1. Topic 15 Intro to Intelligence
Introduction
The purpose of this topic is to introduce the student to intelligence, intelligence disciplines, confidence levels, organization and maritime intelligence. Also, it introduces the students to shore processing nodes and data dissemination systems including: the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).
Enabling Objectives
15.1 DISCUSS the origin and nature of U.S. intelligence.
15.2 DISCUSS the intelligence disciplines, confidence levels, organization and categories of intelligence products.
15.3 DISCUSS how maritime intelligence is gathered, analyzed and disseminated.
15.4 DISCUSS the Fleet Command Center (FCC), Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
15.5 DISCUSS the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).
C. Topic Outline
1. Introduction
2. Nature of intelligence
3. Intelligence disciplines: GEOINT, HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, OSINT, TECHINT, CI
4. Confidence levels
5. Intelligence organizations
6. Categories of intelligence products
7. Maritime intelligence
8. Intelligence nodes
9. Data Dissemination
10. Summary / Review
Topic 15 Intro to Intelligence
Enabling Objectives
15.1 DISCUSS the origin and nature of U.S. intelligence.
15.2 DISCUSS the intelligence disciplines, confidence levels, organization and categories of intelligence products.
15.3 DISCUSS how maritime intelligence is gathered, analyzed and disseminated.
15.4 DISCUSS the Fleet Command Center (FCC), Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
15.5 DISCUSS the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).

2. Figure 15.1: The First Spymaster
Introduction
The nation's first spymaster, General George Washington, recognized the need for accurate intelligence during the Revolutionary War. In a letter written July 26, 1777, Washington wrote: "The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged—All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible."
Intelligence operations in the colonies predate the war. In 1765, a confederation of dissident groups called the Sons of Liberty formed to harass the British. By 1772 the Sons of Liberty had evolved into the Committees of Correspondence, whose purpose was to share information in resisting colonial rule. In Boston, members of the committee, including Samuel Adams and John Hancock, patrolled the streets at night, observing the movement of British troops and warning rebels in the countryside of impending British raids that might turn up caches of arms and gunpowder.
In an early instance of intelligence tradecraft, Paul Revere arranged a signal that would give the rebels in the countryside advance warning of the direction of the raid—lanterns hung in the steeple of Boston's Old North Church. His stratagem, "one if by land, two if by sea," was immortalized by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in his poem Paul Revere's Ride. This raid went down in the history books as the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the opening salvos of the Revolution.
The Revolution also produced the new nation's first intelligence "mole" and the nation's first cryptanalyst. The mole was Dr. Benjamin Church, who posed as a member of the Boston group while secretly providing intelligence about American rebel activities to General Thomas Gage, commander of the occupying British troops in Boston. He was finally exposed through a compromising letter he wrote in code. The letter eventually fell into the hands of Washington, who hired an amateur cryptanalyst, the Reverend Samuel West, to decipher it.
"The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged – All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible."
15-2

