1. Comments on “Testing alternative approaches to CCT programs in education: evidence from Colombia” IEN, LACEA, October 2007

2. Relevance of the topic Large body of evidence showing the impact of CCT on enrollment, attendance, and (to a lesser degree), promotion and drop-outs. However, this evidence has been almost exclusively based on models which provide regular payments contingent on attendance. For urban populations the main instances of exit from the education system are between school cycles: transitions between primary and secondary and transitions between secondary and tertiary. Therefore, the idea of providing end-of-cycle lump-sum incentives is attractive as a possible solution to these drop outs.

3. Worries However, the end-of-cycle model presents a number of concerns. If the model is budget-neutral, is there an impact on enrollment in early years due to a reduction in the transfer during those years? In terms of tertiary lump-sums, what are the implications regarding targeting? Is it possible that the only beneficiaries here will be self-selected sisben 2? These issues make the program potentially contentious, and require a robust evaluation framework.

4. Validity and randomization The program’s population of interest is determined through a series of cut-offs: SISBEN1+2  Registrants  Lottery  Select group of 68 schools  baseline of a sub-sample of these  HH survey Authors are careful to look at issues of validity and attrition. My only suggestion would be to compare the population actually surveyed to the eligible sisben (68 schools, and 68 schools conditional on baseline).

5. Attendance, enrollment, etc. Comparability between verified enrollment and other measures. Predicted enrollment. What does it mean? Reporting by grade.

6. What is next? The most interesting questions can not be answered with the data available, but rather would require a second round of surveys to look at the transitions. This will allow us to look at the impact of the program on students remaining in the school system, which is what the incentive hopes to accomplish.

7. Social Investment Funds in Guatemala By 1994, the Social Debt concept rouded up Guatemalan’s needs: 30% of boys and 40% of girls aged 5-15 did not attend school 50% of households had dirt floor 72% of household heads did not finish primary education 35% of household dumped their garbage in public spaces 30% of the population was illiterate.

8. What is this Paper About? Assesses the welfare impacts of FIS projects in rural areas of Guatemala. This is the first impact evaluation of social funds in Guatemala, and also the first paper that uses village level data. Estimation using two new techniques for impact measuring: Multi-treatment Analysis Dose-Response function using a Generalised Propensity Score for continuous treatments