2. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 1 OCTA An outsider’s view Tom Vander Beken Stockholm Criminology Symposium Stockholm, 4 June 2007

3. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 2 Overview 1. An outsider’s view on EU organised crime assessments and policy making 2. The Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) a. Background b. What is it (for)? c. Is it reliable? d. Is it meaningful/interesting? e. Link between OCTA and policy making? 3. Conclusions

4. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 3 1. An outsider’s view on EU organised crime assessments and decision making Organised crime is a key concern within the European Union and the explicit justification for many actions taken (e.g. Millennium Strategy 2000). These policy actions are supposed to be based on knowledge about the phenomenon (reported in EU organised crime assessments). What can an outsider (i.e. someone not inside law enforcement or EU policy) know/think about the EU decision making and its (empirical) basis? Based on “public” sources (publications, statements websites,… ) only.

5. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 4 2. The Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) a. Background b. What is it (for)? c. Is it reliable? d. Is it meaningful/interesting? e. Does it influence policy making?

6. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 5 a. Background 1993-2000: European Union (MS, Europol, under supervision of the Council) makes annual “Organised Crime (Situation) Reports” – considered too descriptive, with poor empirical base, only backwards looking, not really useful to support policy making. 2000: Millennium Strategy on prevention and control on organised crime (strenghten collection and analysis of organised crime). 2001: Council decision to make a “Threat Assessment and Situation Report on Organised Crime” (TASROC). 2002: Action Plan to convert the OCSR into an annual strategic report for planning purposes – choice for risk/threat assessment approach (Crimorg 133). 2004: The Hague programme (developing a strategic concept on tackling organised crime) – intelligence led policing – analysis to formulate yearly priorities which will serve as a guideline for further action – European Criminal Intelligence Model with OCTA (Organised crime Threat Analysis) as its core product (Europol, MS, Cospol, ….). 2005: Strategic concept on tackling organised crime (Commission). 2006: First OCTA presented followed by Council conclusions setting EU priorities. 2007: Second OCTA (June 2007).

7. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 6 b. What is it (for)? (1) “Whereas the OCR was primarily focusing on the description of the OC situation in Europe, the OCTA puts an emphasis on the qualitative assessment of this complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. The OCTA, being a forward-looking document, will help decision-makers identify strategic priority areas in the fight against serious and organised crime and to initiate an intelligence process to define operational targets.” (OCTA, 2006, 6) Threat Assessment? OCTA refers to threats related to “oc groups”, but also draws focused attention to “criminal markets” (profit driven crimes) and “regional patterns”. Relationship to vulnerability and harm approach? Future orientedness?

8. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 7 b. What is it (for)? (2) THREAT (criminals) RISKVULNERABILITY (environment) HARM (society)

9. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 8 b. What is it (for)? (3)

10. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 9 c. Is it reliable? Very few public information about the methodology (Europol and the Council refuse to disclose this, even for scientific purposes – see van Duyne and von Lampe). Crimorg 133 conceptual framework still in use? We do know something about how the former OCR reports where made and the problems related to this (MS provide data of different nature, taken from different data bases within MS, different approaches (qualitative and quantitative), different (political) filters within MS, report which is (politically) acceptable to all MS, …) We know that OCTA claims to have made a new methodology, but also know that (Council Conclusions 2006) this methodology is considered far from perfect (clearer indication of the sources, the evaluation of information originating from these sources and the way the conclusions are drawn) We know that OCTA, although a Europol document now, still heavily relies on information provided by MS, we know that many MS are not ready to deliver information about threats, we see that MS are not fundamentally changing their own reporting system because of OCTA (see e.g. SOCA, BKA, Dutch Dreigingsbeeld, …), we know that OCTA is subjected to all kinds of approvals,…

11. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 10 d. Is it meaningful/interesting? (1) “Based on the OCTA, the focus of the fight against organised crime should be to reduce the harm caused by it and in particular to tackle the obstacle in dismantling OC groups linked to their international dimension or influence and the level of infiltraton of OC in society and economy. In that context, four main categories of OC groups have been identified …: (1) Principally territoriality based, indigenous OC groups but with extensive transnational activities, (2) ethnically homogeneous groups with their leadership and main assets abroad, (3) dynamic networks of perpetrators whose fluid organisational setup make them less susceptible to conventional investigative techniques, and (4) outlaw motorcycle gangs and other groups based on strictly defined organisational principles without an ethnic component. With a view to and in targeting the above groups, the following criminal markets should attract focused attention on the common EU level: drug trafficking, THB, fraud, Euro counterfeiting, … intellectual property theft, money laundering. Furthermore, the following regional patterns should attract focused attention …: South West Europe, South East Europe, North East Europe, the Atlantic region, Netherlands, Belgium, Poland and the Baltic States.”

12. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 11 d. Is it meaningful/interesting? (2) Afraid of the own definition and self fullfilling prophecy? Threats coming from transnationality, influence on economy and society, money laundering, profit driven crime.. A real priority setting tool or a report that can justify any/all policy decision(s) ? A threat coming from all kinds of groups, committing many types of profit driven crimes, regionally spread across Europe… Limited added value? Many of this is already known and is reported in literature (see e.g. Fijnaut and Paoli, 2005) But, for the first time, statements are made about the levels of treat (highest threat, most threatening). This is what a threat assessment should do. These threat statements, however, are sometimes closely related/confused to/with harm statements: e.g. something is most threatening because of its social/economic impact…

13. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 12 e. Does it influence policy making? Council priorities based on OCTA: South West Europe: African groups in the field of THB and smuggling HB, drug trafficking, promoting co-operation between French and Spanish LE. African groups and cannabis smuggling South East Europe: Ethnic Albanian groups and their involvement both in heroin trafficking and THB (co-operation between Italy, Slovenia, Greece and Balkan) North East Europe: Oc groups including Russian speaking groups primarily involved in commodity smuggling (co-operation in Baltic Sea region) Atlantic region: Production synthetic drugs by OC groups based in Belgium and the Netherlands and their distribution within the EU and via Germany and the UK across the Atlantic. Money laundering and illicit arms trafficking should be included in all these priorities. Clear relationship between OCTA and Council priorities (this was not the case with the OCR’s and e.g. Millennium strategy), but very general…

14. www.ircp.org Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium tom.vanderbeken@Ugent.be T +32 (0)9 264 69 39, F +32 (0)9 264 69 71 T. Vander Beken – OCTA: outsider’s view – Stockholm, 4 June 2007 13 3. Conclusions Although the method behind OCTA is not disclosed, we know that there are problems with data (collection), reliability and compatibility. Although the content of the (open version) is very general, and contains self fulfilling prophecy statements, OCTA defines (levels of) threats and can be seen as a first EU threat assessment. (So far), the political priority setting remains as general as OCTA, allowing for any concrete action. In sum: We know enough about OCTA to conclude that it cannot convince so far (problems related to method, quality of data, conceptual clarity and relevance), but may have the potential to become a part (corner stone?) of a criminal intelligence model.