1. Chimp minds: Suspiciously human Two possible reasons why chimp and human minds appear to be so similar 1.They are! Argument from biological parsimony BP: Humans and chimps are closely related, so similarity in brain and mental functions is not unexpected Problem: Even close relationship does not exclude possibility of important adaptive differences. Ex: humans upright, chimps not; humans hairless, chimps not; humans use language, chimps not, etc.

2. Chimp minds: Suspiciously human Second reason: Human minds have exactly the design characteristics that would lead them to incorrectly interpret other species minds as similar to our own. Design characteristic: HADD (although P&V don’t use that term). Attributing agency on minimal evidence Thus, other minds (including chimp minds) could be radically different, but we would have a hard time seeing that

3. A mind based on behavioral abstraction BA: certain behavioral/bodily cues are reliably associated with the tendency to exhibit certain responses. For example, hair standing on end, canines bared, loud screaming/hooting; all reliably predict aggressive actions. Repeated exposure to this connection allows “abstraction” of a behavioral category “threat display.” Adaptive reaction does not require knowing mind of threat displayer, only what threat displayer is likely to do in the near future In experimental setting: “Competitor does not know where grape is” or “competitor is not in a position to challenge me for grape”

4. Competitive TOM

5. Rhesus Macaques and TOM Cayo Santiago field station in Puerto Rico. Human experimenter approach monkey; placed a platform on the ground and put a grape on the platform. E then either faced grape or (a) turned around; (b) averted eyes; (c) blocked vision with small barrier or blocked mouth with small barrier.

6. Rhesus TOM Would monkeys take into account what a competitor knows based on past experience, rather than what a competitor currently sees? E placed to grapes on platform where one could be triggered to roll to a different location. E would be “unaware” (from monkey’s perspective) of new location of rolled grape. Monkey watches. Monkeys attempt to steal grape that E did not know had moved.

8. Povinelli TOM chimpanzee studies

9. Reinterpretation hypothesis In humans, BA is interwoven with the additive capacity to reinterpret behavior in terms of mental states. In other animals, every instance (according to P&V) where reinterpretation might be evoked requires an already present BA, and thus RH adds nothing.

10. Rhesus Macaques and TOM Cayo Santiago field station in Puerto Rico. Human experimenter approach monkey; placed a platform on the ground and put a grape on the platform. E then either faced grape or (a) turned around; (b) averted eyes; (c) blocked vision with small barrier or blocked mouth with small barrier. Does person “know” the grape is not there or is person not in a (behavioral) position to challenge if I go for the grape? Does it matter?

11. Reinterpretation hypothesis If RH adds nothing to chimpanzee adaptiveness, what does it add to human? Ans: theory-building. Humans use “unseen” causal forces (such as mental states, or weight, magnetism, etc.) as ways of explaining a large array of highly varied perceptualy dissimilar situations. Weight: hard to lift; keep items in place, drop quickly, hard impact; provide stability, etc. Love: roses as gift; two lips touching; mothering disciplining child; friend fixing car, etc.

12. Chimp Theory of Mind (CTOM) Initially C&T agreed with Povinelli – no CTOM Late 90’s they changed? Why? New studies using more naturalistic testing procedures, competitive rather than cooperative (such as the Hare et al. study described earlier or below) Chimp and human vie for food. Chimp more often reaches through opaque rather than clear tunnel, presumably understanding that human competitor cannot “see” or “know” what chimp is doing.

13. CTOM Strong test of understanding goals and intentions: Accidents and failed attempts. Why? Because what the model “wants” to accomplish is actually different from their overt behavior. BA argues that chimp uses behavioral cues associated with goals and intentions. With accidents and failed attempts, behavioral cues don’t connect with goals or intentions Chimp executes intended behaviors, not failed ones or accidental ones

14. CTOM Imitation: Chimps (as with children), imitate “rationally,” that is, they imitate intended actions, not necessarily performed actions C&T argue that parsimony works against BA theory “Again, behavioral rules might be concocted to explain the results of each of the various studies individually, but again this will require creating a variety of post hoc explanations on the basis of no direct evidence of the requisite past experiences.” When given the opportunity to imitate, chimps use hands to turn on light in (a), but not (b), same as kids

15. CTOM: False Belief The aspect of TOM that chimps seem to consistently fail at is false belief Chimps fail to distinguish when a dominant is uniformed about the location of food vs. misinformed (and therefore has a false belief about food location). Chimp TOM: goals, intentions, knowledge states But not: beliefs, theories, logical inferences. The latter may be required for general theory building across widely perceptually dissimilar situations.