2. PUT ASSIGNMENT #4 IN ENVELOPE ON CHAIR  Greatest Hits of 1790 PERFORMANCES 1979-80 Philharmonia Virtuosi of New York Richard Kapp, Conductor

3. WARM-UP/REVIEW Terminology

4. TERMINOLOGY: ME v. WORKBOOK Workbook: Adds language to define nature of future interests in grantor. E.g., –Reversion in Fee Simple Absolute –Poss. Of Reverter in Fee Simple Absolute

5. TERMINOLOGY: ME v. WORKBOOK Workbook: Adds language to define nature of future interests in grantor. E.g., –Reversion in Fee Simple Absolute –Poss. Of Reverter in Fee Simple Absolute My Test Questions: Only will add this sort of language for remainders

6. TERMINOLOGY: ME v. WORKBOOK Workbook: Describes all present possessory estates as a “Possessory Estate in …” Fee Simple Absolute, Life Estate, etc.

7. TERMINOLOGY: ME v. WORKBOOK Workbook: Describes all present possessory estates as a “Possessory Estate in …” Fee Simple Absolute, Life Estate, etc. My Test Questions: Will not use the italicized phrase.

8. TERMINOLOGY: ME v. WORKBOOK Workbook: Describes all present possessory estates as a “Possessory Estate in …” Fee Simple Absolute, Life Estate, etc. Maybe there to help you remember important rule: You can have only one present possessory estate at any given time with respect to a particular parcel of land.

9. TERMINOLOGY: ME v. WORKBOOK Defeasible fee in the form of a Fee Simple Determinable BUT with the future interest in third party: Me (& Restatement): “Fee Simple on Executory Limitation” Workbook: “Fee Simple Determinable” (See Workbook p.72 fn19)

10. TERMINOLOGY: ME v. WORKBOOK I will post (in section on e-mail Qs & responses) any other relevant inconsistencies or ambiguities regarding the workbook that arise over the course of the week.

11. WARM-UP/REVIEW Working with Conditional/Defeasible Present Estates

12. WARM-UP/REVIEW Working with Conditional/ Defeasible Present Estates 1. Identifying Defeasible Fees

13. IDENTIFYING DEFEASIBLE FEES

15. Remember, unlike the Workbook, I will give you ambiguous grants and you will need to be able to recognize arguments about whether the language should be interpreted to end the fee automatically when the condition is violated or instead to give the future interest-holder a choice.

16. IDENTIFYING DEFEASIBLE FEES Remember, unlike the Workbook, I will give you ambiguous grants. More general point: Most of my questions are harder than the end-of-chapter problems in the workbook.

17. IDENTIFYING DEFEASIBLE FEES

18. WARM-UP/REVIEW Working with Conditional/Defeasible Present Estates 1. Identifying Defeasible Fees 2. Distinguishing Defeasible Fees from Finite Estates + Contingent Remainders

19. DEFEASIBLE FEES v. CONTINGENT REMAINDERS

20. DEFEASIBLE FEES PRESENT INTEREST IS FEE CONTINGENT REMAINDERS PRESENT INTEREST IS FINITE

21. DEFEASIBLE FEES PRESENT ESTATE CUT OFF IF CONDITION MET CONTINGENT REMAINDERS PRESENT ESTATE TERMINATES NATURALLY

22. DEFEASIBLE FEES FUTURE INTEREST IN EITHER GRANTOR OR GRANTEE CONTINGENT REMAINDERS REMAINDER IN GRANTEE PLUS REVERSION IN GRANTOR

23. Pepe grants Tealacre to Rory and his heirs, but if Totie loses 100 pounds, she may enter and retake the land. (Fee Simple on Executory Limitation + Executory Interest) Pepe grants Tealacre to Rory for life, then to Totie if she loses 100 pounds. (Life Estate + Contingent Remainder)

24. WARM-UP/REVIEW Working with Conditional/Defeasible Present Estates 1.Identifying Defeasible Fees 2.Distinguishing Defeasible Fees from Finite Estates + Contingent Remainders 3.Defeasible Finite Estates

25. DEFEASIBLE FINITE ESTATES Can create conditions cutting off finite estates, yielding, for example: Life Estate Determinable Term of Years on Condition Subsequent Life Estate on Executory Limitation