3. The beginnings of professional intelligence
The beginnings of professional intelligence. In the decades between the Civil War and World War I, the United States took steps toward the development of an organized, professional intelligence capability. In 1885, President Cleveland called for assignment of military attachés to foreign countries to gather information. During the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired—and most importantly, acted upon—human intelligence about Spain's war-making capabilities. John Wilkie, head of the U.S. Secret Service, broke up the "Montreal spy ring" Spain had put in place in Canada. Before and during American participation in World War I, counterintelligence agents of the FBI and Secret Service were successful at ferreting out German agents and saboteurs within the United States, but during the war, the nation relied on cooperative arrangements with the British for overseas intelligence. It was the British, for example, who broke German diplomatic codes and in 1917 intercepted and deciphered the infamous Zimmermann telegram revealing Germany's intention to begin unrestricted submarine warfare against the United States.
Modern U.S. intelligence. The chief deficiency of U.S. intelligence during World War II was that it was scattered among the various branches of the military; whatever coordination it received happened only on President Franklin Roosevelt's desk. To correct this deficiency, Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan, a New York lawyer and former Army colonel, to assemble a plan for an intelligence service. Out of Donovan's plan emerged the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in June Under Donovan's leadership, the OSS was given the task of collecting and analyzing information needed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct "special operations," or clandestine operations that were not carried out by other federal agencies or the military. Throughout the war the OSS provided policy makers and the military with enemy troop strength estimates and other intelligence that was crucial to planning military campaigns.
The cold war with the Soviet Union following World War II gave increased urgency to the need for good intelligence, but opinion was divided about who should conduct intelligence operations and who should supervise their efforts. Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, divided responsibilities between military and civilian agencies in October 1945 when he abolished the OSS and transferred its operations to the Departments of War and State. Donovan, though, favored the formation of a strictly civilian organization that would coordinate intelligence gathering. Fearing that the plan would lessen their influence, both the military and the FBI opposed it. Truman struck a middle course in January 1946 when he established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), giving it the authority to coordinate intelligence gathered by existing departments and agencies. The CIG was placed under the supervision of a National Intelligence Authority, which consisted of the President and the secretaries of the State, War, and Navy departments. Thus, for the first time in its history the United States had a peacetime intelligence organization. Less than two years later, though, Congress passed the 1947 National Security Act, creating the civilian National Security Council (NSC) and placing under its authority the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Intelligence gathering was now firmly under the control of civilian rather than military authorities.
In the 1950s and early 1960s the CIA was the nation's bulwark against the expansion of communism and Soviet influence. It was the CIA, for example, that revealed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Its reputation was tarnished, though, by the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation against Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and reports of unsavory CIA activity during the war in Vietnam and, in the 1970s and 1980s, against unfriendly leftist regimes in Central and South America. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the CIA took on more notoriety as the nation looked to it as the front line in the fight against terrorism.
15-3

4. Figure 15.2 - Relationship of data, information and intelligence.
“By ‘intelligence’ we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.
Clausewitz
On War, 1832
The Nature of Intelligence
Raw data by itself has relatively little use. However, when data is collected from a sensor and processed into intelligible form, it becomes useful information. Information on its own is a fact or a series of facts that may be of use to the commander, but when related to other information already known, it gives rise to a new set of facts, which may be termed “intelligence”.
Intelligence includes organizations, processes, and products and involves the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and dissemination of information important to decision makers. Intelligence, however, is not an end in itself. For intelligence to have utility, it requires users. Thus, an examination of whether or not intelligence is effective or influential not only depends on the intelligence organizations, processes, and products, but also must consider the users. Explicit user requirements, properly communicated to intelligence agencies, initiate the intelligence collection process. Intelligence products provide users with the information that has been collected and analyzed based on requirements.
“By ‘intelligence’ we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.
Clausewitz
On War, 1832
15-4

5. Figure 15.3 – Intelligence Disciplines.
Intelligence disciplines are well-defined areas of intelligence planning, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination using a specific category of technical or human resources. The disciplines are sometimes broken down further into more specific subcategories as indicated in figure 15.3.
Intelligence sources are the means or systems that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. Intelligence sources can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors, and are grouped according to one of the seven major intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence (GEOINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT); open-source intelligence (OSINT); technical intelligence (TECHINT); and counterintelligence (CI). These disciplines should be used in concert to complement and support analytic conclusions in an integrated, multidisciplined approach to intelligence analysis.
15-5

6. Figure 15.4: Geospatial Intelligence origins.
Origin of Geospatial Intelligence
The U.S. geospatial intelligence effort began in 1803 when President Thomas Jefferson sent the Army’s Lewis and Clark expedition to explore and map the recently acquired Louisiana Territory. As the Army, assisted by its contract civilian scientists, supported the country’s westward expansion, the Navy began reaching out across the oceans. This maritime expansion, coupled with the Navy’s desire not to rely on British or commercial charts, led to establishment of the Navy Depot of Charts and Instruments in 1830.
During WWI, aerial photography became a major contributor to battlefield intelligence. Using stereo viewers, photo interpreters reviewed thousands of images. Many were the same target at different angles and times, giving rise to what became modern imagery analysis and mapmaking.
Mapping, 1803
Mapping, 2008
An Improvement?
During WWII, women entered the mapping workforce in substantial numbers to meet the growing need for skilled workers and technical improvements to aircraft, cameras and film. It was during this era when the concept of combining maps with analyzed imagery matured.
15-6

