2. University of Virginia 1 Gregory LammGerlando Falauto Jorge EstradaJag Gadiyaram November 29, 2000 Identifying and Assessing Security Issues related to Bluetooth Wireless Networks

3. University of Virginia 2 A Christmas Carol Charles Dickens had it right-for every major issue (or story) in the world, there is usually a Past, a Present and a Future that are clearly identifiable. Group 11 would like to tell you a story.

4. University of Virginia 3 The Ghost of Bluetooth Past 10 th Century Danish King (unified warring Viking Tribes): Harald Bluetooth No Wireless Networks prior to 20 th Century New Wireless Transmission Schemes for the 21 st Century –802.11b –Home Radio Frequency –Bluetooth (version 1.0)

5. University of Virginia 4 Past Bluetooth Attacks 1.Third Party Eavesdropping & Impersonating 2.Stealing Addresses from a Bluetooth Device  Tracking the device through the network  Impersonate a device AB C

6. University of Virginia 5 Ad hoc Networks Bluetooth Chip: $50 Range: 10 meters (30 feet) Throughput: 720,000 bps Peer to Peer Piconet (8/250) Scatternet (10 Piconets) The Ghost of Bluetooth Present

7. University of Virginia 6 Bluetooth ( Special Interest Group) 1,900 Bluetooth Technology Manufactures

8. University of Virginia 7 Bluetooth Applications

9. University of Virginia 8 Bluetooth Development Local Area Network (LAN) Wireless Phone Network Small Network Large Throughput IR or Radio Communication Relays not used Fixed with limited mobility Small Distances Large Network Small Throughput Radio Communication Relays used Mobility Large Distances

10. University of Virginia 9 Bluetooth Overview Local Area Network (LAN) Wireless Phone Network Encryption Authentication Communication Challenge-Response Scheme SAFER+ None/One-way/Mutual Needed for encryption Optional Symmetric Stream Cipher Negotiable Key Size (8-128 bits) Clock dependent Radio Frequency Hopping (1600 Hps) 2.4GHz Frequency Range RF Interface 720 Kbps – 4 Mbps

11. University of Virginia 10 Bluetooth Communication Link Manager Protocol (LMP) –Configure, authenticate and handle the connections –Power management scheme Radio Frequency Communications (RF C) –Controls Frequency Hopping for Bluetooth Logical Link Control (LLC) –Link Management –Security Management –QoS Management –Transmission Scheduling

12. University of Virginia 11 Bluetooth Authentication Link key generation K LINK PIN Random # SRES’ SRES ACO’ ACO Encryption key generation SRES’ BD_ADDR B CHECK SRES = SRES’ E 1 (SAFER+) BD_ADDR B K LINK AU_RAND E 1 (SAFER+) BD_ADDR B K LINK AU_RAND A (Verifier) B (Claimant) AU_RAND

13. University of Virginia 12 Bluetooth Encryption E0E0 BD_ADDR A clock A K C’ K cipher data A-B data B-A E0E0 BD_ADDR A clock A K’ C’ K’ cipher data A-B data B-A data AB = Is everything OK? Yes, BUT... Is everything OK? Yes, BUT...

14. University of Virginia 13 The Ghost of Bluetooth Future Encryption – Plain Text Attack Authentication – Unit Key Stealing Communication – Impersonation Security Weaknesses

15. University of Virginia 14 Bluetooth Applications

16. University of Virginia 15 Conclusions As Viking Hackers, we believe that Bluetooth has some vulnerabilities and some increased security measures are needed. Security Functionality