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Hao Wang Computer Sciences Department University of Wisconsin-Madison Security in Condor.

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Presentation on theme: "Hao Wang Computer Sciences Department University of Wisconsin-Madison Security in Condor."— Presentation transcript:

1 Hao Wang Computer Sciences Department University of Wisconsin-Madison hbwang@cs.wisc.edu http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Security in Condor

2 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Outline › Motivations › Security Goals › Design › Current Status › Issues and Future Work

3 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Why Do We Need Security? Alice Condor

4 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Why Do We Need Security? Alice Condor I am Alice; Please run 100 jobs for me

5 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Why Do We Need Security? Alice Condor

6 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Why Do We Need Security? Here comes Bob…. Alice Condor Bob I am Alice; Please remove all my jobs

7 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Why Do We Need Security? Alice Condor Bob

8 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Why Do We Need Security? › Problem:  False identification, stolen identity › Solution:  Authentication Establish the identities reliably AliceBob Condor

9 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Other Problems › Stolen data › Eavesdropping ProblemsSolutions › Encryption

10 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Other Problems › Stolen data › Eavesdropping › Tampered data or messages › Integrity check via Message Authentication Code (MAC) ProblemsSolutions › Encryption

11 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Design Requirements › The ultimate goal – Secure Channel › Strong authentication  Cross platform support (Unix, NT, Linux, etc…)  Must support multiple authentication protocols Different sites have different security requirements Flexibility

12 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Design Requirements › Protecting data and secure communication  Encryption  Integrity check  Support multiple platform  Must support both TCP and UDP › User based authorization  Fine-Grained access control › Auditing  Logging

13 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Grid Requirements › Condor is part of the Grid community  Need to meet various Grid security requirements  AAA: Authentication -- X.509 based PKI infrastructure Authorization Accounting  Fully integrated with Globus Toolkit

14 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Trust Model › In what do we trust?  Authentication Protocols Kerberos, X.509, NTSSPI, etc. Strong authentication is the key  Authentication services Certificate Authorities, Kerberos servers, etc  System Administrators Configurations  Machines where Condor is installed

15 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Condor Daemons and Tools Condor Security Architecture TCP/UDP OpenSSLGlobus GSIKerberos Cryptography Services Authentication Services Other CEDAR Libraries Services Authorization

16 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Current Status (>=V6.3.2) › Authentication  Support multiple protocols Kerberos, X.509, NTSSPI, File System Use Globus Toolkit (2.0) for Grid related security services

17 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Authorization › User based access control policy  Access Control Format: ACCESS_LEVEL = user@domain/hostname,  Support wild cards for flexibility › Each Condor command is associated with an authorization level: READ, WRITE, DAEMON, CONFIG, ADMIN, OWNER, NEGOTIATOR › Specify users for each authorization level  Either ALLOW or DENY

18 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Authorization Examples › Allow all users READ access  ALLOW_READ=*/* › Allow all engineering department users who come from a machine on UW campus network WRITE access  ALLOW_WRITE=*@engr.wisc.edu/*.wisc.edu › Allow condor-1 and condor-2 to have CONFIG access level  ALLOW_CONFIG = condor-1@cs.wisc.edu/*,condor-@cs.wisc.edu/*

19 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Authorization Examples › Only allow the user condor@cs.wisc.edu who come from CS department network to have DAEMON access level  ALLOW_DAEMON= condor@cs.wisc.edu/*.cs.wisc.edu › Only condor-admin@cs.wisc.edu from the host bigbird can have ADMIN level of access  ALLOW_ADMIN= condor-admin@cs.wisc.edu/bigbird.cs.wisc.edu

20 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Authorization Examples › Deny following users READ access  DENY_READ=bob@crash.net/*, bob@hack.biz › Deny bob@crash.net WRITE access  DENY_WRITE=bob@crash.net/*

21 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Current Status (Cont.) › Data Encryption  OpenSSL based Support 3DES, Blowfish  Support both TCP and UDP › Data Integrity  OpenSSL based Support MD5  Support both TCP and UDP

22 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity › Encryption and Integrity support for UDP is hard  UDP is connectionless Packets may come from different sources!  UDP is not reliable  How to address these issues?

23 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity › Use TCP+strong authentication protocol for initial key exchange  The protocol must provide encryption support  Exchange a secret key and a key Id › Each side cache the pair › Include in subsequent communication › Use for encryption, for integrity check for UDP packets

24 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity ScheddStartd Central Manager Initial State

25 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity ScheddStartd Central Manager UPDATE Command Request (UDP)

26 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity Schedd Startd Central Manager AUTHENTICATE Authentication (TCP)

27 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity Schedd Startd Central Manager [Key-1, ID-1] ID-1Key-1 ID-1 Key Exchange (TCP+Encryption)

28 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity ScheddStartd Central Manager [UPDATE,ID-1] ID-1Key-1 ID-1 Update (UDP with Encryption/Integrity)

29 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor UDP Encryption/Integrity ScheddStartd Central Manager ID-1Key-1 ID-1Key-2ID-2 Key-2ID-2 [UPDATE,ID-1] [UPDATE,ID-2] Steady State (UDP) ID-3Key-3 ID-3

30 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Issues with UDP Encryption/Integrity › Session Management › Key Management › Key expiration  How frequent should we exchange a new set of keys? › Crash recovery

31 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Status Summary › Strong authentication  Support multiple protocols › User-based authorization › Encryption for both TCP/UDP › Integrity check for both TCP/UDP

32 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Future Work › Grid related work  Science Grid, PPDG … related work  Community Authorization Service (CAS) › Credential related  Expiration, refresh, delegation  MyProxy › More work on authorization  SPKI/SDSI, ClassAd

33 www.cs.wisc.edu/condor Questions? › Demo on Wednesday  Room 3397, CS Building, 9am – noon › More about Condor  http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor  condor-admin@cs.wisc.edu › Talk to us: Zachary Miller, Todd Tannenbaum Miron Livny Hao Wang

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