1. 1 Self Knowledge 自我知識 第十三單元： Acquaintance theories: objections and replies 親知理論的困難與回應 梁益堉 教授 2012.5.28 【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用 CC 「姓名標示 －非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版授權釋出】創用 CC 「姓名標示 －非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版 本課程指定教材為 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge 。 本講義僅引用部分內容，請讀者自行準備。 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2007 多媒體藝廊，依據 Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 Microsoft 服務合約

2. 4.4.1 The speckled hen 經驗現象是非常細緻的 (phenomenally very fine-grained) ， 但區辨能力有限 (cannot introspectively discriminate phenomenal properties at this level of grain) 。 形成判斷，對經驗進行概念化時，判斷的內容不要超過 區辨能力的範圍 (limit herself to those aspects of her phenomenology that she can grasp directly) avoid conceptualizations (like 48-speckledness) that transcend her powers of introspective discrimination stick with those (like many-speckledness) that are within her powers to discriminate 2

3. 4.4.1 The speckled hen The problem of the speckled hen remains: Epistemic appearances may fall short of phenomenal reality, they may nonetheless go beyond the subject’s powers of introspective discrimination. (p.106) How can I determine that my judgment about my experience is accurate, and does not exceed my introspective abilities? It shows that the extent of our introspective knowledge is limited by our powers of discrimination. The acquaintance theorist must explain how introspective subjects can respect those limits. (p.106) 3 以上著作轉載自 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge ， 106 頁，依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。

4. 4.4.2 The problem of conceptualization A full defense of ACQ against the speckled hen problem must explain (1) what is involved in possessing phenomenal concepts like pain and many-speckledness (2) how one can directly grasp that a particular conceptualization of a state, e.g. as pain, is accurate. 我如何知道我們對痛覺的概念化是準確的。 Sosa’s externalist account: possession of the concept at a given time 1.recognize the pattern if then presented it 2. classify the instances of the features appropriately 3. would not have mischaracterized instanced of other, distinct, patterns at instances of this one. 4

5. 4.4.2 The problem of conceptualization Sosa: possession of a phenomenal concept requires in relevant circumstances, one is disposed to apply the concept if, and only if, the phenomenal property in question is present. Such reliability can justify a phenomenal judgment like pain is present. 外在論 (externalism) ：當事者不需要知道自己的概念能力 是不是可靠的。 (subjects need not have access to whether they are reliable. [That is, condition (iii) above is not needed.] Sosa’s proposal cannot be adopted by acquaintance theorists. 5

6. 4.4.2 The problem of conceptualization 當代 ACQ 作為一種內在論，第三個條件需要被滿足 (a knowing subject must grasp what it is that justifies her judgment) 。外在論 認為不需要。 外在論：擁有概念是由傾向所構成。傾向在理論上優先。 (Sosa: my grasp of the concept three-dottedness is constituted by my dispositions to apply this concept correctly) ACQ: 因為有概念才會展現出相關的傾向。 (my grasp of the concept explains why I am disposed to apply it correctly) BonJour: reliability is a consequence of grasping the concept’s descriptive content, and so this grasp cannot be analyzed in terms of reliable use. Ex: judgment three-dottedness is present 6

7. 4.5 A proposed solution 4.5.1 Pruning the epistemic appearances Gertler: ACQ must show how epistemic appearances can be pruned, so as to eliminate questionable epistemic appearances like the appearance of 48-speckledness or at-least-50- speckledness. Epistemically appears will depend, in part, on what the subject already knows. 超過經驗證據之外，採取謹慎的 立場。 Epistemic appearance 受到 區辯能力的影響。 7 Flickr ，作者： Stephen Poff 。

8. 4.5.1 Pruning the epistemic appearances Gertler we can exclude potentially misleading epistemic appearances by adopting the scrupulously cautious attitude of someone especially concerned to avoid error. reflecting on her current experience: if an experience epistemically appears to involve many-speckledness, then it does involve many-speckledness. 8

9. 4.5.1 Pruning the epistemic appearances The key question is not whether it is possible to doubt that you’re experiencing that sensation [i.e. not about condition (i)]. The key question is this: if you judge, from the perspective of scrupulous caution and on the basis of careful reflection on your current experience, that you’re now experiencing a pinching sensation(that pinching is present), might this judgment be incorrect? [about condition (iii)] The acquaintance theorist expects that the intuitive answer is “no”─or at least that error here is exceedingly unlikely. [i.e. condition (iii) is satisfied.] (p.111) 9 以上著作轉載自 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge ， 111 頁，依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。

10. 4.5.1 Pruning the epistemic appearances Why won’t epistemic appearances mislead a sufficiently careful introspector? 10 Flickr ，作者： Bob Elderberry 。

11. 版權聲明 11 頁碼頁碼 作品授權條 件 作者 / 來源 1-11 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2007 多媒體藝廊，依據 Microsoft 服務合約及著作權 法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 Microsoft 服務合約 3 Epistemic appearances, …, can respect those limits. 本著作轉載自 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge ， 106 頁，依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 7 Flickr ，作者： Stephen Poff 。 本作品轉載自 http://www.flickr.com/photos/stephenpoff/2317139954/sizes/m/in/photostream/ ， 瀏覽日期 2012/6/2 。本作品採取創用 CC 姓名標示 - 非商業性 - 禁止改作 2.0 通用版 授權釋出。 http://www.flickr.com/photos/stephenpoff/2317139954/sizes/m/in/photostream/創用 CC 姓名標示 - 非商業性 - 禁止改作 2.0 通用版 9 The key question is not, …, exceedingly unlikely. 本著作轉載自 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge ， 111 頁，依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 10 Flickr ，作者： Bob Elderberry 。 本作品轉載自 http://www.flickr.com/photos/rthunder/4047521821/sizes/m/in/photostream/ ，瀏 覽日期 2012/6/2 。本作品轉載自，。本作品採取創用 CC 姓名標示 - 非商業性 - 相同 方式分享 2.0 通用版授權釋出。 http://www.flickr.com/photos/rthunder/4047521821/sizes/m/in/photostream/創用 CC 姓名標示 - 非商業性 - 相同 方式分享 2.0 通用版