26. Defeasible Finite Estates: Example (7H): Thelma "to Louise for 99 years if Louise so long live." Louise: Term of years determinable. Thelma: Possibility of Reverter + Reversion = Reversion (Merger)

27. WARM-UP/REVIEW Working with Conditional/Defeasible Present Estates 1.Identifying Defeasible Fees 2.Distinguishing Defeasible Fees from Finite Estates + Contingent Remainders 3.Defeasible Finite Estates 4.Timing Ambiguity

28. TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. If Cheryl graduates from law school during Andrew’s life estate, does she divest Andrew’s interest or just Brian’s?

29. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Common law presumption: If ambiguous, interest won’t divest life estate

30. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Now generally treated as a question of grantor’s intent.

31. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl has graduated from law school, then to Cheryl.

32. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl has graduated from law school, then to Cheryl. Verb Tenses suggest immediate for first; at end of life estate for second.

33. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Andrew is 16; Cheryl is 46.

34. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Andrew is 16; Cheryl is 46. Seems unlikely Cheryl will survive Andrew, so this suggests immediate divestment (or no point to grant).

35. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Andrew graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Brian graduates from law school, then to Cheryl.

36. TIMING AMBIGUITY: POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Andrew graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Brian graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Seems odd to punish Andrew for Brian’s life choices, so absent clear reason, likely treat as just cutting off B’s remainder

37. In 2006, Brian grants Mason-acre “to Dolly for life, then to Jessica so long as she never tries to sell Mason-acre, otherwise to Mike and Mili.” At the time of the grant, Jessica has a (a) Vested remainder in fee simple determinable. (b) Vested remainder in fee simple absolute. (c) Vested remainder in fee simple on executory limitation. (d) Vested remainder subject to divestment.

38. In 2006, Brian grants Mason-acre “to Dolly for life, then to Jessica so long as she never tries to sell Mason-acre, otherwise to Mike and Mili.” At the time of the grant, Jessica has a (a) Vested remainder in fee simple determinable. (b) Vested remainder in fee simple absolute. (c) Vested remainder in fee simple on executory limitation. (d) Vested remainder subject to divestment.

39. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Conditions So Abhorrent … You Can’t Even Impose Them on Your Own Children

40. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Total Restraint on Alienation

41. In 2006, Brian grants Mason-acre “to Dolly for life, then to Jessica so long as she never tries to sell Mason-acre, otherwise to Mike and Mili.” Total Restraint on Alienation is Invalid

42. In 2006, Brian grants Mason-acre “to Dolly for life, then to Jessica so long as she never tries to sell Mason-acre, otherwise to Mike and Mili.” Total Restraint on Alienation is Invalid Pencil Out Unlawful Condition (and executory interest that turns on it)

43. In 2006, Brian grants Mason-acre “to Dolly for life, then to Jessica. Total Restraint on Alienation is Invalid Pencil Out Unlawful Condition (and executory interest that turns on it) Result is a Vested Remainder in Fee Simple Absolute

44. In 2006, Brian grants Mason-acre “to Dolly for life, then to Jessica. Total Restraint on Alienation is Invalid Pencil Out Unlawful Condition (and executory interest that turns on it) Result is a Vested Remainder in Fee Simple Absolute Nasty Exam Q from Fall 2007 (b/c at End of Test)

45. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Total Restraint on Alienation –Partial Restraint OK if Reasonable Casebook says only if Promissory (P625) Other sources say sometimes Forfeiture

46. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Total Restraint on Alienation –Partial Restraint OK if Reasonable –Most Restrictions Restrain Alienation to Some Extent If too burdensome/weird could treat as too much restraint See Casebook at P632-33

47. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Total Restraint on Alienation –Partial Restraint OK if Reasonable –Most Restrictions Restrain Alienation to Some Extent –Use Restrictions (Only by X?) OK if Charitable Some jurisd: Non-Charitable = Unreas. Restraint on Alienation

48. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Doing Criminal Acts

49. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Total Restraint on Marriage –Some Jurisd: Maybe OK if Life Estate –Some Jurisd allow partial restraints Until turn 25 Shapira

50. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Obtaining Divorce

51. UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS Race-Based Limitations (Unenforceable) –Sex-Based Upheld w/in Family –Religion: (Discuss w Shapira)

52. (7O) Archie in will: “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Residue to daughter Gloria. Edith moves in with male friend, Sherman. Edith subsequently dies, devising her property to Sherman.

