1. ATS1371 Life, Death, and Morality Semester 1, 2015
Dr Ron Gallagher
Tutorial 6 (5 more tutorials to go)
Self-defence- Hobbes
Office Hour: 1-2 pm Friday Menzies Bldg, Room ? Please make appointment
Check your Monash – check Moodle – check the Unit Guide

2. The philosopher and the magician and common-sense.
What’s analytic philosophy? What’s common-sense?
What was the trolley/transplant problem? – apparently it was inconsistent ethical judgements when we rely on intuition.
Everything in the lectures has hinged on that being the problem.
Maybe there was no inconsistency. Perhaps our reluctance to cut up the healthy patient and our readiness to sacrifice the “track-worker” are consistent with common-sense.
JJT’s ‘contract’ explanations make sense but how many students thought that in week-one when they made the call on the scenarios? Did you instinctively know that track-workers sign up to get run-over?
I think the JJT solution is not the solution to the ‘inconsistent ethical intuitions” problem that this discussion is predicated on.
Here’s my solution. We don’t to ethical calculus – it’s common-sense.
The Morris solution. It’s quality vs quantity. It’s a bird in the hand against two in the bush.
The future “clone organ donor” scenario”.
The ‘fat bastard’ scenario.

3. Lectures and Tutorials at Clayton (Ron G indicated)

4. GOOD FRIDAY NO TUTORIAL
DON'T FORGET Weekly Reading Quizzes
(x 0.5% bonus each) Mondays 10am, weeks 2-11.
Note: The section you need to read for the quiz is the one indicated for the week beginning the day the quiz is due. (Not the week just gone past.)

5. Assessment Summary
Within semester assessment: 60% Exam: 40%
Assessment Task
Short Answer Questions:
AT1.1:(5%), 400 words due Wed 18th March
AT1.2:(10%), 400 words due Wed 15th April
AT1.3:(15%), 600 words due Wed 6th May
AT2: Essay (30%), 1100 words due Wed 20th May
Weekly Reading Quizzes (x 0.5% bonus each) Mondays 10am, weeks 2-11.
Examination (40%)

6. AT1.3:(15%), 600 words due Wed 6th May
Does Singer think the principle of equality plays a role in showing that racism is wrong? Explain why or why not. Does the principle rule out all forms of racism?  (suggested 150 words max)
If one ethnic group was naturally smarter than another, would this pose a threat to the principle of equality according to Singer? (suggested  words) 
Peter Singer presents a number of reasons in favour of vegetarianism. Critically present and discuss one of those reasons. (suggested words)

7. Questions for AT2: Essay (30%), @1100 words due Wed 20th May
1. Is it justified to kill an innocent threat in defence of oneself or
others? Why/why not? Discuss, with reference to the views of at least two authors from the unit.
2. The principle of equality that Singer defends has radical
consequences. Critically discuss the principle, explaining some of its
consequences, and assess whether Singer is right that we ought to adopt it.
3. “Abortion is impermissible, because it deprives a being of a future
like ours. Accordingly, it is morally similar to killing a healthy
adult.” Critically discuss this argument, drawing upon at least one of
the authors we have looked at in the readings.

9. Questions for AT2: Essay (30%), @1100 words due Wed 20th May
1. Is it justified to kill an innocent threat in defence of oneself or
others? Why/why not? Discuss, with reference to the views of at least two authors from the unit.
2. The principle of equality that Singer defends has radical
consequences. Critically discuss the principle, explaining some of its
consequences, and assess whether Singer is right that we ought to adopt it.
3. “Abortion is impermissible, because it deprives a being of a future
like ours. Accordingly, it is morally similar to killing a healthy
adult.” Critically discuss this argument, drawing upon at least one of
the authors we have looked at in the readings.

