Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Cellular Automata Based Authentication (CAA ) Monalisa Mukherjee 1 Niloy Ganguly 2 P Pal Chaudhuri 1 1 Department of Computer Science & Technology, Bengal.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Cellular Automata Based Authentication (CAA ) Monalisa Mukherjee 1 Niloy Ganguly 2 P Pal Chaudhuri 1 1 Department of Computer Science & Technology, Bengal."— Presentation transcript:

1

2 Cellular Automata Based Authentication (CAA ) Monalisa Mukherjee 1 Niloy Ganguly 2 P Pal Chaudhuri 1 1 Department of Computer Science & Technology, Bengal Engineering College ( D. U ), Howrah, West Bengal, India 711103 2 Department of Business Administration, Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management, Calcutta, West Bengal, India 700073

3 CA Research Group (BECDU) Importance 1. Authentication & Verification of data source 2. Protection of copyright & detection of intrusion 3. Prevention of Cyber-Crime Wide Applications E-Commerce, Medical, Technology, Government, Law Authentication

4 CA Research Group (BECDU) Message Digest Generation Function Message Digest Generation Functions Accepts a message of arbitrary length as the input Transforms a key of fixed length called “fingerprint” or “message digest” as the output One-way hash function with the addition of a secret key forms the basis of this transformation Authentication Compares fingerprint produced at source and destination end Important for the security protocols in Message authentication, Data integrity and Digital signature

5 CA Research Group (BECDU) SOURCE MessageDigest Cellular Automata (CA) based Authentication (CAA) MessageDigest DESTINATION Digest Hash Private key Hash Private key Compare Same Not Hacked Hacker

6 CA Research Group (BECDU) Importance of Proposed Method Limitations of the conventional MD5 based message authentication -Not withstand the advanced cryptanalytic attacks -The hash function used is weak In the above background, we propose an efficient message digest generation scheme. The proposed scheme employs a special class of GF(2 p ) Cellular Automata (CA ) 2 p Predecessor Single Attractor Cellular Automata(SACA )

7 CA Research Group (BECDU) p p p p 1i-1ii+1n 0/1 Input Output Input Output 0/1 An n Cell GF(2 P ) CA W i W i+1 W i-1 Input 0 --- 2 p - 1

8 CA Research Group (BECDU) Structure of a 3 Cell GF ( 2 2 ) CA Cell 2 Cell 1 Cell 0 Clock T = 3 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 S 1 = T S 0 0 3 2 33 1 2 2 0 XOR

9 CA Research Group (BECDU) 300 301302303 233200 010013012011022020021023 030033032031 130131132133100333 002 001 003 000 STATE TRANSITION OF A 3 CELL GF ( 2 2 ) SACA T = 3 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 Depth = 3, Attractor - 0 No. of predecessors = 2 p = 4 No. of non reachable states = 48

10 CA Research Group (BECDU) Structure of a 3 Cell GF ( 2 2 ) CA Clock T = 3 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 S 1 = T S 0 + F Cell 2 Cell 1 Cell 0 XNOR 0 3 2 33 1 2 2 0 F = 111111

11 CA Research Group (BECDU) T = 3 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 DUAL SACA F = 111111 103 010 011012013 233200 110112111101100102 121123122120 310311312 313 330003 133 132 131 130 113

12 CA Research Group (BECDU) SACA AND ITS DUAL 300 301302303 233200 010013012011022020021023 030033032031 130131132133100333 002 001 003 000 103 010 011012013 233200 110112111101100102 121123122120 310311312 313 330003 133 132 131 130 113 DUAL SACA SACA

13 CA Research Group (BECDU) HASHING USING SACA AND ITS DUAL 300 301302303 233200 010013012011022020021023 030033032031 130131132133100333 002 001 003 000 103 010 011012013 233200 110112111101100102 121123122120 310311312 313 330003 133 132 131 130 113 SACA DUAL SACA Hashing 300 Hashed value 113

