1. Monitoring Key performance indicators Ruud van der Ploeg EMTA GM 11-12 november 2010 Quality in Amsterdam public transport contracts

2. 2 Stadsregio Amsterdam in Randstad area

3. 3 Running contracts in Amsterdam region Zaanstreek €9 mio subsidy €5 mio revenue Cost coverage 36% Waterland €11 mio subsidy €22 mio revenue Cost coverage 67% Amsterdam €221 mio subsidy €129 mio revenue Cost coverage 37% Amstelland- Meerlanden €30 mio subsidy €21 mio revenue Cost coverage 41% 2004 2005 2007 2011 2004 2005 2007 2012

4. responsabilities and risk sharing Risks linked with the production hold by The AuthorityThe Operator Revenues risks hold by Management contract (M) Gross cost contract (GC) Net cost contract (NC) M with productivity bonus M with productivity and revenue bonus M with revenue bonus GC with shared production risk GC with revenue bonus NC with revenue bonus and shared production risks NC with shared revenue risk NC with shared production risks GC with shared production risk and revenue bonus Source: MARETOPE

5. 5 Need to have Want to have Wish to have Basic Quality Experience Satisfiers Dissatisfiers Quality of a trip Minimum Quality

6. 6 Trust: Safe and secure journey Get what you expect Mental effort: No hassle, no stress Travel time door to door: The faster, the better Physical effort: Personal convenience Emotions Time is money Reliability Ease Speed Comfort Experience Safety ‘must’: travel fast ‘lust’: travel relaxed Pyramid of Customer Needs

7. 7 Minimum Quality Basic Quality Experience Emotions(Lust) Functionalities(Must) Emotions....and Functionalities

8. 8 Amsterdam concession Performance indicators Punctuality (departures times) Trips cancelled Accessibility Vehicle capacity Incidental under capacity Key performance indicators bonus and fines Customer judgment (KKM*) Only fines bonus and fines

9. 9 Looking back from figures 2006-2010 Development of Bonus/fines Development of main KPI’s Punctuality Trips cancelled KKM (Passenger Satisfaction)

10. Methods of monitoring (1) Concession Amsterdam City –In Amsterdam: making use of quarterly data base performance information; (a minimum of 95% of trips is checked) –Operator management reports send to the transport authority –Outcomes of the reports are randomly checked –Apart from these reports, mystery guests are brought into play –Operator earns a bonus for the % of performance within the standard and is fined for the % of performance above the standard.

11. Methods of monitoring Concessions (3) outside Amsterdam –Carrying out quarterly surveys (observations i.e. with cameras and mystery guests) –Representative random check (every day of the week; in and outside rush hours) in respect to the total network –Random checks  faults assessed  fines imposed –Independent consultant carries out the surveys (outsourced) Administrative fines imposed for a range of quality insufficiencies

12. 12 Contract incentives regional buses 1. Revenue based contract 2. Bonus/Fine arrangement on Passenger satisfaction –Yearly report by independent institution –Rise of figure results in Bonus –Decrease of figure results in Fine 3. Fine policy on Key Performance Indicators

13. 13 2006-± mid 2008: –animosity and tiresome discussions on contract clauses  imposing fines (“malus”) for insufficient reporting on performances and poor level of operations; Mid 2008 – 2009: –Improvement of relation and mutual understanding (mediation);  GVB meets standards of reporting and succeeds better in meeting (key) performance indicators  less fines 2009 – now: –growing towards a joint effort of GVB and PTA (Stadsregio), aiming to improve customer services (transition to customer oriëntation) Looking back on GVB-concession 2006-2011

14. 14 Results Suburban transport contracts (bus): -Considerable growth of both productivity and ridership (from 15-60% more driving hours); -National barometer customer satisfaction: stable (on average 7,5). Urban transport (GVB): - Step by step a better performance on the main kpi’s for quality: less fines and more bonuses.

15. 15 GVB delivers more driving hours (dru) for less subsidy

16. 16 Recommendations To the PTA’s Generate a level of trust between commissioning authority and operator Define a starting level of reliability of service in your tender documents (indicating that the level of performance has to move up each year) Think of fines/bonuses as a means to an end: just a trigger to get better quality Create a reliable and trustworthy monitoring system Be transparent, consistent and straightforward Quality is reflected in customer surveys appreciation! To the operators - mind the comfort and style of driving (bus) - grant friendliness to passengers - don’t take the passenger for granted!

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21. 21 Customer appreciation yardstick