1. Emerging Nations: Russian Comparative Perspective on Problems of Sovereignty and New Forms of Stateness in Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia Yan Vaslavskiy Senior Lecturer, Chair of Political Theory Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University, Russia) International Association of Political Science Research Committee #37 Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

2. 2 Content overview Origins of sovereign state. Trends of the last 20 years and today’s situation: competition of sovereign states with new actors. Cases: Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Comparing consequences of superpower grip removal for the cases. Main situation development points for Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Approaches and attitudes of Russian experts and politicians towards the cases. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

3. 3 How do certain non-state actors influence the international relations and vice versa? Why major powers differ on the status of non-state actors? What are the motives and interests of Moscow in dealing with Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, as well as key points of the Russian perspective towards these cases? Key questions Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010 Important: Russian national interests are not equal to those of some unrecognized territories (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) or certain states struggling with maintaining territorial integrity (Serbia).

4. 4 Origins of sovereign state Sovereign states emerged as winners in a contest with demised empires, city-states, and trade leagues at the end of the Middle Ages. Yet, the number of sovereign states started to grow drastically only in the 20th century after the foundation of the UN. CATALYZERS: 1.UN structure with sovereign internationally-recognized state membership only. 2.Acceleration of the decolonization process. 3.Wide use of self-determination principle. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

5. 5 Trends of the last 20 years and today’s situation Developments since the end of the cold war have led to: removal of a very tight grip on the international system exercised by the two superpowers; nation-states gaining more room for maneuvering; opening of new opportunities for regional and local actors; focus being turned from a major global contest to multiple conflict with different specifics, lesser scope, though greater intensity. New non-state actors: make (no matter deliberately or not) obstacles for nation-states to exercise unilateral control on vital issues; influence nation-states in internal affairs (again, no matter deliberately or not); do not tend to develop into completely new sorts of actors. Rather, they strive to acquire all features inherent in sovereign states, with their elites aspiring to become fully recognized and join the global club; present an alternative to sovereign states, as they rest outside the mainstream and most often remain not recognized by a more or less considerable number of sovereign states. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

6. 6 Role of major powers and problems of position understanding Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010 Major powers like the US, European leaders, Russia, China, Japan, Brazil, and others have their own interests in different regions, with the Balkans and the Caucasus among them; the American (and, partially, European) and Russian perspectives towards the problem are not equally presented and explained in the global information field; a consequence of that is not only misunderstanding, but even ignorance of important points of the position of the Russian policy-makers and the academic community on Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.

7. 7 Comparing consequences of superpower grip removal for our cases a spark for both conflicts (similarity); serious difference in the process dynamics; local actors, standing for secession, started gaining more supporters and resources, including help from abroad, and that served as a major cause for central authorities in Belgrade and Tbilisi losing control over secessionist regions. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

8. 8 breakup of the Yugoslavian federation; a new Serbian constitution was adopted in 1990 with much less autonomy for Kosovo; dissolved parliament proclaims independence; Serbian government uses police and army to restore order; serious clashes start at 1998, outside support coming from NATO and the US; Serbia loses control over Kosovo, NATO presence paves the way for de-facto secession; as of January 2010, Kosovo was recognized by 64 UN member- states and Taiwan; the rest of the world continues to consider Kosovo an integral part of Serbia, as is underlined in its Constitution. Kosovo: main points Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

9. 9 Abkhazia: main points breakup of the USSR provoked legal and political controversies, as Georgia proclaimed independence and ignored the USSR preservation referendum; Abkhazians first opted for the USSR, but when the breakup became inevitable, opted for independence; in July 1992, Abkhazian parliament restores the 1925 Abkhazian Soviet Socialist republic constitution; Georgian government tries to restore order, but eventually got a civil war in other parts of the country; since 1993, Abkhazia has been ruled by its own government and parliament; partial recognition came only 15 years later, after the conflict in South Ossetia, when Russia recognized both Georgian breakaway republics, followed by Nicaragua; as of January 2010, Abkhazia was recognized by four UN member-states – Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru, as well as by the Republic of Transnistria, a state that is not recognized by all UN members. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