53. (7O): 3 QUESTIONS 1.“To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Life estate determinable or fee simple determinable?

54. (7O): 3 QUESTIONS 1.Life estate determinable or fee simple determinable? 2.Is condition restraining second marriage void as against public policy?

55. (7O): 3 QUESTIONS 1.Life estate determinable or fee simple determinable? 2.Is condition restraining 2d marriage void? 3.Is cohabitation a violation of a restraint on marriage?

56. (7O): 3 QUESTIONS 1.Life estate determinable or fee simple determinable? 2.Is condition restraining 2d marriage void? 3.Is cohabitation a violation of a restraint on marriage? Then Work Through Decision-Tree

57. (7O): 1st QUESTION: ARGUMENTS? “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Life estate determinable or fee simple determinable?

58. (7O): 1st QUESTION: ARGUMENTS? “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Life estate determinable or fee simple determinable? Presumption of Fee Simple Use and Benefit Sounds Like Life Estate Condition is Consistent with Intent to Support Reasonable to Think Archie would try to Protect Gloria (not Edith’s daughter)

59. (7O): 1st QUESTION “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Majority: E = Fee Simple Determinable A G = –Remaining Future Interest in Archie passed to Gloria through residuary clause in will

60. (7O): 1st QUESTION “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Majority: E = Fee Simple Determinable A G = Possibility of Reverter

61. (7O): 1st QUESTION “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Some: E = Life Estate Determinable A G =

62. (7O): 1st QUESTION “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” Some: E = Life Estate Determinable A G = Possibility of Reverter +Reversion = Reversion (Merger) (See Problem 7H)

63. (7O): 1st QUESTION: RECAP Edith’s Interest – Majority: E has F.S. Determinable – Some: E has Life Estate Determinable Gloria holds future interest through residuary clause

64. (7O): 2d QUESTION: ARGUMENTS? Is condition restraining second marriage void as against public policy?

65. (7O): 2d QUESTION: Recap Is condition restraining 2d marriage void as against public policy? Policy Discussion: A’s right to control property v. E’s right to control her life Maybe more likely OK if just life estate for support

66. (7O): 2d QUESTION Is condition restraining 2d marriage void as against public policy? Result: –If not void, nothing changes –If void, pencil out condition

67. (7O): 2d QUESTION If condition void, pencil out condition –“To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.”

68. (7O): 2d QUESTION If condition void, pencil out condition –“To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit.” Majority: E = Fee Simple Absolute Some: E = Life Estate + G = Reversion

69. (7O): 2d QUESTION If condition void, pencil out condition: “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit.” Edith Dies? Majority: E = Fee Simple Absolute  S= Fee Simple Absolute

70. (7O): 2d QUESTION If condition void, pencil out condition: “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit.” Edith Dies? Some: E = Life Estate + G = Reversion  G = Fee Simple Absolute

71. (7O): 3d QUESTION: ARGUMENTS? Is cohabitation a violation of a restraint on marriage? (Only need to resolve if condition is valid).

72. (7O): 3d QUESTION Is cohabitation a violation of a restraint on marriage? –If yes, Gloria gets fee simple absolute. –If no (Restatement position) nothing changes

73. (7O): E Dies, Condition Valid, No Violation “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” –Some: E = Life Estate Determinable G = Possibility of Reverter +Reversion = Reversion (Merger) –Who Gets?

74. (7O): E Dies, Condition Valid, No Violation “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” –Some: E = Life Estate Determinable G = Possibility of Reverter +Reversion = Reversion (Merger) G = Fee Simple Absolute

75. (7O): E Dies, Condition Valid, No Violation “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” –Majority: E = Fee Simple Determinable G = Possibility of Reverter –Who Gets?