10. THREATS, SHIELDS, BYSTANDERS
What is the difference, according to Thomson, between an innocent threat and an innocent bystander, which explains why you can kill one, but not the other, in self-defence? How does her theory apply to innocent shields?
› A threat is a thing such that, if you don’t stop it, it will kill you. A bystander is a thing which is around when you are under threat, and perhaps by killing or harming the bystander you can save yourself, but it is not true that the bystander is threatening to kill you.
› A shield is a person being used by a threat, such that, if you kill the threat, you will kill or harm the shield.
› Thomson’s theory is that, you may kill someone in self defence, only if it is true of that person that: if you don’t kill her, she’ll kill you.
› Her criterion is, strictly speaking: if you don’t kill her, she’ll infringe your right to life.
›What happens to someone fulfilling this condition is that they forfeit the right to life.
› Therefore, there is a big difference between threats and bystanders. Because the condition is not true of bystanders, but it is true of threats.
› Moreover, shields cannot be legitimately harmed in self-defence, either. The condition is not true of shields.

11. Definitions
Unless otherwise noted, all references to Aggressors, Bystanders, and Threats are to those who are Innocent. (Footnote #6)
Lethal agent - something or someone that acts to bring about death
Qua = ‘in the capacity of’ (example: “someone who is not in control of her body qua endangering object” means “someone who is not in control of her body in its capacity as endangering object”

12. Michael Otsuka from Reading D LDM Study Guide
“In this section and the next, I shall defend the following argument for the impermissibility of killing a Threat.”
[Argument 1 (Innocent Threats)]pp.126-7
P1: It is impermissible to kill a Bystander to prevent oneself from being killed. (I shall refer to this premise as the Inviolability of a Bystander thesis.)
P2: The killing of a Threat and the killing of a Bystander are, other things equal,on a par as far as permissibility is concerned.
(I shall refer to this premise as the Moral Equivalence thesis.)
C. It is impermissible to kill a Threat to prevent oneself from
being killed.

13. Sub-argument for P1 Argument 1 (Inviolability of Bystander)
P1 Killing an innocent is not permitted even when it is necessary to save your own life.
P2 Bystanders are innocent
C. It is impermissible to kill a Bystander to prevent oneself from being killed.

14. Sub-argument for P2 Argument 1 (Moral Equivalence)
P1 Innocent Threats do not have responsibility for their lethal agency
P2 It is impermissible to kill an innocent Bystander to save your life because they are not responsible lethal agents
C. The killing of a Threat and the killing of a Bystander are, other things equal, on a par as far as permissibility is concerned.

15. Argument 2 (Main Argument concerning innocent aggressors)
P1 It is impermissible to kill an innocent Threat in self-defense [from Argument 1]
P2 The only morally relevant fact that distinguishes innocent Aggressors from innocent Threats is harmful agency[define]
P3 Harmful agency is only relevant when persons act as morally responsible agents
P4 Innocent threats and innocent Bystanders do not function as morally responsible agents.
P5 Harmful agency is not morally relevant in cases of self-defense against innocent Threats and innocent Aggressors.
C. It is impermissible to kill an innocent Aggressor in self-defense.

16. Innocent Bystanders
Innocent Threats - eg falling fat man
Innocent Shields
Innocent Agressors - eg drug crazed maniacs

17. Innocents
Traditional account does not clearly settle the status of innocents.
On Hobbesian account, innocence looks likely to be irrelevant.
> What is crucial is my interest in living.
> My interest in living can threatened just as
much by innocent or non-innocent threats.

19. THOMSON’S ‘KILLING’ THEORY CONDITION*
If you don’t harm X, X will kill you.
OTSUKA’S ‘KILLING’ THEORY CONDITION*
If you don’t harm X, X will be morally responsible
for killing you.
CLASSIC UTILITARIANISM
Best consequences - maximise happiness- minimise pain
PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM
Best consequences - Satisfy preferences – “my interests cannot count more than the interests of others”
HOBBES
State of nature, self-preservation, social contract
*Whenever the condition is true of someone, you may harm them in self-defence.

20. A Permissive Account (1)
A permissive account allows the harming of innocents in self-
defence by making the criterion for being a legitimate target
a causal criteria.
THOMSON’S ‘KILLING’ THEORY
CONDITION If you don’t harm X, X will kill you.
THEORY Whenever the condition is true of someone,
you mill kill them in self-defence.
Innocent aggressors, threats, are in.
Innocent shields, bystanders, are out.
More intuitive
Although perhaps questionable about innocent threats. Is it really true that the falling fat man will kill you. Thomson argues that it is true in the same way it is true to say that a falling piano will kill you. But this is disputable. After all, the fat man did not do anything to bring about my death. There is no intentional lethal agency. Surely talk of the being killed by a piano is merely figurative language.

