1. The Evolution of Identity Management February 18, 2005 © Copyright 2004, Credentica – all rights reserved Dr. Stefan Brands

2. 2 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Part I The evolution of conventional I&AM

3. 3 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Set-up: Identity enrolment & provisioning I:  I: a 1, a 2, … AS IdS I I RP I&AM set-up: Enrollment in Identity Server (IdS) Provisioning in Attribute Server (AS) Identity Token issuance Next slides: Access to Resource Provider (RP)

4. 4 © Copyright 2004, Credentica RP Phase 0: Intra-enterprise I&AM (today) I:  I: a 1, a 2, … AS IdS yes/no I Security Privacy Other

5. 5 © Copyright 2004, Credentica RP Phase 1: Access by “extended” user (today) I:  I: a 1, a 2, … AS IdS yes/no I Security Privacy Other No access privacy

6. 6 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Phase 2: Federated access (in progress …) AS RP IdS RP ? ? = Security Privacy RP can trace User IdS can trace User IdS can monitor RP IdS cross-profiling Availability Insider fraud IdS & AS exposed Denial of service Other RP–IdS/AS relation

7. 7 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Phase 3: Federated I&AM (a la SAML) AS RP IdS RP Security Privacy RP can trace User IdS can trace User IdS can monitor RP IdS cross-profiling Privacy legislation Availability Insider fraud IdS & AS exposed Denial of service Other RP–IdS/AS relation

8. 8 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Phase 3: Federated I&AM (a la SAML) AS RP IdS RP Security Privacy RP can trace User IdS can trace User IdS can monitor RP IdS cross-profiling Privacy legislation Availability Insider fraud IdS & AS exposed Denial of service Other RP–IdS/AS relation Scalability

9. 9 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Phase 4: Data sharing a la Liberty Alliance AS RP IdS RP RP can trace User IdS can trace User IdS can monitor RP IdS cross-profiling Privacy legislation Availability Insider fraud IdS & AS exposed Denial of service Other RP–IdS/AS relation Scalability Privacy Security

10. 10 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Phase 5: Cross-federated I&AM (not yet …) RP can trace User IdS can trace User IdS can monitor RP IdS cross-profiling Privacy legislation Availability Insider fraud IdS & AS exposed Denial of service Other RP–IdS/AS relation Scalability Privacy Security

11. 11 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Phase 5: Cross-federated I&AM (not yet …) IdP Security Privacy RP can trace User IdS can trace User IdS can monitor RP IdS cross-profiling Privacy legislation Availability Insider fraud IdS & AS exposed Denial of service Other RP–IdS/AS relation Scalability

12. 12 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Part II Solution with Digital Credentials

13. 13 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Digital Credentials The digital equivalent of real-world objects issued by “trusted” issuers: Driver licenses, passports, stamps, coupons, entitlements, cash, ballots, credit report data, health record entries, …. New “credentials” that have no real-world equivalent Unique security, privacy, and efficiency features Independent “sliders” – pick according to application needs Traditional digital certificate techniques do not work – Inescapable systemic identification, security problems, inefficient – Note: Encryption only protects against content wiretapping Security is tied to the “attribute” data itself, so that the credential information can flow anywhere Accomplished through modern cryptographic techniques

14. 14 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Life-cycle of a Digital Credential Alice American 23 y.o. Married Teacher RACA Verifier 3 rd party User Alice American 23 y.o. Married Teacher Alice American 23 y.o. Married Teacher Registration Authority can prepare a DC with some verified user attributes. Can hide the attributes before passing the DC to the CA. CA can add some more attributes and then certifies the DC. User knows all the attributes. User can disclose a subset of the attributes to a verifier. Verifier can prove the transaction to a 3 rd party. It can also hide some disclosed attributes.

15. 15 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Alice Smith Token-specific information Example: privacy-friendly CRL Verifier “Bob Barker” “Dan Daniels” “Hilary Heintz” “Ed Edwards” “Max Murray” “Frank Foster” “Charlie Colm” “George Gosp” BLACKLIST Alic e Token-specific information

16. 16 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Example: privacy-friendly blacklist Verifier “Bob Barker” “Dan Daniels” “Hilary Heintz” “Ed Edwards” “Frank Foster” “Charlie Colm” “George Gosp” BLACKLIST Alic e Token-specific information “Alice Smith” Alice Smith

17. 17 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Non-intrusive account linking I:  I: a 1, a 2, … AS IdS John D = Y j 1, j 2, … Doe, J = X d 1, d 2, … RP I I I I IXY

18. 18 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Non-intrusive data sharing across accounts I:  I: a 1, a 2, … AS IdS John D = Y j 1, j 2, … Doe, J = d 1, d 2, … RP XY j 1, j 2, … j1j2j1j2 j2j2 j1j2j1j2 X

19. 19 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Federated access control I:  I: a 1, a 2, … AS IdS Doe, J = X d 1, d 2, … RP John D = Y j 1, j 2, … RP j1j2j1j2 z1z2z1z2 v1v2v1v2 X yes/no j1j2j1j2 z1z2z1z2 v1v2v1v2

20. 20 © Copyright 2004, Credentica Federated security services I:  I: a 1, a 2, … AS IdS Doe, J = X d 1, d 2, … RP John D = Y j 1, j 2, … RP IIIIII IIIIII CRL Y Y X ABUSE CRL X = Y