1. 1 THE PRE-LICENSING OF A MULTI-PURPOSE HYBRID RESEARCH REACTOR FOR HIGH- TECH APPLICATIONS: “MYRRHA” N. HAKIMI, C. DAMS, A. WERTELAERS, V. NYS, M. SCHRAUBEN, R. DRESSELAERS Nuclear Facilities & Waste Department and Security & Transport Department Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC-AFCN) Rue Ravensten 36, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

2. 2 Outline of the presentation MYRRHA in brief The overall licensing process and the pre-licensing The MYRRHA strategic note: –Objectives and Applicability –The safety regulatory framework and philosophy –The security regulatory framework and philosophy –The safeguards regulatory framework and philosophy –Safety, Security and Safeguards Integrated Approach –Presentation of the “Guidance for the format and content of the Design Options and Provisions File”

3. 3 MYRRHA Fig. 1: The MYRRHA reactor (1: Reactor vessel; 2: Reactor cover; 3: Diaphragm; 4: Core barrel; 5: Heat exchanger; 6: Pump; 7: In-Vessel Fuel Handling Machine) A flexible fast spectrum RR conceived as an accelerator driven system (ADS), able to operate in sub-critical and critical modes. More info on: http://myrrha.sckcen.be/

4. 4 The overall licensing process Looking at the overall licensing process, two phases could be distinguished: –a pre-licensing phase and –a licensing phase. The pre-licensing phase of MYRRHA, initiated by the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK.CEN), started in February 2011 for an estimated period up to mid 2014.

5. 5 The objectives of the pre-licensing 1.Identification, by the regulatory authority, of the necessary and/or desirable improvements of the regulatory framework in case the existing regulatory framework is not sufficient for such a new type of facility. 2.Development, by the regulatory authority, of the safety objectives and security requirement that it expects the future facility to meet. 3.The description, by the requester, of the safety options and security provisions that he applies to his future facility to meet, at the minimum, the objectives and requirements of the regulatory authority. These safety options include the national and international experience feed-back on significant incidents and accidents.

6. 6 The objectives of the pre-licensing 4.The assessment, by the regulatory authority, of the level the design achieves the expected objectives and requirements. This assessment applies to the technologies and to the processes, but also to the tools which must provide evidence that the safety options are met e.g. assessment methodologies for safety, computer codes, as well as the security requirements. 5.The development, by the requester, of answers and justifications to specific Focus Points he identified himself and/or identified by the regulatory authority to demonstrate that the future installation can meet the expectations of the regulatory authority

7. 7 Instruments developed by FANC An integrated project structure FANC/Bel V Documents: –A Strategic note: Regulatory Framework Safety philosophy Security & Safeguards philosophy Integrated safety and Security/Safeguards Approach –A guidance document for the format and content of a Design Options and Provisions File (DOPF) –Other guidance (e.g. Design basis Earthquakes,…)

8. 8 Objectives of the strategic note to recall and resume the regulatory framework applicable to MYRRHA to present and comment the safety, security and safeguard philosophy for MYRRHA; to present the content of the Design Options and Provisions File (DOPF)

9. 9 Applicability of the MYRRHA strategic note This strategic note is written for the MYRRHA project  The goals, objectives, principles and requirements are established taking into account that this installation would be: –an experimental facility, –using a liquid metal cooled fast reactor system technology which is considered as representative of “Gen-IV” reactors.

10. 10 Safety Aspects

11. 11 The safety regulatory framework Existing: –Royal Decree of July 20, 2001 (GRPIS) –EIA protocol –Royal decree regarding safety rules for nuclear installations (WENRA) Current developments: –Cooperation agreement between the Federal State and the Regions –Update of licensing system for class 1 facilities (article 6 GRPIS) New developments as a consequence: –Specific safety rules for research reactors –Specific FANC guidelines

12. Safety goals and safety objectives The design and operation of MYRRHA should warrant a high level of safety. This means that the expected level of safety should: –Reach, at least, a level as high as the level of PWRs designed according to the WENRA objectives for new power plants and PWRs currently under construction (generation III+) –tend to the highest level that can be expected for new reactor designs – i.e. generation IV 12