21. A Restrictive Account (2)
CONSEQUENCE we may not defend ourselves against the innocent aggressor.
The restrictive account can minimize how disturbing this is, by suggesting that some killing of innocents, though not strictly permissible, are excusable wrongs.
HOWEVER this might suggest that there is a big difference between defence of self and defence of others.
The excusability of one’s actions is going to depend heavily on one’s circumstances. The person under threat has a good excuse – they wished to save their own life.
It is plausible to say that the desire save a mere stranger’s life is a much less powerful reason to excuse a wrongful killing.

22. Utilitarian Approach (1)
If people submitted to attacks, everyone would be less secure.
But if we retaliated with excessive force, killing innocent bystanders, overall security would also be diminished.
So perhaps a rule that permits limited self-defence has good consequences.
But this more a utilitarian justification for a law or a custom
permitting self-defence.
It does not actually justify individual acts of self-defence.
Each act must be justified on the consequences of that act.
Rights might be useful ‘rules of thumb’, but no more.
Same goes for self-defence right.

23. Singer describes the POE as a ‘minimally egalitarian principle’
It doesn’t recommend equal outcomes, but equal interests being considered equally.
Egalitarianism (derived from the French word égal, meaning equal) or Equalism is a political doctrine that holds that all people should be treated as equals and have the same political, economic, social, and civil rights.[1]

24. HOBBESIAN MORAL THEORY
Part 1
HOBBESIAN MORAL THEORY

25. Hobbes’s Contract Approach (1)
Pessimistic starting point.
State of nature (SON)- a state with no morality.
SON is a state of perfect liberty.
No binding agreements.
No duties.
No obligations (promises are not binding)
No injustice.
Despite apparent nihilism, the SON is a very powerful theoretical device.
It allows us to explain morality in non-moral terms.

26. Hobbes’s Contract Approach (3)
For Hobbes, moral obligation arises from considerations about rationality in a non-moral state. That is, Hobbes explains moral phenomena in terms that are non-moral. Therefore, he can perhaps give a deeper explanation.
The SON is a powerful theoretical device because it allows us to explain morality in non-moral terms.

27. QUIZ
In the Hobbesian state of nature, which of the following is true? 1. There is no injustice. 11. Everyone is in a state of perfect liberty Promises are not binding. A. 1 and 11 only B. 11 only C. 11 and 111 only D. 1, 11 and 111
D all are correct

28. HOBBES ON MORAL OBLIGATION
PART 11
HOBBES ON MORAL OBLIGATION

29. THE SOVEREIGN Obligations are generated by giving up our liberty.
We do this by a mutual contract to establish a sovereign. A common power to keep us in ‘awe’.
The threat of being punished by the sovereign is what keeps us all obliged to follow the law.
The contract works by transferring our rights to the sovereign.

30. RIGHTS AND LIBERTY-RIGHTS (1)
Earlier I said there are no duties in SON. But now I say the contract works by transferring rights to the sovereign. How can there be rights without duties? Normally if I have a right to something, you have a duty or obligation not to bring about what I have a right is not the case.

31. RIGHTS AND LIBERTY-RIGHTS (2)
Hobbes means something different by ‘rights’. ‘Normal’ rights are claim-rights. Hobbesian rights are liberty-rights. (CR) I have a claim-right means you have a duty to me. (LR) I have a liberty-right means I am not under a duty.
liberty right:
Consider an apple that has fallen the ground on a bit of unowned land.
Plausibly, I am free to take it.
We might express this by saying “ I have a right to take it”.
But that does not mean that anyone is under any duty to not to interfere with my taking it. Indeed, you might want to rush up and take it and that would be within your rights too.
Claim right – I promise my mother never to take apples from the ground. That promise generates a duty to my mother not to take the apple. Therefore, I no longer have a liberty right to take the apple. You however retain the liberty right because you made no such promises.

32. RIGHTS AND LIBERTY-RIGHTS (3)
So liberty-rights are:
> Weak – they don’t count for much.
> They are compatible with other people interfering.
> Not the sort of thing that can be infringed.

