1. Education for Accountability Workshop, June 22 nd, 2009 Overview of the Evidence: Interventions in Teacher Incentives Barbara Bruns Lead Education Economist, LCSHE

2. Education for Accountability Workshop, June 22 nd, 2009 Evidence: Teacher Incentives (1) CountryAuthorsInterventionMethodologyFindings INDIADuflo, Hanna, Ryan 2008 External monitoring of teachers with & w/o financial incentives Randomized trial Decrease teacher absence rate (42% > 21%) Increase of 0.17 std. dev. in student test scores (in 1 yr) INDIABanerjee, Cole, Duflo, Linden 2006 Community-hired Balskaki teachers employed to teach students lagging behind in literacy and numeracy skills Randomized trial Increase in test scores of students of 0.28 std. dev. KENYAGlewwe, Nauman, Kremer 2003 Teacher incentives (gifts) to teachers based on student performance Randomized trial Temporary increase in student scores (linked to increase in time spent on test prep) EL SALVADOR Sawada & Ragatz 2005 (in Vegas 2005) School councils given authority to set teacher pay scale and pay for performance (EDUCO program) (*also SBM) Propensity- score matching, OLS Increase in teacher time on task/ decrease in teacher absenteeism; No effect on student achievement.

3. Education for Accountability Workshop, June 22 nd, 2009 Evidence: Teacher Incentives (2) CountryAuthorsInterventionMethodologyFindings ISRAELLavy 2008Teachers rewarded with case bonuses for improved student performance (on high-school matriculation exams) Randomized (due to measurement error treatment random) DID; RDD Increase in student performance; Increase in test taking rates, conditional pass rate. BOLIVIAUrquiola & Vegas 2005 (in Vegas 2005) Salary bonus (0.3 -1.1% mo wages) to teachers who willing to teach in less desirable areas Exploitation of arbitrary variation in teacher pay No effect on test scores; pay differential not enough to attract more effective teachers MEXICOMcEwan & Santibanez 2005 (in Vegas 2005) Possibility of permanent wage increase for teachers & principals based on index (which includes student performance) Quasi- experimental counterfactual analysis/ DID 1 std dev. Increase in teachers’ initial scores lead to 0.12 std. dev increase in classroom scores.

4. Education for Accountability Workshop, June 22 nd, 2009 Evidence: Teacher Incentives (3) CountryAuthorsInterventionMethodologyFindings INDONESIA forthcoming Doubling of base salary for all certified teachers + additional monetary incentives for teachers in rural areas Randomized trial forthcoming RWANDA forthcoming Performance-based incentives for teachers on fixed contracts Randomized trial forthcoming

5. Education for Accountability Workshop, June 22 nd, 2009 Evidence: Teacher Incentives (4) CountryAuthorsInterventionMethodologyFindings INDIAMuralidharan & Sundararaman 2009 Extra contract teachers provided to gov’t primary schools (state of AP) Randomized trial Increase in student performance (after 2 yrs) of 0.16 & 0.10 std. dev in math & language (largest impact in remote areas & in grade 1 (impact partly due to ↓ in class size) INDIAMuralidharan & Sundararaman 2008 Teacher bonus payment program based on student results on independently administered exams (AP). Randomized trial Increase in student performance (after 2 yrs) of 0.28 std dev in math & 0.16 in language. KENYADuflo, Dupas, Kremer 2009 Provision of extra teachers to first grade classrooms (reducing pupil-teacher ratio from 82 to 43) w/ & w/o teacher incentives (monetary & PTA supervision) Randomized trial With incentives: significant increase in test scores (w/o incentives: no increase + reduced teacher effort) BRAZIL forthcoming Pay-for-performance teacher bonus pay system (index based on numerous school performance indicators) RDD/ Randomized trial forthcoming TODAY***