76. (7O): E Dies, Condition Valid, No Violation “To my wife Edith, for her use & benefit, so long as she remains unmarried.” –Majority: E = Fee Simple Determinable G = Possibility of Reverter –S = Fee Simple Absolute (Condition Can Never Occur)

77. LOGISTICS Info on Friday’s Test Posted. Qs? Sweet Sixteen Pool Rest of Syllabus, Materials & Assignments Posted

78. Shapira v. Union National Bank EAGLES: DQS105-107

79. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS (DQ105A) Gift conditioned upon religious faith of beneficiary v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith Why Relevant?

80. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Gift conditioned upon religious faith of beneficiary v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith –Belief v. Conduct (Marriage in 1974) –Administrability

81. ADMINISTRABILITY  ADMINISTRABILITY  To Pigpen, so long as the kitchens and bathrooms are always kept very clean.  To Schroeder, so long as he never plays any work by Beethoven on the piano. 

82. ADMINISTRABILITY  ADMINISTRABILITY  To Lucy so long as she remains a member of the Society of Friends.  To Linus, so long as he remains a good Catholic. 

83. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS (DQ105A) Gift conditioned upon divorce v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith Why Relevant?

84. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Gift conditioned upon divorce v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith Ct: Latter not sufficient to encourage fake M & divorce Grantee can’t avoid condition by saying “I will act in bad faith”

85. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS (DQ105A) Conditional gift with “gift over” to third party v. Conditional gift without “gift over” Why Relevant?

86. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Conditional gift with “gift over” to third party v. Conditional gift without “gift over” Comprehensive plan v. “In Terrorem” condition

87. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS (DQ105A) Forcing a marriage as condition of completed gift v. Withholding gift until marriage made Why Relevant?

88. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Forcing a marriage as condition of completed gift v. Withholding gift until marriage made Remedy: Injunction v. Forfeiting Gift Like case involving divorce settlement requirement that child be raised in partic. faith: Won’t impose contempt/crim sanctions for not following religion

89. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Quaker men (Maddox) v. Jewish women (Shapira) Why Relevant?

90. SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Quaker men (Maddox) v. Jewish women (Shapira) Quakers = Too Few Available Partners E.g., you must marry one of the Bronte Sisters

91. DQ106.Maddox rules that these kinds of conditions are unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners. How few partners must there be to meet the test?

92. DQ106.Maddox: unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners. If you were living in a state with that test, how would you prove it was met?

93. DQ106.Was the Maddox opinion cited in Shapira correct to rule that these kinds of conditions are unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners?

94. DQ106.Was Maddox correct to rule that these kinds of conditions are unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners? Too much restriction on grantee v. Grantor’s rights

95. DQ107: Should a court enforce conditions that limit or mandate religious behavior for the grantee?

96. DQ104. Why should we allow grantors to have any control at all of what happens to land after they have died? Maybe allow life estates & vested remainders but no conditions on use?

97. RULES THAT FURTHER ALIENABILITY featuring Falcons

98. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor

99. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor Today usually a rule of construction, not a rule of law

100. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor Today usually a rule of construction, not a rule of law Abolished in many jurisdictions

101. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor Today usually a rule of construction, not a rule of law Abolished in many jurisdictions NOTE: Grantor must be alive at time of grant for DWT to apply

102. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Example: While alive, Oscar conveys: “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.”

103. Doctrine of Worthier Title Example: While alive, Oscar conveys: “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” As written: Agnes has life estate O’s heirs have contingent remainder O has reversion

104. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” As written: Agnes has life estate O’s heirs have contingent remainder O has reversion If A dies, and no destructability, O has fee simple on exec. limitation & heirs have springing executory interest.

105. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” As written: Agnes has life estate O’s heirs have contingent remainder O has reversion If A dies, and no destructability, O has fee simple on exec. limitation & heirs have springing executory interest. NOT VERY MARKETABLE!!

106. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” Effect of Doctrine: Agnes has life estate Remainder in O’s heirs treated as “remainder” in O = reversion.

107. DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” Effect of Doctrine: Agnes has life estate Remainder in O’s heirs treated as “remainder” in O = reversion. If A dies, O has fee simple absolute

108. (7P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy?

109. (7P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs?

110. (7P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Other?

111. (7P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Sleepy: Reversion Effect of Doctrine of Worthier Title?

