1. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March, 2007 Sensor Networks: Technology Transfer Stephen Wicker – Cornell University

2. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 TRUST SN Technologies Self-Configuring, Wireless Systems Camera Network Technologies – Mote Design – Localization – Privacy Policy Real-Time Data Transfer Tools Security Models and Design Tools Medical Networking Transport Tools

3. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Control Applications

4. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Wireless Networked Embedded Systems: Next Generation SCADA/DCS Systems DCS: Digital Control Systems – The overall collection of control systems that measure and change the infrastructure state to facilitate delivery of the commodity (electricity, water, gas, & oil) Opportunity for a new generation of secure critical physical SCADA and DCS depend on the gathering, monitoring, and control of information from distributed sensing devices. Powerful platform for privacy policy development.

5. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Water Supply Protection

6. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 A Typical Industrial Facility: 40+ years old, $10B infrastructure ~2 Square Miles 1400 Employees Operating Budget: $200M+/year Primary products: Chlorine, Silica, Caustics Highly profitable facility DHS, OSHA, EPA compliance

7. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 The Plant: A Complex Environment  sec msec 1 sec secs min hours

8. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007

9. Comments from Marty Geering, BP Wireless Engineer, Cherry Hill, New Jersey

10. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007

12. Camera Mote Daughter Board Source: ITRI

13. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Sharing of sensor readings in real time EVENTS Mobile display of locally obtained and globally shared sensor readings: Local Sensors are Queried: EVENTS SHARED Sensor readings are shared opportunistically: SENSTRACMobOS

14. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Security: Threat Model Mote-class Attacker – Controls a few ordinary sensor nodes – The attacker has the same capabilities as the network Laptop-class Attacker – Greater battery & processing power, memory, high-power radio transmitter, low-latency communication – The attacker can cause more serious damage Outsider Attacks – Passive eavesdropping: listening to the ongoing communication – Denial of service attacks: any type of attack that can cause a degradation in the performance of the network – Replay attacks: the adversary captures some of the messages, and plays them back at a later time which cause the network to operate on stale information Insider Attacks: compromised node – Node runs malicious code – The node has access to the secret keys and can participate in the authenticated communication.

15. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Basic Security Requirements  Confidentiality  Authentication  Integrity  Freshness  Secure Group Management  Availability  Graceful degradation  Design time security

16. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Taxonomy of Security Attacks in Sensor Networks Tanya Roosta, Alvaro Cardenas, Shiuhpyng Shieh, Shankar Sastry, UC Berkeley 10/11/2015

17. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007 Embedded System Design (with security extensions) “ESSC”17 Embedded System Security Design Modeling and Analysis- Toolchain SMoLES_SEC Partitions and Dataflows SMoLES_SEC Deployment Diagram SMoLES_SEC Adversary Model Model Transformation Security/Architecture Models Integrity Requirement Violated -- /SimpleSystem/PartitionB/Assembly_B1 has an integrity requirement which is violated by the information flow connecting /SimpleSystem/PartitionB/Port_B2 to /SimpleSystem/PartitionC/Port_C1. Analysis

18. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007“ESSC”18 MedSN Progress Examining various models for users involved and their method of access/integration in system – Physician and support staff – Patient – Patient family – Non-family – Insurance/Payer Collaborative effort with Vanderbilt, Berkeley Agreement for testing at Nashville assisted living facility Joint Publications

19. TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007“ESSC”19 Testbed Progress Testbed Deployment at Cornell (supports medical effort with Vanderbilt and privacy effort with Berkeley) – Implementation of TinySec for MicaZ – Implementation of MAC layer power saving for MicaZ – Implementation of power aware routing in network – Implementation of HP Jornada based sound actuation overlay network – Deployment of PIR overlay network using Crossbow security motes Joint Publications