7. Figure 15.5: Geospatial Intelligence.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically reference activities on the Earth. It encompasses a range of products from simple IMINT reports to complex sets of layered foundation and intelligence/mission-specific data. GEOINT products are often developed through a “value added” process, in which both the producer and the user update a database or product with current information.
Advanced geospatial intelligence (AGI), formerly known as imagery-derived MASINT, includes all types of information technically derived from the processing, exploitation, and non-literal analysis. AGI does not include the MASINT sub-elements of RF, materials, nuclear radiation, geophysical, or radar not related to synthetic aperture radar.
15-7

8. Figure 15.6: Components of GEOINT.
Three Components of GEOINT
Imagery – likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related
object or activity and the associated positional data acquired at the same time
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) – the technical, geographic, and intelligence
information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral
materials
Geospatial information – the geographical location and characteristics of natural
or constructed features and boundaries on Earth
Figure 15.6: Components of GEOINT.
Components of GEOINT
Imagery – the likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related object or activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or presentation was acquired, including products produced by space-based national reconnaissance systems, and likenesses or presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar systems.
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) – the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials. IMINT includes exploitation of imagery data derived from electro-optical (EO), radar, infrared (IR), multi-spectral, and laser sensors. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media.
Geospatial information – the geographical location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on Earth, including: statistical data; information derived from remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies; and mapping, charting, geodetic data, and related products. This information is used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning and rehearsal, modeling and simulation, and targeting.
15-8

9. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Figure 15.7: Human Intelligence.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. This includes all forms of information gathered by humans, from direct reconnaissance and observation to the use of recruited sources and other indirect means. This discipline also makes extensive use of biometric data (e.g. fingerprints, iris scans, voice prints, facial/physical features) collected on persons of interest.
Interrogation – systematic effort to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct or indirect questioning techniques of a person who is in the custody of forces conducting the questioning. Proper questioning of enemy combatants, enemy POWs, or other detainees by trained and certified DOD interrogators may result in information provided either willingly or unwittingly.
Source operations – elicitation of sources including “walk-in” (the source makes first contact), developed or unwitting person sources.
Debriefing – the process of questioning cooperating human sources to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. Human sources include friendly force personnel, refugees/displaced persons, returnees (freed hostages), and volunteers.
Document and media exploitation – captured documents and media, when properly processed and exploited, may provide valuable information such as adversary plans and intentions, force locations, equipment capabilities and logistical status.
A category of intelligence derived from information
collected and provided by human sources
15-9

10. Figure 15.8: Signals Intelligence.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Figure 15.8: Signals Intelligence.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
SIGINT is intelligence produced by exploiting foreign communications systems and non-communications emitters. It provides unique intelligence information, complements intelligence derived from other sources and is often used for cueing other sensors to potential targets of interest. For example, SIGINT which identifies activity of interest may be used to cue GEOINT to confirm that activity. Conversely, changes detected by GEOINT can cue SIGINT collection against new targets. SIGINT is subdivided into three categories:
COMINT – communications intelligence is intelligence and technical information derived from collecting and processing intercepted foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means. It includes computer network exploitation.
ELINT – electronic intelligence is intelligence derived from the interception and analysis of non-communications emitters (e.g. radar). Consists of OPELINT (operationally relevant information) and TECHELINT (technical aspects of foreign communications).
FISINT – foreign instrumentation signals intelligence is the technical analysis of data intercepted from foreign equipment and control systems such as telemetry, electronic interrogators, tracking/fusing/arming/firing command systems and video data links.
15-10

11. MASINT
Measurement and Signature Intelligence is scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma and hydro-magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with target, source, emitter, or sender.
Figure 15.9: MASINT
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)
Measurement and Signature Intelligence is scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma and hydro-magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with target, source, emitter, or sender. The technical data sources related to MASINT include:
Electro-Optical data – emitted or reflected energy across the visible/IR portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Radar data – radar energy reflected from a target or object.
Radio Frequency data – RF/electromagnetic pulse emissions associated with nuclear testing, or other high energy events.
Geophysical data – phenomena transmitted through the Earth.
Materials data – gas, liquid, or solid samples.
Nuclear radiation data – nuclear radiation and physical phenomena associated with nuclear weapons, processes, materials, devices, or facilities.
15-11

12. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
Figure 15.10: Open Source Intelligence
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
OSINT is based on publicly available information as well as other UNCLASSIFIED information that has limited public distribution or access. Examples include online official documents, published reference material, academic research, databases, commercial and non-commercial websites, chat rooms and web logs (blogs). Caution should be exercised when using OSINT in that open sources may be susceptible to adversary use as a mode of deception (e.g. incorrect information may be planted in public information).
OSINT can be particularly important during peace operations that place a premium on human factors analysis and data derived from sociological, demographic, cultural and ethnological studies. By using OSINT to supply basic information, controlled assets and/or resources and technical systems are freed to be directed against priority intelligence gaps.
Publicly available information
upon request or observation
15-12

13. Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)
Exploitation of foreign material and scientific information
Begins with acquiring a foreign piece of equipment or scientific/technical information
Item is then exploited by specialized collection and analysis teams
Assess the capabilities and vulnerabilities
Provide a detailed assessment
Figure 15.11: Technical Intelligence
Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)
TECHINT is derived from the exploitation of foreign material and scientific information. It begins with the acquisition of a foreign piece of equipment or foreign scientific/technological information. The item is then exploited by specialized, multi-Service collection and analysis teams. These teams assess the capabilities and vulnerabilities and provide a detailed assessment.
15-13

14. Counterintelligence (CI)
Figure 15.12: Counterintelligence (CI)
Counterintelligence (CI)
Counterintelligence is similar to, and often confused with HUMINT, because CI uses many of the same techniques for information collection. CI obtains information by, or through, the functions of CI operations, investigations, collection and reporting, analysis, production, dissemination, and functional services. CI is not solely a collection discipline, however, and also acts upon information for both offensive and defensive purposes, in coordination with other intelligence disciplines, law enforcement and/or security elements.
CI support includes force protection during all types and phases of military operations, detection, identification and neutralization of espionage, antiterrorism, threat assessments, counter-proliferation actions, countering illegal technical transfer, acquisition systems protection, support to other intelligence agencies, information system protection, and treaty support.
15-14

15. Figure 15.13: Intelligence Confidence Levels.
Intelligence can be facts that have been observed, or it can be a conclusion based on facts of such certainty that it is considered to be knowledge. It can also be conclusions and estimates deduced from incomplete sets of facts or induced from potentially related facts. Determination of appropriate objectives and operations may rest on knowing whether intelligence is “fact” or “assumption” and knowing the particular logic used to develop an intelligence estimate.
Because analytical conclusions are the products of source reliability and analyst’s experience, judgment and intuition, the confidence-level scale from figure gives both a verbal and numerical value to be used as a shorthand assessment.
15-15

16. Figure 15.14 – National Intelligence Leadership structure.
Intelligence Organization
The intelligence community (IC) consists of the member organizations depicted in figure Both DoD and non-DoD members of the IC routinely provide support to JFCs while continuing to support national decision makers. However, the focus of national organizations is not evenly split among intelligence customers and varies according to the situation and competing requirements as prioritized by the national intelligence leadership.
The military members of the IC consist of the four defense agencies (DIA, NGA, NSA, NRO) and the four Service intelligence centers. The non-military members of the IC include: CIA, Departments of State, Energy, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as FBI, DEA, and USCG.
US Navy Intelligence
The Director of Naval Intelligence exercises staff supervision over the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which provides the intelligence necessary to plan, build, train, equip and maintain US naval forces. The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) consists of ONI, the USCG Intelligence Coordination Center, the Navy Intelligence Operations Command, detachments of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
15-16

17. Figure 15.15 – Categories of Intelligence Products.
Intelligence products are generally placed in one of seven production categories: I&W, current, general military, target, scientific and technical, CI and estimative intelligence (figure 15.15). The categories are distinguished from each other primarily by the purpose for which the intelligence was produced. The categories can and do overlap, and the same intelligence and information can be used in each of the categories.
1. Indications and Warnings (I&W) Intelligence – foreign developments that could involve a threat to the US, US allies, US political or economic interests, or US citizens abroad.
2. Current Intelligence – updated support for ongoing military operations.
3. General Military Intelligence – military capabilities of foreign countries that could affect US.
4. Target Intelligence – selecting and prioritizing targets to satisfy objectives.
5. Scientific & Technical (S&T) Intelligence – foreign enhancements in weapon systems.
6. Counterintelligence – threats posed by foreign intelligence and security services.
7. Estimative Intelligence – forecasts of how a situation may develop.
15-17

