1. I.U.D. (of OSHA) v Am. Petrol. Inst. (1980)  Important facts: Sec. of Labor authorized to set standards for safe and healthy work environments and when dealing with toxic materials “set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health...”  After initially allowing benzene in amounts not higher than 10 ppm, the level was lowered to 1 ppm on the basis of  An assumption (without supporting empirical evidence) that since it was impossible to establish a “safe” level of benzene, the less the better,  It was technologically feasible to achieve the lower concentration, though admittedly at a much higher cost to the impacted industries.

2.  A.P.I.’s claim: Sec. has exceeded statutory authority by establishing a standard in the absence of solid scientific evidence of the existence of a health threat for benzene levels under 10 ppm and that any understanding of “feasibility” must rest upon a “costs – benefits” analysis  Gov’t’s claim: The only statutory requirement for the Sec.’s exercise of power is that it not be totally irrational or arbitrary; his interpretation of “feasible” as “technologically possible” should prevail  Court’s holding: No need to rule on the conflicting interpretations of “feasible;” Sec. did not make the required threshold finding required by the statute that the standard was “reasonably necessary or appropriate...”  Statute does not require “absolutely risk-free workplaces” just because it is technologically feasible to do so.  It does require Sec. to make finding that workplace is unsafe before requiring a remedy for the condition

3.  Burden of proof is on Sec. “to show, on the basis of substantial evidence, that it is at least more likely than not that long-term exposure to 10 ppm of benzene presents a significant risk...”  Although the Sec. has no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm, he does have an obligation to find that a significant risk is present before he can characterize a place as “unsafe”  As long as Sec. is supported by a body of reputable scientific thought, he is free to use conservative assumptions in interpreting the data...risking error on the side of overprotection rather than underprotection  But here the Sec. exceeded his power!

4. American Textile Mfg. Inst. v Donovan (1981)   Facts: similar to those in “Benzene case”   Appellant’s claim: when Sec. sets standards, the “feasible” requirement of the statute requires the factoring of an economic (costs- benefits analysis), as well as a technological, dimension   Court’s ruling: No it doesn’t!   Dictionary definition of “feasible”   Legislative history of act   Precedents interpreting meaning of “substantial evidence” – “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”   If agency action is based on “substantial evidence, ” the Court must defer to the agency’s action

5. Chevron v Natural Resources Council (1984)   Facts: EPA issued national standards for air pollution levels. Congress then required states which had not met standards to require industries within their borders to obtain state permits for the addition and operation of certain sources of pollution, “major stationary sources.”   EPA, pursuant to rulemaking authority delegated to it in the statute to “implement the permit requirement,” allowed states to define an entire plant, rather than individual machines w/in it, to constitute “major stationary source”; this came to be referred to as the “bubble concept.” This allowed EPA to monitor only a plant’s total emissions for compliance with pollution standards.

6.   NRDC’s claim: EPA acted outside its statutory authority by adopting this rule, i.e., when Congress passed the statute imposing requirements on states lagging behind national clean air standards, the clear meaning of its words and clear intent was to require a separate permit for each pollution-emitting machine.   Court’s ruling: an agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority must be upheld unless it is in violation of precise language in the statute.   Language of statute is ambiguous, i.e., “major stationary source” is never defined   Agency’s interpretation is “a permissible construction of the statute” and not “manifestly contrary to the statute.”

7.  Case’s significance: in the realm of administrative law, the principle of “judicial restraint” in reviewing agency action reigns supreme. This is the chief dimension of the “deference doctrine.”  Ruling was slammed by liberals and castigated as a pro-business ruling of the Rhenquist Court; was it?