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Lessons from the European Experience with A(H1N1) 2009 Angus Nicoll CBE European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 3 rd meeting of the National Influenza Centres in the Western Pacific and South East Asian Regions, Beijing
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Pandemics of influenza H7 H5 H9 * 1980 1997 Recorded new avian influenzas 19962002 1999 2003 195519651975198519952005 H1N1 H2N2 1889 Russian influenza H2N2 1957 Asian influenza H2N2 H3N2 1968 Hong Kong influenza H3N2 H3N8 1900 Old Hong Kong influenza H3N8 1918 Spanish influenza H1N1 19151925195519651975198519952005 18951905 2010 2015 2009 Pandemic influenza H1N1 Recorded human pandemic influenza (early sub-types inferred) Reproduced and adapted (2009) with permission of Dr Masato Tashiro, Director, Center for Influenza Virus Research, National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID), Japan. Animated slide: Press space bar H1N1 Pandemic H1N1
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The situation could be a lot worse for Europe! (Situation circa summer 2009) A pandemic strain emerging in the Americas. Immediate virus sharing so rapid diagnostic and vaccines. Pandemic (H1N1) currently not that pathogenic. Some seeming residual immunity in a major large risk group (older people). No known pathogenicity markers. Initially susceptible to oseltamivir. Good data and information coming out of North America. Arriving in Europe in the summer. Mild presentation in most. A pandemic emerging in SE Asia Delayed virus sharing Based on a more pathogenic strain, e.g. A(H5N1) No residual immunity Heightened pathogenicity Inbuilt antiviral resistance Minimal data until transmission reached Europe Arriving in the late autumn or winter Severe presentation immediately Contrast with what might have happened — and might still happen!
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Some ‘Lessons Learnt ‘ points Five years preparation paid off – for those who did it But need to operationalise and adapt the plans for this pandemic The ‘acid tests’ have been crucial e.g. can you distribute antivirals quickly and efficiently ?http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Pages/Pandemic_Influenza_Assessment_Tools.aspx Built around a regularly updated risk assessment http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0907_Influenza_AH1N1_Risk_Assessment.pdf Planning projections has to be adjusted http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0908_InfluenzaA_H1N1_Planning_Assumptions_for_ the_First_Wave_of_Pandemic_A(H1N1)_2009_in_Europe.pdf Surveillance has had to be adjusted http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0908_MER_Surveillance_and_Studies_in_a_Pandemi c_Meeting_Report.pdf Personal interventions - are justified Societal Public Health Interventions – mostly not justified http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0906_TER_Public_Health_Measures_for_Influenza_ Pandemics.pdf http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0908_InfluenzaA_H1N1_Managing_schools_during_the_current_pand emic_(H1N1)_2009.pdf http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0906_TER_Public_Health_Measures_for_Influenza_ Pandemics.pdf Containment vs. Mitigation – beware of policy decisions http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0906_Influenza_AH1N1_Mitigation_and_Delaying_St rategies_for_the_Influenza_in_Europe.pdf Beware of stating numbers – deaths are difficult The health care sector is a vulnerable point
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Idealised national curve for planning, Europe 2009: Reality is never so smooth and simple Single-wave profile showing proportion of new clinical cases, consultations, hospitalisations or deaths by week. Based on London, second wave 1918. Source: Department of Health, UK 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 123456789101112 Week Proportion of total cases, consultations, hospitalisations or de aths InitiationAccelerationPeakDeclining Animated slide: Please wait
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One possible European scenario — summer 2009 In reality, the initiation phase can be prolonged, especially in the summer months. What cannot be determined is when acceleration takes place. 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% AprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecJanFebMar Month Proportion of total cases, consultations, hospitalisations or deaths InitiationAccelerationPeakDeclining Animated slide: Press key Apr
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Switch to deaths
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Some ‘Lessons Learnt ‘ points Five years preparation paid off – for those who did it But need to operationalise and adapt the plans for this pandemic The ‘acid tests’ have been crucial e.g. can you distribute antivirals quickly and efficiently ?http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Pages/Pandemic_Influenza_Assessment_Tools.aspx Built around a regularly updated risk assessment http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0907_Influenza_AH1N1_Risk_Assessment.pdf Planning projections has to be adjusted http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0908_InfluenzaA_H1N1_Planning_Assumptions_for_ the_First_Wave_of_Pandemic_A(H1N1)_2009_in_Europe.pdf Surveillance has had to be adjusted http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0908_MER_Surveillance_and_Studies_in_a_Pandemi c_Meeting_Report.pdf Personal interventions - are justified Societal Public Health Interventions – mostly not justified http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0906_TER_Public_Health_Measures_for_Influenza_ Pandemics.pdf http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0908_InfluenzaA_H1N1_Managing_schools_during_the_current_pand emic_(H1N1)_2009.pdf http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0906_TER_Public_Health_Measures_for_Influenza_ Pandemics.pdf Containment vs. Mitigation – beware of policy decisions http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0906_Influenza_AH1N1_Mitigation_and_Delaying_St rategies_for_the_Influenza_in_Europe.pdf Beware of stating numbers – deaths are difficult The health care sector is a vulnerable point
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RCGP (England and Wales) ILI consultation rate per 100,000 2008/09 and recent seasons.