33. QUIZ
Suppose that everyone has a liberty-right to clap hands. I then promise you that I will never clap my hands. Which of the following is true: 1. I lose a liberty-right (the right to clap hands). 11. You obtain a claim-right that I not clap hands. A. 1 only B. 11 only C. 1 and 11 D. Neither
C 1 & 11

34. LIBERTY-RIGHTS IN HOBBES
Hobbes: In SON we have a right to everything.
He means a liberty-right.
So this means: We are under no duties to abstain from anything (anything goes!) .

35. THE COMMONWEALTH
Entering the Commonwealth involves: > Giving up the liberty-rights of nature. > Acquiring a general duty to obey the sovereign’s laws. N.B. The sovereign makes no promises to us.
According to Hobbes contract theory, entering the C/wlth involves:
SLIDE
As I said before, The threat of being punished by the sovereign (and not any promises made by the sovereign) is what keeps us all obliged to follow the law.

36. WHY HAVE THE SOVEREIGN?
Why would we subject ourselves to an all powerful sovereign? Because the state of nature is so awful (nasty, poor, brutish, short lives). It is not in our self-interest to remain in such a state. N.B. If the sovereign cannot keep the peace, we lose this reason to support the sovereign.
If the sovereign makes no promises to us, then why have the sovereign?
We enter into a contract to move into a commonwealth under the rule of sovereign in the hope of getting more good for ourselves (peace, longer lives, etc.)

37. HOBBESIAN SELF-DEFENCE
PART 111
HOBBESIAN SELF-DEFENCE

38. THE SOVEREIGN
The social contract: we give up our liberty rights and have a
duty to obey the sovereign.
The sovereign, however, retains all liberty rights. There is no
Duty for the sovereign to refrain from doing anything. The
sovereign even has the liberty right to kill us.
Does this mean that we have a duty to submit to the sovereign’s attempts?
Hobbes: NO

39. SELF-DEFENCE Basis of Hobbesian self-defence:
First and foremost: a man cannot lay down the right of resisting those who bring force against him to take away his life, because he couldn’t be understood to be doing that with the aim of getting some good for himself. (Reading E).
It wouldn’t be good for us to give up the liberty-right to defend ourselves.
When we transfer our liberty rights to the sovereign we do so for our own self-interest.
That is, we enter into the contract in order to get something that is good for us.
We cannot be supposed to have entered into a contract that is not good for us.
We promise to obey the sovereign, but not where such obedience will pose an immediate threat to our life.
We retain the natural liberty right to self-defence in the transition from the state of nature to the Commonwealth.
Does this mean that we can do anything to defend ourselves?

40. The limits of the liberty to self-defence (1)
How much natural liberty to we retain to defend ourselves? > Whatever it takes to preserve my life? (Big liberty) > Enough to preserve me from direct and imminent threats? > Enough to preserve me from direct, imminent and non-innocent threats only?

41. The limits of the liberty to self-defence (2)
Big Liberty: If I have to do X to ensure my survival then I have the liberty to do X. Problem: If everyone has this sort of liberty then I might get chopped up for organ harvesting. I might get eaten by hungry person, etc. Therefore, no peace. Traditional restrictions (necessity, imminence) are helpful to keeping the peace.
Not so clear that proportionality applies as this imperative arises, for Hobbes, regarding threats to life.

42. Innocents
Traditional account does not clearly settle the status of innocents.
On Hobbesian account, innocence looks likely to be irrelevant.
> What is crucial is my interest in living.
> My interest in living can threatened just as
much by innocent or non-innocent threats.

43. QUIZ I. If I forgo the right to self-defence I will be less secure.
II. If the right to self-defence is extended to a right to self-
preservation, then security for all will be diminished.
III. If the right to self-defence includes the liberty to harm innocents, then we will all be vulnerable to attack.
I and II only
I and III only
II and III only
I and II and III
Which of these statements could be significant factors for a Hobbesian considering whether we have a right of self-defence, and its limits?
D 1, 2, 3

44. Compare with Utilitarianism
Utilitarians wish to promote peace too. So a utilitarian has
some similar reasons as Hobbes to adopt a rule governing
self-defence that limits its applicability.
But:
Utilitarianism cannot justify individual acts on the basis of a rule.
Problem of extreme sacrifice: the organ harvesting attacker, etc.
Hobbes has no such difficulty because of the egoistic basis of
the contract approach.