1. The return of nationalism and populism in Central Eastern Europe: An inevitable consequence of EU-driven democratization? Professor Darina Malová, PhD Department of Political Science, Comenius University, Bratislava This research was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No. APVV Consolidation or De-Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern Europe? Lecture at University of Vienna, 30 November 2007

2. Outline of the presentation
Support for democracy in V-4 in the post accession period. What does it say about the quality of democracy?
A return of extremism or getting back to ‘normal’ political culture in V-4?
Democratic regime design in V-4: focus on horizontal division of power and human rights protection. Weak popular accountability mechanisms and late decentralization.
How to explain? The impact of externally and elite driven democratization and Europeanization on V-4?
Lessons for future EU enlargement?

3. Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works
Country/%
Very Satisfied
Fairly Satisfied
Not Very Satisfied
Not at All Satisfied
Czech Republic 3 45 37 14
Hungary 2 25 48 24
Poland 27 41 26
Slovakia 23 46
Slovenia 4 52 35 8 .
Source: European Commission Eurobarometer 63, Spring 2005: First Results. Brussels: European Commission

4. Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works
Country/%
Very/Fairly Satisfied
Not Very/Not at All Satisfied
Net Satisfaction
Czech Republic 48 51 -3
Hungary 27 72
-45
Poland 29 67
-38
Slovakia 26
-46
Slovenia 56 43 13
EU 15 41 15

5. V-4 after the 2005 and 2006 elections
Czech Republic - political paralysis. Five months without a new government. Political apathy and disillusionment as a result of the ‘opposition’ agreement between CSSD and ODS ( ). “Do not disturb us, we are governing!”
Slovakia - the government led by Smer-Social Democracy includes two political parties (HZDS and SNS) which isolated Slovakia by violating democratic rules. Repetitive coalition’s crisis.
Poland under the Kaczynski tandem went back to nationalism patriotism and arch-conservative values. ‘Buying’ MPs and popular protest. Early elections and the new government thanks to mobilization of voters.
Popular discontent in Hungary organized by the opposition, challenging the very foundations of representative democracy.

6. Democracy design and political institutions in CEE.
What are institutional limits of representative and responsive democracy in CEE?
During the initial institution building – a focus on separation of powers.
Parliamentary democracies (the main principle is power-sharing) requires soft balance of political bargaining and opposition control.
Strong and independent Constitutional Courts to control political elite and protect human rights.
Strong and Independent Central Banks against political voluntarism of governments.

7. Democracy design and civil society weakness in CEE.
Slow and sinuous (zigzag) institutionalization of the role of opposition.
Institutions are mostly consensus oriented, but the part of political elite frequently ignores public and instead of inclusion and deliberation offers populist and nationalist appeals.
Weak organized social actors. Trade unions and NGOs.
Weak linkage between political parties and civil society organizations, as parties are financed by the state.
How can citizens have a say in politics?

8. The return to Europe: the triple transition and EU Copenhagen criteria
Explanations: external contra internal factors or mutual reinforcement?
The candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (transition to democracy)
The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (transition to market economy)
Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (the state building process).

9. The role of the European Commission during the transformation process
EC as the agenda setter and its promoter (regular annual reports on candidate countries)
Cooperation with political elite and neglected public opinion.
Different ways of influence:
direct influence - promoting EU policies, laws and institutions, different compliance in CEE countries, so-called Helsinky group more prone to comply to catch up with the first round of accession countries,
indirect influence - encouraging emergence of political and social actors promoting EU values and norms.

10. EU-driven democratization and Europeanization in CEE
EU-driven economic and political transformation. The nature of the accession process characterized as a one-way transfer of EU rules and norms.
CEE governments identified with the EU agenda and mostly favored with TINA (‘there is no alternative’) approach (with exception of Slovenia - more deliberation during the accession process due to the institutional and cultural legacies).
This type of EU conditionality continues and EC monitors NMS and their economic performance as a condition to adopt Euro.
Neglected social dimension during EU enlargement. Only in 1999 EC insisted on introducing tripartite mechanism in CEE.

11. EU-driven democratization and Europeanization in CEE
Externally and elite driven democratization and Europeanization: socialization or instrumental convergence?
Instrumental convergence: Do X to get Y.
Convergence through socialization: Good people do X.
Partial and/or superficial socialization in CEE.

12. Discussion
Has it an impact on quality of democracy in CEE and the recent return of nationalist and populist forces in the CEE governments?
Is it only post-accession hangover or deconsolidation of democracy in CEE?
What lessons can we take for the future enlargement? If any?