10. 10 South Ossetia: main points. Part I tensions between the Georgians and the Ossetians go back to 1918-1920, when the National Council of South Ossetia, created in 1917, called for granting the South Ossetians the right to free self-determination, with the intention to finally join Soviet Russia; Georgia considered South Ossetia as a territory within its historical Shida- Kartli region and put down the rebellions that took place in 1918 and in 1919-1920, causing thousands of refugees, deaths from famine and diseases. In 1990, the South Ossetian parliament labeled this operation as genocide; in 1989, the parliament declared South Ossetia an autonomous republic. This decision was labeled “unconstitutional” by the Georgian parliament, but it did not stop the South Ossetians from declaring a sovereign republic; like in the case with Abkhazia, the Georgian government tried to restore order, but got a civil war in other parts of the country; in 1992, a referendum was held in South Ossetia, with 99% of the population approving the parliament’s decisions on independence and “reunification” with Russia. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

11. 11 South Ossetia: main points. Part II joint peacekeeping forces (comprising Georgians, Russians, and Ossetians) introduced to the zone of the conflict in 1992; A victory of Eduard Kokoity at the 2001 South Ossetian presidential election and the “Revolution of roses” in Georgia put an end to a slow but evolutionary peace process in the region, with a significant rise in the number of provocations from both sides; as of May 2009, Abkhazia was recognized by three states, two of them UN- members – Russia, Nicaragua, and South Ossetia; in 2008, Russia was on the Ossetian side during the Georgian August assault and recognized it as a sovereign state; as of 2010, Russia has been followed by Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Transnistria (the latter state is not recognized by all UN members). Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

12. 12 What the developments mean for Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia ? Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia largely depend not on themselves, but on external factors such as global balance of power and superpower regional preferences forming the mainstream of the rest of the world’s attitude towards such contenders; Kosovo has advanced more than Abkhazia and South Ossetia on its way to full recognition, mainly due to US and majority of EU countries’ support; at the same time, authorities in Abkhazia have been more successful in designing and using political institutions and practices, emphasizing historical prerequisites for independence, and, finally, exercising sovereignty over their own territory; South Ossetia is strongly backed by Russia, and Russia’s recognition in this light is more than just a formal act; it is rather a strong regional leader’s backing. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

13. 13 What the developments mean for the world and Asia? such developments may result in severe consequences for sovereign states having multiethnic social structure and ethnic regions on their territories (for example, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and even Spain). the potential of this threat can remain latent until periods of serious political and other types of crises, and, with a sovereign state being in a vulnerable position, become a menace for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order; as Asia is very densely populated multiethnic and multiconfessional continent, a number of states may suffer similar problems at points of regional or domestic instability which leads to the erosion of stateness (examples: China, India, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Turkey, etc.). Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

14. 14 common ethnic and religious backgrounds are among fundamental factors explaining why Russia has favored Serbia on the Kosovo issue since the very beginning; at the same time, one should not forget about realpolitik and Russian interests in Europe and in the Balkan region; Russia does not see any contradiction between the process of the europeanization of the Balkans and the leading role of the UN and its Security Council in the Kosovo conflict settlement; Russia hesitates which of the two major principles of the international law should dominate in its foreign policy, either territorial integrity of a state and inviolability of borders, or national self-determination and rights of minorities; ethnic separatist or secessionist interests in Russia itself may at some time come out on the surface and become a threat to territorial integrity and national security of the Russian Federation, as Russia has 83 regions with more than a dozen among them comprising Non-Russian ethnic majorities; Russian official position on Kosovo is based on Resolution #1244 of the UN Security Council which put Kosovo under the UN administration. Unilateral proclamation of independence is in contradiction with the international law. Kosovo: Russian perspective Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

15. 15 a major concern for Moscow is maintaining stability in the Caucasus; Russia understands that today, when it comes to its Caucasus policy, it has to take into account actions of other countries aimed at the realization of their foreign policy goals; Russia is often wrongly presented as a giant striving to expand its borders and absorb everything around where instability is present; in its actions in the Caucasus, Russia was mainly forced by the inability of the Georgian elites to conduct cohesive policies aimed at softening the regional confrontation; developments in the Southern Caucasus influence Russian domestic politics, especially in its southern regions, and that is why Russia cannot and does not want to exclude itself from the regional interaction. Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Russian perspective Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

16. 16 Final points neither of the breakaway republics is going to return to its previous, “pre- independence” status, and new approaches towards unrecognized states have to be developed by the world community; rethinking security, sovereignty, and justice, means that the world’s scholars and practitioners must seek ways to support internally stable and externally friendly political entities, able to exercise sovereignty within their borders and act as decent members of the international community; such approaches should promote ease of tensions in international relations, simultaneously not creating paths for potential similar moves by other actors willing to gain independence, as such a trend could add many more problems to the current changing international system, form new dangerous threats and intensify local and regional conflicts. Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010

17. 17 THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION! Dhaka, Bangladesh 5 January 2010