1. Clay Brockman ITK 478 Fall 2007

2. Why intrusion detection? Comparing two types: Monitoring Database Application Behavior Using Time Signatures

3. “Security is an integrative concept that includes the following properties: confidentiality …, authenticity …, integrity …, and availability” (Vieira and Madeira, 2005, p. 350) Explanation of these properties

4. Occur in one of the following ways: “intentional unauthorized attempts to access or destroy private data” (Vieira and Madeira, 2005, p. 351) “malicious actions executed by authorized users to cause loss or corruption of critical data” (Vieira and Madeira, 2005, p. 351) “external interferences aimed to cause undue delays in accessing or using data, or even denial of service” (Vieira and Madeira, 2005, p. 351)

5. False Positive the detection system reports an intrusion but the action is really a legitimate request (Afonso, et al., 2006, p.37) accounts for 17% of recorded events (Afonso, et al., 2006, p.37) False Negative system will allow a malicious request to pass, identifying it as a legitimate request (Afonso, et al., 2006, p.37) accounts for about 12% of recorded events (Afonso, et al., 2006, p.37)

6. Developed by José Fonseca, Marco Vieira, and Henrique Madeira This method “adds concurrent intrusion detection to DBMS using a comprehensive set of behavior abstractions representing database activity” (Fonseca, et al., 2006, p. 383). Messages checked at 3 different levels Command Level Transaction Level Session Level

7. Command Level “checks if the structure of each executed command belongs to the set of command structures previously learned” (Fonseca, et al., 2006, p. 383) Transaction Level “checks if the command is in the right place inside the transaction profile (a transaction is a unit formed by a set of SQL commands always executed in the same sequence)” (Fonseca, et al., 2006, p. 383) Session Level “checks if the transaction fits in a known transaction sequence. It represents the sequence of operations that the user executes in a session” (Fonseca, et al., 2006, p. 383)

8. Results: 1 normal request was found to be malicious, resulting in 1 false positive 100% accuracy on requests with slight changes Randomly ordered SQL commands resulted in 4.2% false negatives All 50 manual injections were caught

9. Expects requests to come in at certain times Based on a real-time database Examples: Stock Market Power Grid Air Traffic Control

10. Two different types of intrusions User transactions: “the characteristics of an intruding transaction are identical to a user transaction except for the data object access pattern” (Lee, et al., 2000, p. 128) Sensor transactions: Read a sensor periodically to check for updated information (Lee, et al., 2000, p. 127-128)

11. Results: False positive rate was as low as 0.36% (Lee, et al., 2000, p. 129) False negative rate was as high as 5.5% (Lee, et al., 2000, p. 129).

12. Both methods had very low false positive rates Monitoring Database Application behavior was better on false negative rates by 1.5%