18. Command Centers National Systems Network Management Center (NMC) BFT
IBS-S
IBS-I
AIS
Figure 15.16: Maritime intelligence is predominately gathered using C4ISR systems.
Maritime Intelligence
Maritime intelligence is a military discipline that focuses on the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of information about the enemy in an area of operations or areas of interest. Intelligence information includes the location of an enemy’s military air, surface and subsurface platforms, including maritime threats such as mine fields.
Gathering Intelligence
Maritime intelligence is predominately gathered using C4I Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. C4ISR systems gather maritime intelligence by detecting, localizing, classifying, and reporting contacts. C4ISR systems are located on land, at sea, and in space. They include shipboard sensor systems and embarked aircraft, assigned assets and their sensor systems (e.g. P-3C), and other sensor systems not directly under the control of the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) (e.g. Integrated Undersea Surveillance System – IUSS).
Command Centers
Mission
Management
Center
IBS-LOS
Network Management
Center (NMC)

19. 15-19 Analyzing and Disseminating Intelligence
Figure 15.17: Notional Theater COP dissemination architecture.
Analyzing and Disseminating Intelligence
After maritime intelligence is collected it can be sent to applicable shore nodes/fusion centers for analysis. Shore nodes mainly gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information from supporting sensor systems. These nodes provide all source data to shore commanders, but are also configured to export intelligence information to units afloat via COP Synch Tools (CST). Shore nodes normally have an assigned geographic area, however, some shore nodes do have worldwide responsibility (e.g. the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)).
Some shore nodes have assigned data management responsibilities, generally commensurate with the capabilities of their data processing and correlation systems. Data from these shore nodes provide indication and warning (I&W) information, and is used to cue attached and assigned sensors. Data is normally transmitted to afloat users through COP Correlation Sites using CST. Additionally, data can be sent and received to/from afloat users via NETPREC if required.
There are many types of shore nodes that assist afloat units gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence information, however, this topic focuses on: the Fleet Command Centers (FCC), Joint Intelligence Operation Centers (JIOC), and Office of Naval Intelligence.
15-19

20. Fleet Command Center
Mission – Organize, man, train, and equip Navy operational forces and provide planning support to Combatant Commanders
- Deter, detect, and defend against homeland maritime threats
- Articulate Fleet warfighting and readiness to the CNO
Equipment and facilities
GCCS-M
Display theater-wide tactical data
Locations
CFFC (Norfolk, Va)
COMPACFLT (Hawaii)
COMUSNAVEUR - (Stuttgart, GE)
Theater Maritime COP Manager
COP Fusion Center
Provide fused and managed Theater Maritime COP
to the Combatant Commander
Responsible for fusing and managing the white shipping
component of the COP
Figure 15.18: Fleet Command Center (FCC).
Fleet Command Centers
The Fleet Command Centers (FCC) maintain a timely flow of command and control data from various sources. They coordinate the tasking of joint, allied, and other national resources to support theater surveillance requirements. They are solely responsible for receiving and populating the COP with the Common Intelligence Picture (CIP). Additionally, FCC’s are designated as the Theater Maritime COP Manager and responsible for providing the Combatant Commander with a fused and managed Theater Maritime Common Operational Picture. Fusion and management of the theater COP is accomplished at the COP Fusion Center.
It should be noted that the COP responsibilities of the FCC are migrating over to the Maritime Head Quarters (MHQ) within Maritime Operations Center (MOC).
COP Fusion Centers
COP Fusion centers are an entity of the FCC and provide overall management of the accumulated data from the Cop Correlation Sites (CCS). They will also add additional information as required and act as a gateway to the Combatant Commander. Accumulated data from the CCSs includes white shipping broadcasts (e.g. Automatic Identification System (AIS)), red cell data, ship positional reports from non-CST capable units (normally a numbered fleet commander function), and data injected from afloat units. They also provide COP connectivity for intra-theater Naval shore nodes and Maritime CJTF/JFMCC as directed.
15-20

