1. page 1 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA CARE-ASAS Activity 3: ASM Autonomous Aircraft OHA

2. page 2 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Objectives and tasks Objectives: Qualitative assessment of operational hazards related to Autonomous Aircraft (AA) operations Identification of safety-influencing factors R&D work, not definitive results Tasks: High-level description of operational procedures and CNS/ASAS functions based on AA-OSED Analysis of operational failure scenarios Consolidation of risk mitigation measures

3. page 3 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Customised OHA method Customised OHA method to facilitate identification of factors that may directly or indirectly impact the Airborne Separation Minima

4. page 4 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA ASAS operations description Phase P0 Next phase P1 Condition C0 Title Surrounding traffic surveillance and monitoring Conflict detected Functions (air-air) CNS, CD, ASAS display PhaseTitleConflict status P0Traffic surveillance and monitoringNo conflict P1Priority determination Conflict P2Conflict resolution P3Conflict monitoring P4Conflict resolution negotiation Abnormal conflict P5Abnormal conflict monitoring P6Abnormal conflict resolution

5. page 5 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Operational failure scenarios Failure conditions related to system functional characteristics and operational procedures: Various failure modes either related to system functions or human operations: Detected/undetected loss, incorrect/misleading (erroneous detected/ undetected) function (or information) Lack of (or inability), incorrect/misleading operation (or human action) Operational failure scenarios assessment: Effects on operations, detection and correction means (with associated (ASS, SR, REC) Resulting operational consequences (OHs)

6. page 6 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Operational hazard description Effects on flight deck, air traffic control and operations Possible cause with environmental factors Safety influencing factors

7. page 7 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Identified operational hazards During normal evolution in FFAS: Aircraft flying in FFAS without or with degraded CNS capabilities (OH 1 to OH 6) During normal CD&R in FFAS: Missing, delayed or incorrect CD&R by aircraft that has (or does not have) priority during conflict in FFAS (OH 7 to OH 12) Induced conflict by aircraft manoeuvring in FFAS (OH 13,14) During abnormal operations in FFAS: Multiple OHs in FFAS (OH 15) or during abnormal exit of FFAS (OH 16,17)

8. page 8 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Main OSED mitigations (1/2) Aircraft flying in FFAS without RNAV/ASAS capability: Segregated FFAS airspace with only suitably equipped aircraft with qualified flight crew (ASS/ENV 1 ) Including 4D RNAV, ADS-B transmitter/receiver, ASAS based on ADS-B only, and CDTI equipment Including priorities rules defining which aircraft in conflict has to manoeuvre (ASS/OPS 1 ) Emergency procedure in case of an ADS-B/ASAS, or navigation, system failure (ASS/OPS 9, ASS/OPS 10 ) Aircraft in emergency situation has right of way over interfering traffic in FFAS (ASS/OPS 11)

9. page 9 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Main OSED mitigations (2/2) Aircraft co-operation during CD&R process in FFAS: Flight crews monitoring of conflict resolution (ASS/OPS 7 ): Assisted by both aural and visual alarms at T Low minutes before potential loss of separation (ASS/SYS 1 ) Increasing alarm levels (respectively at T Medium and T High minutes) before potential loss of separation (ASS/SYS 2 ) Flight crews agreement on a common resolution strategy: In case of incompatible aircraft priorities during a conflict (ASS/OPS 3) If the conflict is not solved T Medium minutes before loss of separation(ASS/OPS 5 )

10. page 10 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Additional OHA mitigations (1/3) Aircraft flying in FFAS with degraded ASAS capability: Independent ADS-B emission and reception capabilities (SR/SYS 1) To allow the see or being seen principle even in case of one aircraft failure Alerting mechanism in case of ASAS system failure (SR/SYS 6) Additional recommendations even in conflict-free situations: Flight crews monitoring of surrounding traffic (REC/OPS 1 ) ASAS alerting when an aircraft in proximity is suddenly no more detected (REC/SYS 4 )

11. page 11 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Additional OHA mitigations (2/3) Aircraft flying in FFAS with degraded navigation capability: Different separation minima depending on Actual Navigation Performances (ANP) of the aircraft (SR/ENV 2) Emergency procedure applied in case of inappropriate ANP within FFAS (SR/OPS 3) Alerting mechanism in case of 4D RNAV navigation system failure (SR/SYS 5) Display of uncertainty associated with ADS-B traffic position on CDTI (REC/SYS 5 )

12. page 12 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Potential loss of separation in FFAS: At that T High minutes before potential loss of separation: Additional rules of flight applicable within FFAS (SR/ENV 1) Flight crews manoeuvring of their aircraft independently from their assigned priority using applicable rules of flight in FFAS (SR/OPS 8) Based on independent surveillance: Alerting mechanism in case of any (imminent) loss of separation (SR/SYS 7) Conflict information to the flight crew in case of (imminent) loss of separation (SR/SYS 8) Additional OHA mitigations (3/3)

13. page 13 CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001 Autonomous Aircraft OHA Main OHA results o Mainly related to airborne self-separation inside FFAS o More in-depth analysis of aircraft system failure scenarios than human-related errors OHs (17) with severity assignment & Safety influencing factors including OPS (27), SYS (22), ENV (6) with ASS (28), SR (20), REC (7)