112. (7P): S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Sleepy: Reversion Effect of Doctrine of Worthier Title: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy: Reversion

113. (7P): S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect As Written? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Sleepy: Reversion

114. (7P): S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect As Written? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder  Bashful: Vested Remainder Sleepy: Reversion  Nothing (Divests)

115. (7P) : S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect if Doctrine Applies? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy: Reversion

116. (7P) : S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect if Doctrine Applies? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy: Reversion  ANA: reversion

117. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION INTERPRET GRANT ACCORDING TO RULE UNLESS EVIDENCE OF GRANTOR’S INTENT TO THE CONTRARY

118. Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction GEORGE LEAVES BUSH-ACRE: “TO JEB FOR LIFE, THEN TO JEB’S CHILDREN FOR THEIR LIVES, THEN TO MY HEIRS”

119. Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction “TO JEB FOR LIFE, THEN TO JEB’S CHILDREN FOR THEIR LIVES, THEN TO MY HEIRS” We presume George would have wanted to regain complete control of Bush-Acre had he thought he would still be alive after Jeb & children all gone.

120. Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction George leaves Bush-acre “to Jeb for life, then to Jeb’s children for their lives, then to my heirs. It is my wish that the Doctrine of Worthier Title not apply to this grant” WHAT HAPPENS?

121. Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction George leaves Bush-acre “to Jeb for life, then to Jeb’s children for their lives, then to my heirs. It is my wish that the Doctrine of Worthier Title not apply to this grant” DON”T APPLY RULE!!

122. RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE IF-- One Instrument –Creates Life Estate in A –Plus Remainder in A’s Heirs –Both Equitable or Both Legal Remainder in A’s heirs  Remainder in A

123. RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE RULE OF LAW, NOT RULE OF CONSTRUCTION

124. RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE RULE OF LAW, NOT RULE OF CONSTRUCTION ELIMINATED BY STATUTE IN MOST STATES

125. (7Qi): Will "to Grace for life, then to Grace's children and their heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

126. (7Qi): Will "to Grace for life, then to Grace's children and their heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? None. Remainder to “children” not “heirs”

127. (7Qii): Johnny “to Jay for life, then to Jay's heirs if Jay survives David." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

128. (7Qii): Johnny “to Jay for life, then to Jay's heirs if Jay survives David." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? To Jay for life, then to Jay, if Jay survives David.

129. (7Qiii): Cher "to Chastity for 100 years if she so long live, then to Chastity's heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

130. (7Qiii) : Cher "to Chastity for 100 years if she so long live, then to Chastity's heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? None. Chastity has term of years determinable, not life estate.

131. (7Qiv): Bill "to Chelsea for life." Bill subsequently devises the reversion to Chelsea's heirs. Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

132. (7Qiv): Bill "to Chelsea for life." Bill subsequently devises the reversion to Chelsea's heirs. Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? N one. Not done in one instrument.

133. (7Qv): Al "to Tipper for life, then to Tipper's heirs. I intend that the rule in Shelley's Case shall not apply." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

134. (7Qv): Al "to Tipper for life, then to Tipper's heirs. I intend that the rule in Shelley's Case shall not apply." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? Rule applies. Rule of Law, not construction.

135. (7Qv): Al "to T for life, then to T's heirs. I intend that the rule … shall not apply." Rule applies. “To Tipper for life, then to Tipper”  into fee simple absolute.

136. “ At Common Law ” v. “ Today ”

137. Default Estate “At Common Law” v. “ Today ” Life Estate Fee Simple

138. “to X and the Heirs of his Body” “At Common Law” v. “ Today ” Created a Traditional Fee Tail Traditional Fee Tail eliminated; state statutes provide different results when this language used Not responsible for details of this

139. Doctrine of Destructability of Contingent Remainders “At Common Law” v. “ Today ” Applied everywhere Eliminated in all states except Florida

140. Doctrine of Worthier Title “At Common Law” v. “ Today ” Applied everywhere as Rule of Law Eliminated in some states; Rule of Construction in others

141. Rule in Shelley’s Case “At Common Law” v. “ Today ” Applied everywhere as Rule of Law Eliminated in most states