21. NMIC/ONI
National Maritime Intelligence Center/Office of Naval Intelligence
Creates and maintains a Maritime Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) on merchant and fishing vessels of interest
Maintains SEA LINK data base on SIPRNET website
Receives Reports via:
FNMOC (WMO)
Sightings (USN, other)
Lloyds shipping reports
Disseminates maritime CIP via CST to
CFFC
NMIC/ONI
Figure 15.19: The Office of Naval Intelligence is the primary WHITE database manager.
Office of Naval Intelligence
The primary white database manager is the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). ONI is located at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) in Suitland Maryland. They are the Navy’s principal source for the maritime Common Intelligence Picture (CIP). Additionally, they are the national leader in non-traditional maritime issues such as counter-narcotics, poaching issues, illegal ocean dumping of hazardous material, and counter-proliferation of illegal weapons.
Traditionally, merchant ships have transmitted their positions to the Fleet Numerical Meteorological Oceanographic Center (FNMOC) reporting and requesting weather information. FNMOC then retransmits this information to ONI. ONI also gathers data from other sources (like sailing plans) on merchant ship arrivals and departures. Additionally, ONI receives information from various shore and afloat commands/units which get input into the SeaLink database which can be accessed via the ONI SIPRNET website.
Suitland Maryland
15-21

22. JIOC (formerly JIC/JAC)
Joint Intelligence Operations Center
Process theater-wide red/white data
Support
FCCs via COP
Afloat Units
SPOT reports and IMINT (via JWICS)
Tailored support available (requested)
Access info via SIPR/JWICS websites
Each Combatant Commander is supported by a JIOC
JIOC
Figure 15.20: Joint Intelligence Operations Center.
Shore Intelligence Centers
Shore intelligence centers are responsible for tracking and reporting hostile or assumed hostile ships and high interest white merchant ships. In short, they are responsible for tracking any contact that has some sort of intelligence value. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) is the primary intelligence analysis organization. Each Combatant Commander is supported by a JIOC.
The national military strategy describes intelligence centers as “the primary element for ensuring effective intelligence support for Commanders, Combat Commanders and Joint theater forces.” The concept is to fuse the main support capabilities of all services, combat support agencies, and combat units into a “one stop shopping center” for intelligence support.
By design they should be scalable, expandable, and mobile enough to meet the needs of the Combatant Commander by performing such duties as: 1) Indications and Warnings (I&W), 2) Current intelligence products, 3) Collection management center, 4) Production of specific and/or general intelligence products, and 5) Support the Fleet Command Centers, Joint Command Centers, and Afloat/Mobile units.
15-22

23. SeaLink
SeaLink is an ONI development and integration initiative to improve fleet access to maritime intelligence. SeaLink provides fleet and other intelligence consumers with on-line, on-demand access to maritime intelligence information produced and maintained at the National Maritime Intelligence Center. SeaLink provides direct, seamless access to ONI production databases using World-Wide Web (WWW) browsers, meaning that users now have a simple, point-and-click interface to databases with dynamic, data-driven displays from any client platform.
SeaLink provides access to ONI maritime scientific and technical information, ship location, ship characteristics, and an extensive range of other maritime intelligence information.
SeaLink uses commercial technology to enable users to call database-stored procedures; in turn, these procedures generate HTML (HyperText Markup Language) pages on the fly with imbedded data from the databases. A joint Government/ MITRE/Contractor team developed and prototyped SeaLink, the first use of WWW Database Interface Software within Intelink to provide a seamless access to a federation of operational maritime databases.
Users can perform geographic searches for maritime intelligence using a system-supplied map, user-provided coordinates, or region or port names. The results from the query can themselves contain pointers to other important intelligence information in other databases. A geographic query may return a number of ships each with pointers to ship location and characteristics data.
In addition to SeaLink, ONI can disseminate maritime information to CFFC via CST. CFFC will then disseminate it to the COP Fusion Centers via CST where it is input into the theater COP and shared with afloat users.
Sea link paragraphs
15-23