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Some revised planning assumptions for the pandemic – first wave A(H1N1) 2009 These represent a reasonable worst case applying to one European country (the United Kingdom) with data available as of July 2009 They should not be used for predictions Source: UK http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_102892http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_102892 Clinical attack rate30% Peak clinical attack rate6.5% (local planning assumptions 4.5% to 8%) per week Complication rate15% of clinical cases Hospitalisation rate2% of clinical cases Case fatality rate0.1% to 0.2% (cannot exclude up to 0.35%) of clinical cases Peak Absence Rate12% of workforce
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Some ‘Lessons Learnt ‘ points Five years preparation paid off – for those who did it But need to operationalise and adapt the plans for this pandemic The ‘acid tests’ have been crucial e.g. can you distribute antivirals quickly and efficiently ?http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Pages/Pandemic_Influenza_Assessment_Tools.aspx Built around a regularly updated risk assessment http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0907_Influenza_AH1N1_Risk_Assessment.pdf Planning projections has to be adjusted http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0908_InfluenzaA_H1N1_Planning_Assumptions_for_ the_First_Wave_of_Pandemic_A(H1N1)_2009_in_Europe.pdf Surveillance has had to be adjusted http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0908_MER_Surveillance_and_Studies_in_a_Pandemi c_Meeting_Report.pdf Personal interventions - are justified Societal Public Health Interventions – mostly not justified http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0906_TER_Public_Health_Measures_for_Influenza_ Pandemics.pdf http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0908_InfluenzaA_H1N1_Managing_schools_during_the_current_pand emic_(H1N1)_2009.pdf http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0906_TER_Public_Health_Measures_for_Influenza_ Pandemics.pdf Containment vs. Mitigation – beware of policy decisions http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Documents/0906_Influenza_AH1N1_Mitigation_and_Delaying_St rategies_for_the_Influenza_in_Europe.pdf Beware of stating numbers – deaths are difficult The health care sector is a vulnerable point
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Daily and Weekly hospitalisations with suspected pandemic influenza in England, by age group. Weekly number (rate per 100,000 population) of new hospitalisations Daily rate per 100,000 population of new hospitalisations.
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Hospitalised patients England Age group (years) < 55-1516-6465+Total Total number of patients in hospital 462522773371 Number of patients in critical care 2031639 At 12 August 0800
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Hospitalisation ratios per 100,000 population of that age
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Some ‘Lessons Learnt ‘ points Five years preparation paid off – for those who did it But need to operationalise and adapt the plans for this pandemic The ‘acid tests’ have been crucial e.g. can you distribute antivirals quickly and efficiently Built around a regularly updated risk assessment Planning projections has to be adjusted Surveillance has had to be adjusted Personal interventions - are justified Societal Public Health Interventions – mostly not justified Containment vs. Mitigation – beware of policy decisions Beware of stating numbers – deaths are difficult The health care sector is a vulnerable point
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