1. Participation of Actors in Land Consolidation Activities in Bulgaria Violeta Dirimanova Bulgaria IDARI

2. Structure of proposal Purpose of the study Background information for the problem Theoretical background Theoretical framework Possible propositions Methodology

3. The problem Agricultural reform in Bulgaria has led to land fragmentation Fragmentation in ownership and land use The government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to solve the problem

4. Purpose of the study To propose institutional options for land consolidation on the basis of analyses of land transactions, the actors’ behavior and institutional settings

5. Current situation and formal legislation Actors’ behavior Land transactions Institutional options Evaluation of the effects Objectives of study

6. Background of the problem 1.Agrarian reform and land fragmentation 2.Land fragmentation and farm’s structure 3.Discussed solution to the problem

7. Agrarian reform and land fragmentation Land reform started in the beginning of 1990 Liquidation of the old cooperatives Reallocation of the land to original owners or their inheritors 1.8 million landowners Half of farms are less then 2 ha

8. Farm’s structure and land fragmentation  Fragmentation in ownership Many inheritors on a single plot Equal shares to all of them Land to landless families  Fragmentation in land use Many small and self-sufficient farms (73% of the total number and 7.5% of the land) Large farms (0.2% of the total number, 66.7% of the land)

9. Solutions to the land fragmentation problem in the literature  Fragmentation in ownership Land market (buy/sell) Land tax Land credit market  Fragmentation in land use Land market (lease/rent) Voluntary/Compulsory land consolidation Establishment a State Land Bank

10. Theoretical background The importance of institutions Institutions are humanly devised formal (law, property rights, etc) and informal (custom, traditions, etc) constraints that regulates political, economic and social interactions. (North, 1991 and 1994) Four levels of social analysis: social embeddedness level, institutional environment, institutions of governance and marginal analysis. (Williamson, 1998)

11. Theoretical background The importance of institutions Theoretical framework for analyzing the institution related to natural resources. This framework conceptualize the relationship between the properties of transactions, characteristics of actors, property rights and governance structure. (Hagedorn, 2001)

12. Theoretical framework TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO NATURE COMPONENTS BASIC FACTORS LOCAL SOCIAL ARENA INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS TRANSITION PROCESS RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS FRAME CONDITIONS ACTORS PROPERTY RIGHT SYSTEM GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE TRANSACTIONS OTHER FACTORS EFFECTS ON THE SYSTEM INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS - INNOVATION OTHER OPTIONS Modified from: (Hagedorn 2002); (Sikor and Hagedorn 2000); CEESA project

13. Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case Basic factors Frame conditions: low income level, high unemployment Transition process: land reform, unpredictability Resource characteristics: spatial location, multiple use, different quality

14. Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case Local social arena Landowners Small farmers New cooperatives Large farmers Local state authorities Government

15. Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case Governance structure Market - Buy/Sell; Rent/Lease Hierarchy (governmental agencies) - land conversion, environmental control Cooperation - voluntary actions for land consolidation Property rights Private property rights on land Inheritance law

16. Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case Land transactions Buying/Selling land Renting Leasing Division of the land between users Interchange of land between landowners Effects on production and ecosystem Low productivity Land degradation Land abandonment

17. Proposition and research hypotheses Main proposition: Agricultural reform has led to land fragmentation and the land transactions further deepened the problem. Sub-proposition 1: Agricultural reform, low income level, and the specific land characteristic form actors’ behavior. Sub-proposition 2: The actors’ behavior has created the existing institutional settings. Sub-proposition 3: The established institutional settings determinate the nature of transaction among the actors. Sub-proposition 4: Land transactions cause deeper land fragmentation

18. What Institutional Options? Land Market Land Tax Compulsory/Voluntary consolidation Cooperation

19. Methodology of analysis Legislation and literature Qualitative method - semi-structural interviews with actors Social network method Quantitative method

20. Proposed survey’s region

21. Thank you very much for your attention!