24. Integrated Broadcast System (IBS)
IBS – Interactive
IBS – Simplex
IBS – Network
IBS – Line Of Sight (LOS)
Figure 15.21: The Integrated Broadcast System (IBS).
IBS (Integrated Broadcast System)
The Integrated Broadcast System (IBS) integrates multiple intelligence broadcasts into a system of systems, and migrates tactical receive terminals into a single, related Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) family. The are four main IBS broadcasts: IBS Interactive (IBS-I), IBS Simplex (IBS-S), IBS Line-of-Sight (IBS-LOS), and IBS Network (IBS-N).
The goal of the IBS is to resolve the uncoordinated proliferation of "stovepiped" intelligence/information broadcasts by providing the tactical commander with integrated time-sensitive tactical information.
IBS – I
The IBS-I is a tactical intelligence dissemination service developed and implemented to provide direct support to military operations in the areas of battlefield management, targeting, and situational awareness as they relate to combat commanders, their supporting echelons, and other supporting organizations throughout the world.
The IBS-I product is a dynamic, near-real-time depiction of the world from the vantage point of intelligence collection platforms. As a satellite broadcast, IBS-I data is available to all user commands, concurrently and immediately.
15-24

25. IBS Network (UHF perspective)
IBS Simplex (IBS-S) Broadcast
(UHF SATCOM)
Command Centers
JTT Users
IBS Interactive (IBS-I) Network
(UHF SATCOM)
National
Systems
Figure 15.22: The Integrated Broadcast System (IBS) from the UHF perspective.
IBS – S
The IBS-S is a centralized, continuous, tactical broadcast system transmitted by UHF SATCOM. IBS-S delivers multiple channels of time-critical intelligence and other information from national systems and theater sensors to US and Allied forces worldwide.
TADIXS B
TADIXS B is a UHF SACOM circuit used to deliver tactical information broadcasts to platforms that have Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT).
Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT)
JTT is a radio system that provides the Navy with the capability to operate as producers and users of Tactical Intelligence Data. The JTT will provide warfighters at all levels the capability to exchange and process timely intelligence and targeting information via the IBS. JTT utilizes receive only Tactical Data Information Exchange Subsystem B (TADIXS-B), IBS-S and IBS-I.
Network Management
Center (NMC)
15-25

26. Joint Tactical Terminal-Maritime (JTT-M)
IBS – Line-of-Sight (LOS)
IBS-LOS is an anti-jam, tactical theater level, readily transportable SIGINT reporting service. It was developed based on the combined requirements of the US Air Force and US Army. The purpose of IBS-LOS is to provide war-fighters at all echelons, the ability to receive and exchange near-real-time theater focused collateral and Sensitive Compartmental Information (SCI) tactical intelligence and targeting data collected by airborne reconnaissance systems.
IBS-Network (IBS-N)
As the tactical user community expands its use of network systems to disseminate near-real-time intelligence, the IBS continually evolves its network delivery options. IBS-N consists of Global Network Initiative (GNI), Global IBS Network Server (GINS), and Radiant Ether (RE).
Radiant Ether
Radiant Ether is an IBS network solution that provides IBS data to bandwidth-disadvantaged SIPRNET users. The majority of RE users require time sensitive tactical intelligence data but do not have an IBS over-the-air capability. IBS-S, IBS-I, and other regional data is currently available via RE. For more information on the IBS family of systems visit the Integrated Broadcast Service Support Office (IBSSO) at
Joint Tactical Terminal/Common Integrated Broadcast Service Modules (JTT/CIBS-M) is a software based UHF radio
Receives and transmits IBS data
Distributes IBS data to Tactical Data Processors (i.e. GCCS-M)
Provides near-real-time all source, joint tactical intelligence, targeting, and situational awareness information
Provides unique access to national SIGINT sources
Networked with worldwide resources
15-26

