1. Infectious Salmon Anemia (ISA) Development and application of a national contingency plan for emergencies in aquaculture – Experience of a country Michael David, MS, VMD, MPH USDA APHIS Veterinary Services Mazatlán, Mexico November 11-12, 2008

2. Acknowledgements Dr. Gary Egrie – Aquaculture Specialist, APHIS/VS, Maryland Dr. Steve Ellis – VMO, APHIS/VS, Maine Ms. Teresa Robinson – Biologist, APHIS/VS, Maine Other State and Industry

3. Maine

4. Isolated Broodstock

5. Lethal spawning

6. Collecting Eggs & Milt

7. Broodstock Sampling

8. Disinfection & Hardening

9. Egg trays

10. Hatchery Tanks Smolt fieldHatch house

11. Smolt Transport

12. Smolt Transfer

13. Harvesting

14. Infectious Salmon Anemia

15. Epidemiology Virus shed in body excretions (feces, urine, mucus) Transmission –Ingestion of contaminated tissues/fluids –Physical contact –Sea lice If uncontrolled, it will spread from site to site Onset of clinical disease affected by: –Length of time fish have been in saltwater –Water temp –Vx status –Sea lice (copepod) load –Nutrition –Immune system status –Site management procedures

16. Clinical signs lethargy protruding eyes pale gills severe anemia swelling of the spleen swelling and hemorrhaging in the kidney and other organs darkening of the posterior gut fluid in the body cavity and Gross pathology

17. Cobscook Bay: 2001 detection 2001: detection of ISA and 1 M fish depopulated Jan 2002: ISA program implemented Feb 2002: 1.6 M addl fish depop Completes depop in Cobscook Bay

18. Cleaning & Disinfection

19. Management of outbreak

20. Outbreak and its response May 2002: restock sites May 2002 – May 2003: 13 months of negative monthly samples June 9 2003: Site - samples collected 1 st cage June 12 2003: positive test results confirming ISAV infection (i.e. 2 fish by 2 tests in one cage) June 18 2003: completion of fish removal 1 st cage June 25 2003: samples collected 2 nd cage July 1 2003: positive test results confirming ISAV infection in 2 nd cage July 6 2003: completion of fish removal 2 nd cage

21. ISA outbreak (2002-2006)

22. 2006YC - 1- 3 month fallow for the sites in ME & NB Spring 2002, new smolts stocked in lower part of bay Spring 2003, smolts stocked in upper part of bay March 2004, all 2002YC confirmed sites out of water First confirmed ISA positive cage of the 2002YC First confirmed ISA positive cage of the 2003YC First confirmed ISA positive cage of the 2004YC Timeline of ISA Confirmed Cages 2002 - 2006 August 2005, all 2003YC confirmed sites out of water March 2006, all 2004YC sites out of water No 2005YC fish in Cobscook Bay No ISA confirmed cages in the 2006YC fish Spring 2004, smolts stocked in lower part of bay

23. Response and actions taken Increased sampling frequency to weekly on affected sites, biweekly on other sites in the bay Collected viral samples from fish in cages with a previous PCR+ result Removed cages with positive test results, whether or not confirmed

24. Example of aggressive cage removal Positive PCR results Aug7, Aug11, Aug12 & Aug15/2003 No corroborating IFAT tests Clinical signs of disease observed Cage removed voluntarily on Aug22/2003 Cage was confirmed positive on Sep12/2003 due to positive results of viral samples taken Aug12 & Aug15 Three weeks less viral exposure to other cages

25. Chronology of events 1996: detected in New Brunswick, Canada 2001: first identified in Cobscook Bay, Maine –Industry voluntarily depopulates affected sites –Sites allowed to fallow for 3 months 2002: May – new smolts stocked 2003: June – two cages positive at two sites Sep 2003 – Feb 2006: 40 more cages positive Mar 2006 – Apr 2006: USA-Canada coordinated fallowing 2006: May – new smolts stocked –No infection/disease for more than 2 years –Fish to be harvested Feb 2009 2009: Spring – new smolts to be stocked

26. Biosecurity

27. Biosecurity Practices Implement mandatory third-party biosecurity audits of farms and vessels Have dedicated site-specific personnel, equipment & vessels Disinfect all aquaculture equipment after use Disinfect crew and visitor gear before and after transport to a site Disinfect mort divers between cages and at the end of the dive –Have dedicated site-specific gear for each diver and cage- specific dive bags Disinfect boat and mort tender gear at the end of each dive Clean and disinfect vessels before being moved between zones or across the border

28. Iodophor scrub station Disinfection after a dive Boot disinfection on vessel Disinfection of diver between cages

29. Management Practices Establish management zones –2006: new management zones established based on hydrographic models of tidal exchange between sites on both sides of the border Fallow all sites in a management zone for one to three months Restrict movement of vessels, equipment and personnel between sites and management zones Prohibit movement of fish between sites Selective age-grouping of fish by zone Monitor sea lice periodically Conduct monthly surveillance for ISAV Depopulate affected cages

30. Bay Management Zonation From this… … to this

31. Canadian standards USA standards Industry

32. Held regular meetings between USDA APHIS and authorities from New Brunswick, Canada (starting in 2003) to discuss infection status, program goals and collaboration strategies. –Also held meetings with state government officials, industry managers and veterinarians. Visited sites, processing plants, and feed companies Result of meetings: –Improved ISA control efforts on both sides of the border. –Improved communication, data-sharing and cooperation. –Improved management strategies. Collaboration & Program Harmonization

33. Infectious Salmon Anemia Program ISA was the first aquatic disease triggering USDA/APHIS intervention –Resulted in establishment of an aquatic health program Formed small committee to establish the ISA Program Standards – (USDA, State, industry and aquatic health professionals) –Used Canadian policies and experience and Norwegian epidemiologic findings as basis of ISA standards Shared resources –Funding: USDA ISA emergency funding (December 2001) No appropriated funding –Personnel: State partner, DMR, lease site and quarantine authority, vessel movement control and enforcement capabilities

34. Seven Components Surveillance Testing Disease reporting Disease control and biosecurity Quarantine Depopulation Partial compensation

35. Next steps … Common management practices Common biosecurity procedures Common database Health and production data

36. Muchas Gracias