1. Global Intrusion Detection Using Distribute Hash Table Jason Skicewicz, Laurence Berland, Yan Chen Northwestern University 6/2004

2. Current Architecture  Intrusion Detection Systems Vulnerable to attackVulnerable to attack Many false responsesMany false responses Limited network viewLimited network view Varying degrees of intelligenceVarying degrees of intelligence  Centralized Data Aggregation Generally done manuallyGenerally done manually Post-mortem global viewPost-mortem global view Not real time!Not real time!

3. Sensor Fusion Centers  Sensor fusion centers (SFC) aggregates information from sensors throughout the network More global viewMore global view Larger information poolLarger information pool Still vulnerable to attackStill vulnerable to attack Overload potential if multiple simultaneous attacksOverload potential if multiple simultaneous attacks  Can’t we leverage all the participants?

4. Distributed Fusion Centers  Different fusion centers for different anomalies  Must attack all fusion centers, or know more about fusion center assignments  Still needs to be manually set up, routed to  What if things were redundant and self-organizing?

5. What is DHT  DHT, or Distributed Hash Tables, is a peer-to-peer system where the location of a resource or file is found by hashing on the key  DHTs include CHORD, CAN, PASTRY, and TAPESTRY  DHT attempts to spread the keyspace across as many nodes as possible  Different DHT use different topologies

6. CAN  CAN is based on a multi-reality n- dimensional toroid for routing (Ratnasamy et al)

7. CAN  Each reality is a complete toroid, provides full redundancy  Network covers entire address space, dynamically splits space  Routes across the CAN, so you don’t need to connect directly to the Fusion Center

8. GIDS over DHT  Fusion centers are organized on a distributed hash table Peer-to-peerPeer-to-peer Self-organizedSelf-organized DecentralizedDecentralized ResilientResilient  We use Content Addressable Network (CAN) Highly redundantHighly redundant N-dimensional toroid enhances reachabilityN-dimensional toroid enhances reachability

9. DIDS diagram

10. INTERNET NIDS Host IDS CAN Peer-to-peer Infected Machine Worm Probe Sent NIDS Reports to Fusion Center CAN directs to Fusion Center IDS on probed Host reports to Fusion Center

11. Reporting Information  Fusion Centers need enough information to make reasonable decisions  ID systems all have different proprietary reporting formats  Fusion Centers would be overloaded with data if full packet dumps were sent  We need a concise, standardized format for reporting anomalies

12. Symptom Vector  Standardized set of information reported to fusion centers.  Plugins for IDS could be written to handle producing these vectors and actually connect to the CAN  Flexibility for reporting more details

13. Symptom Vector Payload: Payload specifies some descriptor of the actual packet payload. This is most useful for worms. Two choices we’ve considered so far are a hash of the contents, or the size in bytesPayload: Payload specifies some descriptor of the actual packet payload. This is most useful for worms. Two choices we’ve considered so far are a hash of the contents, or the size in bytes Event_type: A code specifying an event type such as a worm probe or a SYN floodEvent_type: A code specifying an event type such as a worm probe or a SYN flood Based on the event_type, upper_limit and lower_limit are two numerical fields available for the reporting IDS to provide more informationBased on the event_type, upper_limit and lower_limit are two numerical fields available for the reporting IDS to provide more information

14. Payload Reporting  Hash: a semi-unique string produced by performing mathematical transformations on the content Uniquely identifies the contentUniquely identifies the content Cannot easily be matched based on “similarity” so it’s hard to spot polymorphic wormsCannot easily be matched based on “similarity” so it’s hard to spot polymorphic worms  Size: the number of bytes the worm takes up Non-unique: two worms could be of the same size, though we’re doing research to see how often that actually occursNon-unique: two worms could be of the same size, though we’re doing research to see how often that actually occurs Much easier to spot polymorphism: simple changes cause no or only small changes in sizeMuch easier to spot polymorphism: simple changes cause no or only small changes in size

15. Routing Information  DHT is traditionally a peer to peer file sharing network Locates content based on name, hash, etcLocates content based on name, hash, etc Not traditionally used to locate resourcesNot traditionally used to locate resources  We develop a routing vector in place of traditional DHT addressing methods, and use it to locate the appropriate fusion center(s)

16. Routing Vector  Based on the anomaly type  Generalized to ensure similar anomalies go to the same fusion center, while disparate anomalies are distributed across the network for better resource allocation  Worm routing vector:  Worm routing vector:

17. Routing Vector  Worm routing vector avoids using less relevant fields such as source port or IP addresses  Designed to utilize only information that will be fairly consistent across any given worm  Used to locate fusion center, which receives full symptom vector for detailed analysis

18. Size and the boundary problem  Assume a CAN with several nodes. Each is allocated a range of sizes, say in blocks of 1000 bytes.  Assume node A has range 4000-5000 and node B has range 5000-6000  If a polymorphic worm has size ranging between 4980 and 5080, the information is split  Solution? Have information sent across the boundary. Node A sends copies of anything with size >4900 to node B and node B sends anything with size 4900 to node B and node B sends anything with size <5100 to A

19. To DHT or not to DHT  DHT automatically organizes everything for us  DHT ensures anomalies are somewhat spread out across the network  DHT routes in real time, without substantial prior knowledge of the anomaly  DHT is redundant, making an attack against the sensor fusion center tricky at worst and impossible to coordinate at best

20. Simulating the system  We build a simple array of nodes, and have them generate the symptom and routing vectors as they encounter anomalies  Not yet complete, work in progress  Demonstrates fusibility of information appropriately; non- interference of multiple simultaneous anomalies

21. Further Work  Complete paper (duh)  Add CAN to simulation to actually route  Include real-world packet dumps in the simulation  Test on more complex topologies?