3. Enmity and mistrust: Brandeis compliance project: specific protocol for vendors if followed, 1.5 million premature deaths will be avoided non-compliance rate of 40% - 50%

47. 47 too busy avoid confrontation following protocol doesn’t work: it won’t solve the problem vendor explanations: Structural Problems: S tate/ National 3. Enmity and mistrust: Brandeis compliance project: specific protocol for vendors if followed, 1.5 million premature deaths will be avoided non-compliance rate of 40% - 50%

48. 48 3. Enmity and mistrust: Brandeis compliance project: too busy avoid confrontation following protocol doesn’t work: it won’t solve the problem Vendors = Family Physicians Protocol = PHS Clinical Guidelines HEDIS: 50% - 60% of patients not counseled Vendor explanations: Structural Problems: S tate/ National

49. 49 Retailers: not in corporate culture Public health community: unwilling Enforcement community Structural Problems: S tate/ National 4. Absence of Research

50. 50 Structural Problems: Community 1. Compliance rates are overestimated

51. 51 Structural Problems: Community Brandeis EAV study -- double vs. single inspection protocol 1. Compliance rates are overestimated

52. 52 Structural Problems: Community Brandeis EAV study -- double vs. single inspection protocol Tobacco Inspections Baseline 1 Compliance Baseline 2 Compliance Compliant B1 & B2 Florida81%86%66% Iowa43%51%33% 1. Compliance rates are overestimated

53. 53 Structural Problems: Community Brandeis EAV study DiFranza UMASS study: pairs of inspectors, identical in all but one respect, attempt purchases of tobacco (in alternating order) in 160 stores in 8 Massachusetts communities, all with measured compliance rates > 90% 1. Compliance rates are overestimated

54. 54 Structural Problems: Community 2. Policies do not translate into compliance

55. 55 Structural Problems: Community Christine Milliken, NAAG: “tobacco-ization of alcohol” 2. Policies do not translate into compliance

56. 56 Structural Problems: Community Christine Milliken, NAAG: “tobacco-ization of alcohol” Attorneys General Consumer Protection initiative: “alcohol-ization of tobacco” 2. Policies do not translate into compliance

57. 57 Structural Problems: Community There must be strong, explicit policies; but these policies tend not to be performed Christine Milliken, NAAG: “tobacco-ization of alcohol” Attorneys General Consumer Protection initiative: “alcohol-ization of tobacco” 2. Policies do not translate into compliance

58. 58 Structural Problems: Community Walgreens age verification: Before AVC, ID everyone < age 30 … low compliance 2. Policies do not translate into compliance

59. 59 Structural Problems: Community Walgreens age verification: Before AVC, ID everyone < age 30 After AVC, ID everyone < age 40, i.e. a 17 yr old looked > 30 but not > 39 … low compliance 2. Policies do not translate into compliance

60. 60 Structural Problems: Community Then, ID everyone, i.e. a 17 yr old looked > 40, or a clerk will be more willing to ID a 17 yr old if the clerk also must now ID a 60 yr old! Walgreens age verification: Before AVC, ID everyone < age 30 After AVC, ID everyone < age 40, i.e. a 17 yr old looked > 30 but not > 39 2. Policies do not translate into compliance

61. 61 Structural Problems: Community 3. Paradox of enforcement

62. 62 Structural Problems: Community 3. Paradox of enforcement Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement has limits

63. 63 Structural Problems: Community 3. Paradox of enforcement Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement has limits Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major chains to independent retailers (MN EAV study)

64. 64 Structural Problems: Community 3. Paradox of enforcement Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement has limits Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major chains to independent retailers (MN EAV study) Compliance with sales to minors laws also shifts acquisition by minors from commercial to social sources

65. 65 Structural Problems: Community 3. Paradox of enforcement Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement has limits Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major chains to independent retailers (MN EAV study) Compliance with sales to minors laws also shifts acquisition by minors from commercial to social sources “Moving” vs. “stationary” targets

66. 66 Structural Problems: Community 3. Paradox of enforcement Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement has limits Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major chains to independent retailers (MN EAV study) Compliance with sales to minors laws also shifts acquisition by minors from commercial to social sources “Moving” vs. “stationary” targets Even at 90% - 95% compliance, minors can purchase alcohol and tobacco