27. SUPPORTING SENSORS (e.g.,TENCAP) ASSIGNED SENSORS (e.g., P-3C)
OTC’s LEVEL OF CONTROL
OPCON & TACON
NONE
TACON
SUPPORTING SENSORS (e.g.,TENCAP)
ASSIGNED SENSORS (e.g., P-3C)
ATTACHED SENSORS (e.g., E-2C)
Figure 15.23: C4ISR systems are categorized according to the OTC/CWC tasking authority and level of control.
Categorizing C4I Systems
C4I systems are categorized according to the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC)/ Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) tasking authority and level of control. The two levels of control are: Operation Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON).
OPCON is permanent control where the OTC/CWC has maintenance and administrative responsibility and accountability. TACON is temporary control where the OTC/CWC uses the asset for tactical purposes. It should be noted that maintenance and administrative responsibilities usually do not exist with the OTC/CWC.
C4I systems are categorized as supporting, assigned or attached according to their tasking, and the level of control exercised over them by the OTC (Figure 15.23).
NON-ORGANIC DATA
ORGANIC DATA
15-27

28. Supporting Sensor Systems
COMINT
Crosshair (formerly Bullseye)
RC-135
ELINT
Satellites
TACELINT
Senior Ruby/Span (U-2/TR-1)
TENCAP sources
IRINT
TES
IMINT
UAVs
U-2/TR-1
TENCAP sources
J-STARS
ACINT
IUSS
Figure Some examples of Supporting Sensor Systems.
Supporting C4I System
Supporting C4I systems comprise remote sensor platforms that are not under the control of the OTC. Some supporting C4ISR systems support predominantly Navy needs while others are shared by various government agencies.
Supporting C4ISR systems mostly provide indication and warning cueing (i.e. I&W) and classification data for OTH contacts through various intelligence gathering methods. Crosshair and Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) resources are examples of supporting sensor systems.
15-28

29. Assigned Sensor Systems
P-3C “ORION”
EP-3E “ARIES”
E-3B/C “SENTINEL”
SSN's (under certain mission circumstances)
Figure 15.25: Several of the more common Assigned Sensor Systems.
Assigned C4I Systems
A wide variety of aircraft and ships may be available to support CSG/ESG efforts as assigned sensor assets (Figure 15.25). When directly supporting CSG/ESG operations, some assigned sensor platforms, such as the P‑3C, provide "organic" data via local communication circuits. When their information is routed through the shore nodes (such as P‑3C data sent to a Tactical Support Center (TSC) prior to transmission to afloat units), it is referred to as nonorganic data.
15-29

30. Attached Sensor Systems
E-2C “Hawkeye”
SH-60 “Seahawk”
EA-6B “Prowler”
Ship’s Sensor Systems
Figure 15.26: Several of the more common Attached Sensor Systems.
Attached Sensor Systems
Attached sensors are the principal OTH-T sensors of any strike group (Figure 15.26). The OTC/CWC has both tactical and operational control (TACON/OPCON) of these sensor systems.
In most cases, the attached sensors, cued by data received from other sensor systems, will provide final targeting quality data for weapons engagements. Attached sensor systems usually report contact information via Tactical Data Links and/or voice circuits.
15-30

31. Figure 15.27: Intelligence related components.
THE DEFENSE INFO SYSTEMS NETWORK (DISN)
GCCS Site
GCCS Site
To JWICS
SIPRNET
To CENTRIXS
SHF
EHF
UHF
NIPRNET
Figure 15.27: Intelligence related components.
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
JWICS is the IC’s global communications network that provides a mature, reliable and flexible SCI communications architecture. It is designed to deliver secure, efficient, interoperable information on a global basis to national and defense intelligence consumers. JWICS provides real-time SCI data and video teleconferencing and connects deployed forces on land and at sea with national intelligence producers.
INTELINK
INTELINK is the principal electronic means for intelligence product dissemination. It provides a comprehensive set of tools to query, access, and retrieve information. INTELINK provides collaboration among policy developers, analysts, and users and simplifies access to a wide variety of services.
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS)
CENTRIXS is a global network enterprise for US and coalition forces to share classified operational and intelligence information, region-to-region, for combined planning, unity of effort, and decision superiority in peacekeeping and contingency operations. “Combined” refers to the combination of US, coalition, and allied users. “Enterprise” refers to the multiple networks of voice, data, and video. It provides a seamless, interoperable, multi-classification level of information exchange between warfighting commands and key multinational players.
INTERNET
15-31

32. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK