1. Collaborative Center for Internet Epidemiology and Defenses (CCIED) Stefan Savage Department of Computer Science & Engineering University of California, San Diego

2. Context: threat transformation Traditional threats –Attacker manually targets high- value system/resource –Defender increases cost to compromise high-value systems –Biggest threat: insider attacker Modern threats –Attacker uses automation to attack many resources at once (filter later) –Defender must defend all systems at once –Biggest threat: software bugs and naïve users

3. Technical enablers Wide-open communications architecture –IP model: anyone can send anything to anyone –Federated management, minimal authentication Vulnerable computing platforms –One software bug -> millions of compromised hosts –Naïve users -> don’t even need software bugs Lack of meaningful deterrence –Little forensic attribution/audit capability –Inefficient investigatory mechanisms/ prosecutorial incentives

4. Bigger problem: Economic Drivers In last six years, emergence of profit-making malware –Anti-spam efforts force spammers to launder e-mail through compromised machines (starts with MyDoom.A, SoBig) –“Virtuous” economic cycle transforms nature of threat Commoditization of compromised hosts –Fluid third-party exchange market (millions of hosts) Raw bots (range from pennies to dollars) Value added tier: SPAM proxying (more expensive) Innovation in both host substrate and its uses –Sophisticated infection and command/control networks: platform –SPAM, piracy, phishing, identity theft, DDoS are all applications

5. DDoS for sale Emergence of economic engine for Internet crime –SPAM, phishing, spyware, etc Fluid third party markets for illicit digital goods/services –Bots ~$0.5/host, special orders, value added tiers –Cards, malware, exploits, DDoS, cashout, etc.

6. 6 3.6 cents per bot week 6 cents per bot week 2.5 cents per bot week September 2004 postings to SpecialHam.com, Spamforum.biz >20-30k always online SOCKs4, url is de-duped and updated > every 10 minutes. 900/weekly, Samples will be sent on > request. Monthly payments arranged at discount prices. >$350.00/weekly - $1,000/monthly (USD) >Type of service: Exclusive (One slot only) >Always Online: 5,000 - 6,000 >Updated every: 10 minutes >$220.00/weekly - $800.00/monthly (USD) >Type of service: Shared (4 slots) >Always Online: 9,000 - 10,000 >Updated every: 5 minutes Botnet Spammer Rental Rates Bot Payloads

8. Structural asymmetries Defenders reactive, attackers proactive –Defenses public, attacker develops/tests in private –Arms race where best case for defender is to “catch up” New defenses expensive, new attacks cheap –Defenses sunk costs/business model, attacker agile and not tied to particular technology Defenses hard to measure, attacks easy to measure –Few security metrics (no “evidence-based” security), attackers directly monetization which drives attack quality Minimal deterrent effect 8

9. CCIED Collaborative Center for Internet Epidemiology and Defenses (“Seaside”) –Joint UCSD/ICSI project, 1 of 4 National CyberTrust Centers –Focused on threats posed by large-scale host compromise Worms, viruses, botnets, DDoS, spam, spyware etc Three key areas of work –Internet epidemiology: measuring/understanding attacks –Automated defenses: blocking/stopping attacks: –Economic drivers: why attacks are happening See: http://www.ccied.org

10. 10 Detecting Outbreaks Both defense and deterrence are predicated on getting good intelligence –Need to detect, characterize and analyze new malware threats –Need to be do it quickly across a very large number of events Classes of monitors –Network-based –Endpoint-based Monitoring environments –In-situ: real activity as it happens Network/host IDS –Ex-situ: “canary in the coal mine” HoneyNets/Honeypots

11. Network Telescopes Idea: Unsolicited packets evidence of global phenomena –Backscatter: response packets sent by victims provide insight into global prevalence of DoS attacks (and who is getting attacked) –Scans: request packets can indicate an infection attempt from a worm (and who is current infected, growth rate, etc.) Very scalable: CCIED Telescope monitors 17M+ IP addrs –(> 1% of all routable addresses of the Internet) Moore et al, Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity, USENIX Security, 2001.