67. 67 Structural Problems: S tore 1. Clerk characteristics

68. 68 Turnover > than frequency of inspections No incentive to comply Little or no loyalty to employer Young clerks more apt to sell Willful collusion Structural Problems: S tore 1. Clerk characteristics

69. 69 EAV study: Structural Problems: S tore Inconsistency of store compliance multitude of individual attitudes determines whether clerk adheres to store policy 2. Clerk, not store policy, predictive of store compliance

70. 70 Challenge of Responsible Retailing: How do stores produce organizational and behavioral change? Structural Problems: S tore EAV study: Inconsistency of store compliance multitude of individual attitudes determines whether clerk adheres to store policy 2. Clerk, not store policy, predictive of store compliance

71. 71 Challenge of Responsible Retailing: How do stores produce organizational and behavioral change? Autumn Thomas: Identify new corporate models Structural Problems: S tore 2. Clerk, not store policy, predictive of store compliance

72. 72 Structural Problems: S tore Big Mac and Large Fries? Yes, Sir!

73. 73 But could you first step on the scale, sir? … and show me your cholesterol report? Structural Problems: S tore

74. 74 “I’m so sorry. …But could I interest you in a Diet Coke and Chicken Sandwich?” Structural Problems: S tore

75. 75 Also: “The person who seeks a job at McDonalds may well be different in many ways from the person who seeks a job at ABC Wine and Spirits or at Store 24.” Bill de Jong, Higher Education Center McDonalds has no confrontation! Structural Problems: S tore 3. Aversion to confrontation

76. 76 IV. Game Theory Applications: “Learnings” for Responsible Retailing 1. Pollution abatement models 2. Convenience store models 3. Prisoner’s Dilemma 4. War Games

77. 77 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) 1. Pollution abatement models “abate” = make investments in Best Practices; “player”=retailer

78. 78 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) In absence of enforcement (penalties), the problem will persist 1. Pollution abatement models “abate” = make investments in Best Practices; “player”=retailer

79. 79 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) In absence of enforcement (penalties), the problem will persist No incentive for 1 player to abate problem unless all players take similar measures. Abatement may actually cause competitive disadvantage 1. Pollution abatement models “abate” = make investments in Best Practices; “player”=retailer

80. 80 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) In absence of enforcement (penalties), the problem will persist No incentive for 1 player to abate problem unless all players take similar measures. Abatement may actually cause competitive disadvantage “Freeloader effect” will occur if some stores (typically large chains) invest in abatement while others do not. Only abatement by all players will eliminate free-loader effect 1. Pollution abatement models “abate” = make investments in Best Practices; “player”=retailer

81. 81 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) What would be the incentive (payoff) to remain in the market, or to withdraw from the market, if each player were forced to incur the cost of implementing comprehensive responsible retailing practices? How many “casual” players would withdraw? 2. Convenience store models Replace “enter market” with “remain in market”

82. 82 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) Higher cost for each remaining player may boost revenues and profitability by concentrating market What would be the incentive (payoff) to remain in the market, or to withdraw from the market, if each player were forced to incur the cost of implementing comprehensive responsible retailing practices? How many “casual” players would withdraw? 2. Convenience store models Replace “enter market” with “remain in market”

83. 83 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) 3. Prisoner’s Dilemma The best possible outcome in this non- cooperating game is worse than could be achieved through co-operation

84. 84 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) 4. War Games co-operative solutions can be produced in non- cooperative games: acting out of individual self-interest, diverse stakeholders can arrive at a co-operative solution

85. 85 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) 4. War Games co-operative solutions can be produced in non- cooperative games: acting out of individual self-interest, diverse stakeholders can arrive at a co-operative solution Responsible retailing is not an irreconcilable “structural conflict”: co-operative efforts to establish responsible retailing practices can be a “best strategy” – a Nash equilibrium

86. 86 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) 5. Nash equilibrium: A collection of strategies, one for each player, that are mutual best replies in the sense that each agent’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other agents

87. 87 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) Best strategy for public health agencies/ advocates: given a) private stakeholder propensity to lobby to keep penalties for non-compliance low, and b) community and judicial lassitude re: underage sales... 5. Nash equilibrium

88. 88 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) Best strategy for public health agencies/ advocates: 5. Nash equilibrium is to shift social norms: activism to heighten public concern so as to produce enhanced regulatory, enforcement, judicial and retailer actions.

