1. B.5.2 WP83 Surveillance – Study Issues Associated with Incorrect Flight Identification Presented by: Bill Holtzman (USA) on behalf of TOC 1

2. B.5.2 Flight ID Ground sensors send interrogation that includes the ID of the target plane. Other aircraft receiving the interrogation will not respond. Mode S 2

3. B.5.2 Flight ID Automatic - interrogation not needed to start squitter Dependent – data from on- board nav and comm gear Surveillance – contains radar-like data Broadcast – transmission available to all users ADS-B 3

4. B.5.2 Flight ID BDS Registers are the physical memory in the transponder in which specific data is stored. BDS Registers 4

5. B.5.2 Flight ID 5 BDS Registers Money question: Can Flight ID replace 4096 codes?

6. B.5.2 Flight ID 6  ICAO Annex 10, Volume III, Chapter 9  Assigned by State of Registry  24-bit sequence of 1’s and 0’s  Entered by technician  16,777,214 possible  Shall not be changed Aircraft/Airframe Address

7. B.5.2 Flight ID 24-bit Aircraft Address Source: Eurocontrol, Principles of Mode S Operation and Interrogator Codes, March 18, 2003 7

8. B.5.2 Flight ID “Current monitoring of Mode S transponders that also use the 24-bit address has shown a steady stream of problems, including: - duplicated addresses, - nonsensical addresses.” Source: EUROCONTROL ATM PROCEDURES DEVELOPMENT SUB- GROUP (APDSG), January 23-25, 2007 Agenda Item: 12, 24-bit aircraft address in the flight plan 24-bit ID errors 8

9. B.5.2 Flight ID Flight ID Text string of 8 or less characters containing one of the following:  Carrier and call sign – “KLM 45”  Military call sign – “Air Force 1”  Tail number - “CFXDE” 9

10. B.5.2 Flight ID DF - Downlink format UF - Uplink format Specifications on data transmission between the aircraft and the ground DF messages contain data extracted from BDS Registers UF/DF 10

11. B.5.2 Flight ID 11 Downlink formats Source: “Understanding Mode S Technology”, Wes Stamper, Aeroflex, Defense Electronics, 12/1/2005

12. B.5.2 Flight ID NAVCANADA Hudson Bay 12

13. B.5.2 Flight ID 13 NAVCANADA Source: Hudson Bay ADS-B, January 2009, NAVCANADA Pilot Guidance Brochure

14. B.5.2 Flight ID 14 NAVCANADA Source: Hudson Bay ADS-B, January 2009, NAVCANADA Pilot Guidance Brochure

15. B.5.2 Flight ID 15 NAVCANADA Source: Hudson Bay ADS-B, January 2009, NAVCANADA Pilot Guidance Brochure

16. B.5.2 Flight ID Manual Correlation 16

17. B.5.2 Flight ID Automated Correlation 17

18. B.5.2 Flight ID ASAS 18 Airborne Separation Assistance Systems ASAS applications: Clearance references another aircraft, a “third party” In-Trail Procedure and other new methods

19. B.5.2 Flight ID Mode A Correlation 19

20. B.5.2 Flight ID Conspicuity Code 20

21. B.5.2 Flight ID In-Flight Lock Courtesy: Carlos Limon, President, IFALPA 21

22. B.5.2 Flight ID Mode A vs Mode S 22

23. B.5.2 Flight ID 23 IFATCA considers the following to be the minimum attributes of any CDTI system used in Airborne Separation Assurance applications: Positive unambiguous identification of all relevant aircraft to the standards currently required of ATC systems and controllers. IFATCA Santiago 1999

24. B.5.2 Flight ID 24 IFATCA Policy: Identification issues need to be resolved prior to the implementation of ASAS applications. IFATCA Buenos Aires 2003

25. B.5.2 Flight ID 25 TOC discusses the issues of capability to ‘switch off’ incorrect ADS-B data…In Australia, incorrect Flight ID input is relatively common and the ability to change it ‘airborne’ is limited. [There are] proposed changes to ‘Civil Aviation Regulations’ mandating this function. IFATCA Istanbul 2007

26. B.5.2 Flight ID Maastricht Study Source: ICAO ASP, Louisville, KY, April 20-24, 2009. Eurocontrol Maastricht – UAC Statistics on Aircraft Identification 26

27. B.5.2 Flight ID 27 “..a procedural requirement for controller/pilot communications establishing a shared traffic referent is implicit in the design of multiple [ASAS] applications.” MITRE Study Source: MITRE Corporation, ICAS 2008, Say Who? Homing in on Conventions for Traffic Identification in Communications Centered Around a Cockpit Traffic Display

28. B.5.2 Flight ID 28 “Ideally, the cross validation of display information should be performed automatically and prior to the controller/pilot communication. Cross-validation mechanism may be achieved via new software.” MITRE Opinion Source: MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia, USA, Karol Kerns in an ad hoc paper 2009

29. B.5.2 Flight ID 29 8.5.3.4 Whenever it is observed on the situation display that the aircraft identification transmitted by a Mode S-equipped aircraft is different from that expected from the aircraft, the pilot shall be requested to confirm and, if necessary, re-enter the correct aircraft identification. ICAO Doc 4444: PANS-ATM

30. B.5.2 Flight ID 30 8.5.3.5 If...the discrepancy continues to exist, the following actions shall be taken by the controller: a)inform the pilot... b)where possible, correct the label... c) notify...the next control position... ICAO Doc 4444: PANS-ATM

31. B.5.2 Flight ID 31 –A work around is not an intrinsic solution –“Pay attention” and “make sure” are not guarantees of anything –Positive identification is no different than positive separation ICAO Doc 4444: PANS-ATM

32. B.5.2 Flight ID 32 Surface Vehicles “Sensis VeeLo NextGen…installs on the external surface of vehicles…to provide controllers with vehicle position and identity. “...broadcasts location and identity using Mode S Extended Squitter...” Source: Sensis web site (http://www.sensis.com/docs/50/)

33. B.5.2 Flight ID IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual page 3 2 1 5: To ensure integrity of system surveillance data (not just ATC surveillance) it is essential that the automatic transmission of erroneous dependent position data can be disabled or marked as inaccurate during all phases of flight. Current TPM 33

34. B.5.2 Flight ID 34 1. Correlations Where Mode S flight ID is used to correlate a track: the correlation fails if the Flight ID is incorrect. Where transponder code is used to correlate a track: the aircraft ID shown to the controller on the scope and the aircraft ID shown to the pilot on the CDTI may not agree. Conclusions

35. B.5.2 Flight ID 35 2. IFATCA policy remains valid. “Identification issues need to be resolved prior to the implementation of ASAS applications.” 3. Mode S Flight ID needs to have the same priority, display, and ease of use as existing Mode A implementations on the aircraft. Conclusions

36. B.5.2 Flight ID 36 Debate

37. B.5.2 Flight ID 37 4.1 - IFATCA Policy is: ATC systems must validate the Flight ID transmitted by an aircraft’s Mode S transponder and indicate to the controller any discrepancy with the ICAO aircraft identification in the flight plan. and is included on page 3 2 1 6 of the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual. Recommendations

38. B.5.2 Flight ID 38 4.2 - IFATCA Policy is: Any broadcast of incorrect ATM data should be corrected or if unable then: Switched off, or Marked as invalid. and is included on page 3 2 1 6 of the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual. Recommendations