1. IAEA Safeguards at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant SGOA3 & SGTS-TND 2012/01/24

2. Topics Background Spent Fuel Transfer & Storage Process
Safeguards- By- Design
Safeguards Measures
Detection of Missing Pins with DCVD
Summary

3. Background
Cinshan nuclear power plants consist of two 636 MWe BWRs which have been in operation over 30 years.
The spent fuel ponds (SFPs) are nearing the capacity of their storage capability.
An independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) is under construction with space for 1680 spent fuel assemblies (SFAs).
The IAEA and TWN authorities are implementing safeguards by-design features and innovative technology which were adopted in the early design stage of ISFSI.

4. Spent Fuel Transfer & Storage Process
56 SFAs
Vertical Concrete Cask-used for long storage of the spent fuel assemblies
VCC
OD 3.45 m
ID 1.89 m
Ht m
Wt t
TSC/SFAs are loaded into VCC
TSC
OD 1.70 m
Ht m
Wt t
TSC/SFAs are loaded into TFR
TFR
OD 2.12 m
ID 1.72 m
Ht m
Wt t
AOS
Sq. foot 4.5 x 4.5 m
OD 4.20 m
Wall thk m
Ht m
Wt t
Add On Shield - to provide additional shielding for radiation protection.
Final installation
Transportable Storage Canister -will be loaded with 56 spent fuel assemblies
Transfer Cask - to convey the TSC from the spent fuel ponds into the VCC.

5. Spent Fuel Transfer & Storage Process (cont’d)
Day-1/2/3
TFR/TSC Preparation
Day-3
Day-7
Day-7/8/9/10
TFR Immersing
Positioning
Day-4/5/6
Shield Lid
Lift up
Wash
Drain
Fuel Loading
Tie Down
Decon
H2 Monitoring
Shield Lid Welded
Pneumatic Test
Drain
Vacuum Dry
He Purge
Port Cover Welded
He Leak Test
Structure Lid Welded
Day-12
Day-13/14
ISFSI
VCC Moving
Day-11
Storage monitoring
VCC Ready
Adapter Ready
TFR Lifting
Tie Down
TSC Transfer
VCC Closed
Transfer

6. Safeguards- By- Design
Two important features were incorporated in early design stage of the ISFSI;
1. Innovative Digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD) technology
to perform SF verification for PD.
2. Unique dual sealing arrangement to address all credible
diversion scenarios.
Reduction of field efforts to a minimum level was an important factor in the design process.
According to Agency requirements: LWR spent fuel assemblies considered as easily dismantle are due to partial defect (PD) verification when transferred to difficult to access conditions, in order to assure that at least half of the fuel rods are present.
Continuity of knowledge (CoK) will be maintained by means of containment and surveillance during the SF transfer process.

7. Safeguards Measures ISFSI Transfer Day-1/2/3 Day-3 Day-7 Day-7/8/9/10
Storage monitoring
UW cam
Inspector
Seals on the VCC
Dual seals
Surveillance in reactor hole (RH)
Surveillance in
transfer hatch
SDIS A (main)
SDIS B (back up)
Inputs From UW& reactor building cameras
Remote Monitoring (RM)
Spent fuel is verified by DCVD for PD prior to loading
Day-1/2/3
TFR/TSC Preparation
Day-3
Day-7
Day-7/8/9/10
TFR Immersing
Positioning
Day-4/5/6
Shield Lid
Lift up
Wash
Drain
Fuel Loading
Tie Down
Decon
H2 Monitoring
Shield Lid Welded
Pneumatic Test
Drain
Vacuum Dry
He Purge
Port Cover Welded
He Leak Test
Structure Lid Welded
Day-12
Day-13/14
ISFSI
VCC Moving
Day-11
VCC Ready
Adapter Ready
TFR Lifting
Tie Down
TSC Transfer
VCC Closed
Transfer

8. Safeguards Measures (cont’d)
The VCC is the containment for
the spent fuel - for safeguards
purposes - on which the dual
seals are applied.
The top cover of the VCC in
conjunction with AOS side walls
are the components to be sealed
and immobilized to the concrete
pad.

9. Detection of Missing Pins with DCVD
The Cerenkov light emitted from SFA is recorded as a digitized image.
PDT is performed in real time by quantitative analysis of the Cerenkov light pattern with custom software (DCView).
Cerenkov light intensity emitted from SFA is a function of burn up (BU) and cooling time (CT). Pin substitution by un-irradiated dummies leads to a decrease of light intensity, pin removal to an increase.

10. Detection of Missing Pins with DCVD (cont’d)
Missing pins lead to high intensity spots on Cerenkov light image.
Missing pins are detected and marked by an automated analysis in DCView based on local intensity comparison with fuel template.
DCView software performs comparison between measured Cerenkov light intensity and expected intensity values calculated from declared BU and CT.
Off-line re-evaluation is possible.

11. Summary
Safeguards-by-design features and a process by which they were successfully incorporated in the design phase, have been introduced.
Innovative DCVD technology for PD verification of SF,
prior to its shipment to difficult to access conditions,
has been presented.
Unique dual sealing arrangement to maintain CoK on
SF which is stored in difficult to access conditions, has
been presented.

12. Thank you for your attention Any questions?