89. 89 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) Best strategy for regulatory and enforcement agencies: given a) public health and advocacy pressure to reduce underage sales / use of tobacco and alcohol products, and b) retailer profit motive (i.e. unwillingness to incur the costs of abatement voluntarily and without all players also absorbing those costs)… 5. Nash equilibrium

90. 90 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) Best strategy for regulatory and enforcement agencies: 5. Nash equilibrium is to conduct frequent enforcement inspections (and consumer protection actions).

91. 91 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) Best strategy for retailers and retail associations: given a) public health and advocacy pressure for retailers to reduce underage sales, and b) frequent inspections by enforcement agencies … 5. Nash equilibrium

92. 92 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) Best strategy for retailers and retail associations is to: 5. Nash equilibrium i. invest in Responsible Retailing practices so as to avoid fines/ license suspensions and Attorney General consumer protection actions, and

93. 93 Learnings from Game Theory (cont.) i. invest in Responsible Retailing practices so as to avoid fines/ license suspensions and Attorney General consumer protection actions, and 5. Nash equilibrium Best strategy for retailers and retail associations are to: ii. Work at both the state and community level to insure that all retailers comply with high Respon-sible Retailing standards so as to eliminate the competitive disadvantage caused by the free-loader effect

94. 94 V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation Non-Standardization of IDs EAV and uniformity of codes MA license “only (this state) license is accepted” “Affirmative defense” in OH, CT and NY 1. Policy

95. 95 V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation 1. Policy Non-Standardization of ID Harsh penalties without remedial actions (Wagenaar principle)

96. 96 V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation 1. Policy Non-Standardization of IDs Harsh penalties without remedial actions Health component in clerk/ server training

97. 97 V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation 1. Policy Non-Standardization of IDs Harsh penalties without remedial actions Health component in clerk/ server training Possession laws/ cops and shops

98. 98 V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation 1. Policy Non-Standardization of IDs Harsh penalties without remedial actions Health component in clerk/ server training Possession laws/ cops and shops Parental role

99. 99 2. Allocation of resources V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation

100. 100 2. Allocation of resources V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation Duplication e.g. New Mexico retailer training inconsistencies between tobacco and alcohol laws

101. 101 Duplication Enforcement a. with what frequency? b. saturation or selective? c. all stores equally? d. re-inspections? e. is tobacco a proxy for alcohol? V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation 2. Allocation of resources

102. 102 Duplication Enforcement Retailers don’t co-operate V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation 2. Allocation of resources

103. 103 VI. Summary 1.Game theory illustrates that:

104. 104 VI. Summary Outcomes for each stakeholder are worse through non-cooperation 1.Game theory illustrates that:

105. 105 Acting out of their own self-interest, stakeholders can arrive at co-operative solutions—even in non-cooperative games. VI. Summary Outcomes for each stakeholder are worse through non- cooperation 1.Game theory illustrates that:

106. 106 The Nash Equilibrium for stakeholders involves efforts to shift social norms, aggressive enforcement and universal adherence to comprehensive RR practices VI. Summary Outcomes for each stakeholder are worse through non- cooperation Acting out of their own self-interest, stakeholders can arrive at co-operative solutions 1.Game theory illustrates that:

107. 107 VI. Summary 2. Structural problems of RR exist at the level of store, community and state (and nation)

108. 108 No single stakeholder, acting individually, can eliminate these structural problems VI. Summary 2. Structural problems of RR exist at the level of store, community and state (and nation)

109. 109 Acting co-operatively (i.e. working together; or, at very least, sharing information), diverse stake-holders can produce co-operative solutions VI. Summary No single stakeholder, acting individually, can eliminate these structural problems 2. Structural problems of RR exist at the level of store, community and state (and nation)

110. Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Responsible Retailing: Brad S. Krevor, Ph.D. Schneider Institute for Health Policy, The Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University