1. Intrusion Detection and Prevention

2. Objectives ● Purpose of IDS's ● Function of IDS's in a secure network design ● Install and use an IDS ● Customize the IDS signature database

3. IDS What are they? ● Dedicated hardened host ● Sensors ● Sits on a network that you want to protect ● Network sniffer ● Packet pattern analyzer ● Unlike firewalls an IDS is passive (this is changing) ● They are often on each layer of your layered network

4. Location of IDS's Exterior Firewall Internet Protected Network Internal Clients Internal DNS Mail Server External DNS SMTP Server Web Server IDS Interior Firewall Logging Alerting Server Internal Servers Public Network Internal IDS

5. IDS The Need ● Detection of probes, scans ● Detection of network reconnaissance activity ● Record of attempted exploits ● Location of a compromised host on your network ● Determined compromised information

6. The Attack Plan ● Usually multiphased ● Phase 1: Network scan ● Characterizing the hosts on the network ● Looking for particular services, e.g DNS, HTTP ● Determining the versions and OS types ● Phase 2: Exploits a buffer overflow in DNS ● Compromises the DNS host ● Phase 3: Compromises other hosts on the network ● Without IDS you would not know

7. Protection Plan ● Analyze all packets continuously ● Look for patterns of known attacks ● Network IDS Signatures ● The science behind IDS ● Like virus signatures IDS signatures must be updated ● Do it your self signature writing ● Sometime necessary ● Look for statistical anomalies ● Not a very well developed science as yet

8. Land Attack 1997 ● Based on hand crafted packets ● Source IP and destination IP addresses are the same ● Older systems would crash ● NT & 95 depended on proper packets ● Basically a denial of service attack ● www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/396645 www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/396645

9. Teardrop Attack 1997 – 1998 ● Improper packet sequence ● The IP fragment offset is malformed ● Consecutive packets overlap ● Newtear.c (on web site) ● Another DoS attack

10. Teardrop cont'd ● Packet 1 ● Total length of IP datagram ● 48 bytes ● More fragments flag is set ● Fragment offset is 0 ● UDP length ● 48 bytes – incorrect length should be length – 20 = 28

11. Teardrop cont'd ● Packet 2 ● Total length of IP datagram ● 24 bytes ● Fragment offset is 3 (* 8 bytes) ● More fragments bit is cleared ● 24 bytes are sent

12. Teardrop cont'd IP Datagram headerUDP Segment header Lengt h 48 More Frags Bit 1 Offset 0 Src port Dest port Length 48 Checksu m Packet 1 Byte 20Byte 28Byte 47Byte 0 IP Datagram header IP Payload Lengt h 24 More Frags Bit 0 Offset 3 Src port Dest port Packet 2 Byte 20 Byte 23Byte 0 Length 48 Checku m Byte 0 Byte 27 Byte 3 UDP payload Byte 7 New fragment Fragment reconstruction Byte 23 Should be 28

13. nimda worm 2001 ● Scan phase ● Determine if a web server is an unpatched MS IIS box ● Is it vulnerable to a Unicode-related exploit? ● Attack phase ● Exploit a buffer overflow

14. nimda worm cont'd ● IDS can detect the scan phase of nimda attack ● “%c0%af../winnt/etc” is contained in the URL ● %c0%af is the Unicode of a slash ● Most web servers scan for a “/”stuff indicating a cd to root ● Success of this attempt to change to the root directory indicates an unpatched IIS

15. nimda worm cont'd ● IDS rule ● /scripts/..%c0%af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir ● Specific text search for %c0%af ● Attack may change and this rule would not catch it ● Better approach ● Convert %c0%af to “/” and then check for validity of URL ● More robust

16. False +/- ● False positives ● Classifying benign activity as malicious ● Get a lot of attention since people see the alerts ● Annoying, usually the rule gets shut off entirely ● False negatives ● Missing a malicious activity ● Not seen and ignored ● Dangerous ● The risks in classification

17. IDS Evasion Techniques ● The attacker is patient ● The attacker is clever ● The attacker has nothing else to do ● Examples ● cmd.exe in the URL is often bad ● However cmd.exe-analysis.html may be OKcmd.exe-analysis.html ● cmd.%65xe is the same thing ● Text searches are not always good or effective

18. IDS Software ● Popular systems ● Snort – open source ● Cisco recommends using snort ● ISS RealSecure ● NFR Security NID ● Centralizing all IDS logs ● Easier analysis ● Alerts – logs, e-mails, pagers, etc.

19. Distributed IDS ● IDS logs submitted to third party for collective analysis ● Attack Registry &Intelligence Service ● ttp://aris.securityfocus.com ttp://aris.securityfocus.com ● Dshield ● ttp://www.dshield.org ttp://www.dshield.org

20. Outsourced IDS ● Counterpane ● Trusecure ● Deloitte & Touche