12. Backscatter analysis Monitor block of n IP addresses Expected # of backscatter packets given an attack of m packets: Extrapolated attack rate R’ is a function of measured backscatter rate R:

13. Attacks over time

14. Example: Periodic attack (1hr per 24hrs)

15. Measuring worm growth CodeRed infects 360,000 hosts in 14 hours in 2001 Moore et al, Code Red: a case study on the spread and victims of an Internet worm, ACM IMW, 2002

16. Code red was slow Slammer worm released January 2003 –First ~1 min behaves like classic scanning worm (doubles in 8.5secs) –>1 min worm saturates access bandwidth Some hosts issue > 20,000 scans/sec Self-interfering –Peaks at ~3 min >55 million IP scans/sec –90% of Internet scanned in <10 mins Moore et al, The Spread of the Sapphire/Slammer Worm, IEEE Security & Privacy, 1(4), 2003

17. Scalability/Fidelity Tradeoff in detection Live Honeypot Telescopes + Responders (iSink, honeyd, Internet Motion Sensor) VM-based Honeynet (e.g., Collapsar) Network Telescopes (passive) Most Scalable Highest Fidelity

18. Potemkin Honeyfarm Provide the illusion of millions of honeypots –But use a much smaller set of physical resources –1 Million IP addresses on 10s of physical hosts Gateway multiplexes traffic onto multiple virtual machines (VMs) VMM multiplexes multiple VMs on physical servers Vrable et al., Scalability, Fidelity, and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm, SOSP 2005. Was largest high-fidelity honeyfarm on planet

19. Potemkin Operation Packet received by gateway Dispatched to honeyfarm server VM instantiated –Adopts destination IP address –Creation must be fast enough to maintain illusion (creation via copy) Many VMs will be created –Must be resource efficient (copy-on-write representation) –Can support 100s of simultaneous VMs per server

20. Outbreak Defense Modern worms can infect >1M hosts/sec Need to detect and block new outbreaks << 1 sec [Moore et al, Infocom03] Earlybird: Line-rate network inference of worm signatures [Singh et al, OSDI04] Key issue: how to learn popular strings with high in and out degree, without maintaining per-string state Precise signature identification < 1ms Singh et al., Automated Worm Fingerprinting, NSDI 2004.

21. Today We are increasingly focused on better mapping the economics of on-line crime –Botnet infiltration –Spam conversion –Buying and selling of stolen credit cards, bank accounts, botnets, etc The hope is to find economics bottlenecks and focus defenses there

22. Spam The oldest e-crime profit generator > 100B spam e-mails sent/day (Ironport) Wide range of campaigns –Scams: pharma, software, rolex, jobs, porn,.. –Phishing: banks (e.g. BoA), e-commerce, etc –Web exploits, XSS & social engineering Key question: what is ROI? –Costs can be estimated, but we don’t know sales conversion rate

23. Courtesy Stuart Brown modernlifisrubbish.co.uk How Pharma Spam works?

24. Key opportunity Spam is increasingly sent by botnets Botnets are increasingly self-organizing Can infiltrate botnet C&C network –Observe who is getting spammed –Observe what spam is being sent –Observe which addresses get delivered to –Change templates in transit Kanich, Kreibich, Levchenko, Enright, Paxson, Voelker and Savage, Spamalytics: an Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion, ACM CCS 2008

25. http://canadianpharma.com http://ucsdpharma.com

26. Spam pipeline 26 83.6 M 347.5M 21.1M (25%) 82.7M (24%) 3,827 (0.005%) 10,522 (0.003%) 316 (0.00037%) 28 (0.000008%) --- Pharma: 12 M spam emails for one “purchase” SentMTAVisitsConversionsInbox 40.1 M10.1M (25%)2,721 (0.005%)225 (0.00056%) E-card: 1 in 10 visitors execute the binary

27. Questions? Yahoo!27 Collaborative Center for Internet Epidemiology and Defenses http://ccied.org

28. What’s next: Value-chain characterization Value-chain characterization –Empirical map establishing links between criminal groups and enablers Affiliate programs, botnets, fast flux networks, registrars, payment processors, SEO/traffic partners, fulfillment/manufacturing Data mining across huge data feeds we’ve built or established relationships for –Social network among criminal groups Semantic Web mining

29. New: Fulfillment measurements About to start purchasing wide range of spam-advertized products –Watches –Pharma –Traffic Cluster purchases based on –Merchant and processor –Packaging (postmark, forensic analysis of paper) –Artifacts of manufacturing process (e.g., FT- NIR on drugs) 29

30. Observations – Modest number of bots send most spam – Virtually all bots use templates with simple rules to describe polymorphism – Templates+dictionaries ≈ regex describing spam to be generated – If we can extract or infer these from the botnets, we have a perfect filter for all the spam generated by the botnet – Very specific filters, extremely low FP risk New: Bot-based spam filter generation http://www.marshal.com/trace/spam_statistics.asp random letters and numbers phrases from a dictionary

31. Early results (last week) 0 FP with 50 examples 0 FN on Storm with 500 examples Still tuning for other botnets