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Port of Rotterdam.

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Presentation on theme: "Port of Rotterdam."— Presentation transcript:

1 Port of Rotterdam

2 Radiation Detection Systems at the Major International Seaport of Rotterdam
“Balance Between Trade and Security” “Benefits and Challenges” Sylvia Niesing Teamleader Nuclear Detection Rotterdam Customs Bosporusstraat 5 3199 LJ Maasvlakte Rotterdam the Netherlands South East Asia SLD Megaports Technical Workshop, Bangkok - May 12, 2009

3 Index History (from “Brinker” until now) The Rotterdam approach
Balance between Trade and Security The Rotterdam approach Operational mode Results Benefits and Challenges

4 Port of Rotterdam

5 History 1998: The USA started 2nd line of Defense Program (DOE)
Prevention of Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive/Nuclear Material 2002: CSI Container Security Initiative Canada: Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver; Singapore; Netherlands: Rotterdam; Belgium: Antwerp; France: Le Havre; Germany: Bremerhaven and Hamburg.

6 “Brinker” Megaports project
After a visit of the Dutch Minister of Finance to the United States On the 13th of August 2003 A Mutual Declaration Of Principles was signed at Rotterdam

7 MUTUAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF
THE NETHERLANDS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMARICA CONCERNING THE PREVENTION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

8 “Brinker” project Objective: Security Most important requirement:
To monitor as much as possible incoming and outgoing containers in order to intercept and/or stop illegal import, export and transhipment of nuclear and radioactive materials Most important requirement: Trade Logistic process in the Port of Rotterdam should not be disrupted All destinations, import, export and, if logistically possible, transhipment were inspected

9 “Brinker” project 4 TSA Nuclear Detection Portals were installed at the Europe Container Terminals (ECT), location Maasvlakte Rotterdam A computer system was placed at the Central Command Post (CCP) in the Customs main building

10 “Brinker” project

11 “Brinker” project Lessons learned
It’s possible to monitor large numbers of containers a close cooperation between container terminal and customs is essential “innocent” alarms caused by NORM materials like ceramics, fertilizer and ore disrupted the logistic process

12 Tender procedure Rotterdam Customs decided not to participate further in the Megaports Project Why ? To be independent To pay for all expenses To tender nuclear detection portals with “Norm” recognition Special requirements for database To install two Central Command Posts, 40 km apart but connected by glass fibre To investigate in the usefulness of advanced spectral portals Note: There is still a very good and close relationship between DOE and Dutch Customs !!

13 Tender procedure “turn-key” project for supply, installation and maintenance of two connected networks in which a total of 40 gamma/neutron portals and hand-held equipment were requested ANSI N42.35 requirements at a speed of 20 km/h with NORM recognition Siemens / SAIC was awarded

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15 Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam
3 different phases can be distinguished Phase 1: passage through the portal Trucks and trains drive through the SAIC AT980 or ST-20 advanced portal, possible alarm, stopping container, gathering information about the contents (freight documents, BL) Is the radiation evenly distributed in the container or are there peaks? Is it “normal” that the cargo emits radiation (ceramics, fertilizer, etcetera ….)

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18 Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam
Phase 2: Identification Inspection with identifiers like SAIC GR-135, Ortec Detective HPGe, Berthold Neutron Counter, or SAIC GR-460 mobile system Or inspection with SAIC ST-20, an Advanced Spectral NaI Portal

19 Screenshot ST-20 Advanced Spectral Portal

20 Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam
Phase 3: If not conform in Phase 2, the container is handed over to the Department of Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment Opening and unloading of the container. If necessary, call in police, public prosecutor, etc.; removal and storage of the nuclear material

21 Location Rotterdam Maasvlakte 2008 Location Rotterdam Reeweg 2008
Results Port of Rotterdam 10,8 million TUE in 2008 Location Rotterdam Maasvlakte 2008 Number of passages Phase 1 alarms Phase 2 Phase 3 58.676 914 11 1,59% 1,56% 1,20% Location Rotterdam Reeweg 2008 Number of passages Phase 1 alarms Phase 2 Phase 3 54.644 2192 17 1,63% 4,01% 0,78%

22 Some examples of interceptions
Numerous containers with radioactive contaminated metal scrap 60Co and 65Zn contaminated stacking kits for washing machines and tumble dryers Illegal transport of Co-60, Am-241/Be, Cs-137 sources Lightning rod (Ra-226) max. doserate container 650 µSv/h (65 mrem/h) at surface of object 1,03 mSv/h (103 mrem/h)

23 Some examples of interceptions
4 “empty” UF6 containers Leather handbags with Cobalt-60 contaminated hardware All seizures were not in conformity with Dutch Legislation The amount of uranium exceeded the 0.1 wt% limit Maximum doserate at surface 80 µSv/h (8 mrem/h) !!

24 Benefits and Challenges
Port of Rotterdam profiles itself as a safe port Important for International Trade Installing Nuclear Detection Sytems in the Port of Rotterdam could work preventative Protection against radioactive products coming to the consumer market

25 Benefits and Challenges
Detection ship to ship transport More portals in other ports and airports Faster nuclide identification with advanced spectral portal systems can increase the logistics even more Incorporation of Nuclear Detection Systems with X-ray scanning technology  one point of control Discuss with terminals about the possibilities of installing portals before a terminal is actually build

26 Sylvia


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