1. Port of Rotterdam

2. Radiation Detection Systems at the Major International Seaport of Rotterdam
“Balance Between Trade and Security”
“Benefits and Challenges”
Sylvia Niesing
Teamleader Nuclear Detection
Rotterdam Customs
Bosporusstraat 5
3199 LJ Maasvlakte Rotterdam
the Netherlands  
South East Asia SLD Megaports Technical Workshop, Bangkok - May 12, 2009

3. Index History (from “Brinker” until now) The Rotterdam approach
Balance between Trade and Security
The Rotterdam approach
Operational mode
Results
Benefits and Challenges

4. Port of Rotterdam

5. History 1998: The USA started 2nd line of Defense Program (DOE)
Prevention of Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive/Nuclear Material
2002: CSI Container Security Initiative
Canada: Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver; Singapore; Netherlands: Rotterdam; Belgium: Antwerp; France: Le Havre; Germany: Bremerhaven and Hamburg.

6. “Brinker” Megaports project
After a visit of the Dutch Minister of Finance to the United States
On the 13th of August 2003
A Mutual Declaration Of Principles was signed at Rotterdam

7. MUTUAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF
THE NETHERLANDS
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMARICA
CONCERNING THE PREVENTION OF ILLICIT
TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR AND OTHER
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

8. “Brinker” project Objective: Security Most important requirement:
To monitor as much as possible incoming and outgoing containers in order to intercept and/or stop illegal import, export and transhipment of nuclear and radioactive materials
Most important requirement:
Trade
Logistic process in the Port of Rotterdam should not be disrupted
All destinations, import, export and, if logistically possible, transhipment were inspected

9. “Brinker” project
4 TSA Nuclear Detection Portals were installed at the Europe Container Terminals (ECT), location Maasvlakte Rotterdam
A computer system was placed at the Central Command Post (CCP) in the Customs main building

10. “Brinker” project

11. “Brinker” project Lessons learned
It’s possible to monitor large numbers of containers
a close cooperation between container terminal and customs is essential
“innocent” alarms caused by NORM materials like ceramics, fertilizer and ore disrupted the logistic process

12. Tender procedure
Rotterdam Customs decided not to participate further in the Megaports Project
Why ?
To be independent
To pay for all expenses
To tender nuclear detection portals with “Norm” recognition
Special requirements for database
To install two Central Command Posts, 40 km apart but connected by glass fibre
To investigate in the usefulness of advanced spectral portals
Note:
There is still a very good and close relationship between DOE and Dutch Customs !!

13. Tender procedure
“turn-key” project for supply, installation and maintenance of two connected networks in which a total of 40 gamma/neutron portals and hand-held equipment were requested
ANSI N42.35 requirements at a speed of 20 km/h with NORM recognition
Siemens / SAIC was awarded

15. Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam
3 different phases can be distinguished
Phase 1: passage through the portal
Trucks and trains drive through the SAIC AT980 or ST-20 advanced portal, possible alarm, stopping container, gathering information about the contents (freight documents, BL)
Is the radiation evenly distributed in the container or are there peaks?
Is it “normal” that the cargo emits radiation (ceramics, fertilizer, etcetera ….)

18. Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam
Phase 2: Identification
Inspection with identifiers like SAIC GR-135, Ortec Detective HPGe, Berthold Neutron Counter, or SAIC GR-460 mobile system
Or inspection with SAIC ST-20, an Advanced Spectral NaI Portal

19. Screenshot ST-20 Advanced Spectral Portal

20. Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam
Phase 3:
If not conform in Phase 2, the container is handed over to the Department of Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
Opening and unloading of the container. If necessary, call in police, public prosecutor, etc.; removal and storage of the nuclear material

21. Location Rotterdam Maasvlakte 2008 Location Rotterdam Reeweg 2008
Results
Port of Rotterdam 10,8 million TUE in 2008
Location Rotterdam Maasvlakte 2008
Number of passages
Phase 1 alarms
Phase 2
Phase 3
58.676
914 11
1,59%
1,56%
1,20%
Location Rotterdam Reeweg 2008
Number of passages
Phase 1 alarms
Phase 2
Phase 3
54.644
2192 17
1,63%
4,01%
0,78%

22. Some examples of interceptions
Numerous containers with radioactive contaminated metal scrap
60Co and 65Zn contaminated stacking kits for washing machines and tumble dryers
Illegal transport of Co-60, Am-241/Be, Cs-137 sources
Lightning rod (Ra-226)
max. doserate container 650 µSv/h
(65 mrem/h)
at surface of object 1,03 mSv/h (103 mrem/h)

23. Some examples of interceptions
4 “empty” UF6 containers
Leather handbags with Cobalt-60 contaminated hardware
All seizures were not in conformity with Dutch Legislation
The amount of uranium exceeded the 0.1 wt% limit
Maximum doserate at surface 80 µSv/h (8 mrem/h) !!

24. Benefits and Challenges
Port of Rotterdam profiles itself as a safe port
Important for International Trade
Installing Nuclear Detection Sytems in the Port of Rotterdam could work preventative
Protection against radioactive products coming to the consumer market

25. Benefits and Challenges
Detection ship to ship transport
More portals in other ports and airports
Faster nuclide identification with advanced spectral portal systems can increase the logistics even more
Incorporation of Nuclear Detection Systems with X-ray scanning technology  one point of control
Discuss with terminals about the possibilities of installing portals before a terminal is actually build

26. Sylvia