13. Minimum safety objectives for MYRRHA WENRA has defined and expressed a common position on the safety objectives of new nuclear power plants, so that: –new nuclear power plants to be licensed across Europe in the next years will be safer than the existing ones, especially through improvements of the design; –regulators press for safety improvements in the same direction and ensure that these new plants will have high and comparable levels of safety; –applicants take into account this common position when formulating their regulatory submissions. The regulatory authority considers that WENRA safety objectives for new power plants shall be the minimum objectives to be met by the MYRRHA design, taking into account its specificity. 13

14. Safety goals for MYRRHA The regulatory authority considers that GEN IV safety goals shall be the goals retained for the MYRRHA design, taking into account its specificity: –Generation IV nuclear energy systems operations will excel in safety and reliability. –Generation IV nuclear systems will have a very low likelihood and degree of reactor core damage. –Generation IV nuclear energy systems will eliminate the need for offsite emergency response. 14

15. 15 Safety design principles Taking advantage of inherent safety characteristics, utilizing passive safety systems Performing the safety functions Safety independence of experimental devices Defence in depth for accident prevention, control and mitigation Risk-Informed Design, Simulation and Prototyping

16. Safety requirements General and specific IAEA safety requirements standards shall be followed by the designer, taking into account the specificity of MYRRHA. The extent of their application and any additional safety measures that may need to be taken, are: – required to be proposed by the operating organization and –submitted for approval to the regulatory authority. 16

17. Safety guides IAEA safety guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply with the IAEA safety requirements. In that context: –general and specific IAEA safety guides standards shall be considered by the designer as the first option when compared to alternative guidance, taking into account the specificity of MYRRHA. –Other complementary guidance documents may be followed provided a justification is presented. 17

18. 18 Security Aspects

19. 19 Security regulatory framework Conventions –Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material –The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorist Acts Laws and Royal Decrees –Law of 15th of March 1994 modified by the laws of 2th of April 203 and of 30 March 2011  “Categorization” –Law of 11th of December 1998 modified by the law of the 30 March 2011  “Habilitation” –Royal decrees of Oct 2011 (physical protection, categorization, security attestations, documents ) Circular –Ministerial Circular letter OOP 36 regarding the security of Class 1 nuclear installations

20. 20 Security Fundamentals & Requirements The security requirements are derived from the regulations developed based on the fundamental security principles (IAEA security series N°13): Categorization Design Basis Threat (DBT)

21. 21 Safeguards Aspects

22. 22 Safeguards regulatory framework Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Euratom treaty and regulation (302/2005): Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA): Additional Protocol: Law of 20/07/1978  Allow Euratom and IAEA inspection Law of 01/06/2005  Implements the additional protocol in the Belgian regulation Integrated safeguards:  For each installation a Partnership Approach was developed with the safeguards measures applicable on the specific types of installations

23. 23 Safety, Security and Safeguards Integrated Approach: Basic principles

24. 24 Safety, Security and Safeguards Integrated Approach: Basic principles The safe architecture reached at the end of the safety design process does not necessarily fully comply with the security and safeguards regulatory framework Thus in order to reach a safe and secure architecture, a second process should be initiated that aims to fully comply with security fundamentals and safeguards obligations. This second iterative process (security process) should be such that: –any security design proposal should not jeopardize the safety level of the facility but also should meet the security requirements and safeguards obligations. –any design modifications, for safety reasons or not, should be such that it does not jeopardize the security level of the facility and be in accordance with the safeguards obligations.

25. 25 Guidance for the format and content of a Design Options and Provisions File

26. 26 Design Options and Provisions File Volume 1: Purpose and description of the facility Volume 2: Approach to the nuclear safety Volume 3: Design Options and selected provisions Volume 4: Justification of design options against the objectives and related goals Volume 5: Management system for safety of the installation Volume 6: Security and Safeguards Integrated Approach

27. The flowchart for the design 27

28. Thank you for your attention