14 CA Research Group (BECDU) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 bits Message Hash Function – 2-cell GF(2 2 ) SACA Key Size = 4 2 3 Message Authentication Through CAA 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 02 3 3 2 Matrix from first token 2 1 1 3 3 2 Private Key 3232 0 2 0

15 CA Research Group (BECDU) 2 3 3 2 2 3 Matrix from first token Message Authentication Through CAA 2 1 1 3 3232 3 2 0 2 0 3232 0101 0 2 0 1313 F = 1 3 SACA DUAL SACA Private Key

16 CA Research Group (BECDU) 2 3 3 2 3 2 Matrix from first token Message Authentication Through CAA 3 1 1 2 1313 0 2 0 0000 0101 0 2 0 1212 F = 1 2 Message Digest

17 CA Research Group (BECDU) Brute Force Attack Key Size can be increased with minimum cost Attack Changing key Related Key Cryptanalysis Differential Cryptanalysis Security Analysis For CAA

18 CA Research Group (BECDU) Attack changing Message File Size No of Ones in xored cyphertext Key 128bit Key 256bit 128 P=4P=8P=8P=16MD5 3239347012812269 65780557611413864 259120516413013670 P1 = 101010111111 C1 = 110101 P2 = 101010111101 C2 = 011011 XORED = 101110 No of 1’s = 4

19 CA Research Group (BECDU) Attack changing key File Size No of Ones in xored cyphertext Key 128bit Key 256bit 128 P=4P=8P=8P=16MD5 3239546313413064 65780456410413468 259120556413212866 K1 = 101010111111 C1 = 110101 K2 = 101010111101 C2 = 011011 XORED = 101110 No of 1’s = 4

20 CA Research Group (BECDU) Differential Cryptanalysis No of 1’s = 5 P1 = 11001011 C1 = 00110101 P2 = 10011001 C2 = 10000110 XORED=0101010 XORED=10110011 No of 1’s = 3 P1 = 11000011 C1 = 10110101 P2 = 00001001 C2 = 00100110 XORED=0101010 XORED=10010011 No of 1’s = 3No of 1’s = 4

21 CA Research Group (BECDU) Differential Cryptanalysis No of 1’s = 5 P1 = 11001011 C1 = 00110101 P2 = 10011001 C2 = 10000110 XORED=0101010 XORED=10110011 No of 1’s = 3 P1 = 11000011 C1 = 10110101 P2 = 00001001 C2 = 00100110 XORED=0101010 XORED=10010011 No of 1’s = 3No of 1’s = 4 P1 P2 = 3 C1 C2 Freq 1 n1n1n1n1 2 n2n2n2n2 3 n3n3n3n3 4 n4n4n4n4 5 n5n5n5n5 6 n6n6n6n6 7 n7n7n7n7 8 n8n8n8n8 Standard Deviation of distribution

22 CA Research Group (BECDU) Differential Cryptanalysis Avg. Std. Devn. Of XOR Distribution (%) using CAA P=16P=8P=8P=4 Key 256bit Key 128bit File Size 4.9865.0025.0346.66765780 5.1226.1236.1348.45835860 4.0336.1027.98210.213259120

23 CA Research Group (BECDU) Time Needed for MD5 & CAA File Size CPU Time in Seconds P=1P=2P=4P=8 MD5 n=128n=64n=32n=16 16080.0550.0500.040.040.55 1421640.2050.1650.1180.0810.220 8529840.2930.2520.2050.2050.330 Speed calculated in WindowsNT 4.00 -1381, IBM

24 CA Research Group (BECDU) Watermarking – Its Importance Invisible Fragile Watermarking - Image Authentication / Ownership - Tamper Detection - Verification of Image Integrity Application - Legal matters - News reporting, Medical

25 CA Research Group (BECDU) Watermarking Existing Tools - MD5 based One-way Hash Function Advantages - Easy Software implementation - License free nature Disadvantages - Non-keyed primitive - Lacks sound & realistic cryptanalysis

26 CA Research Group (BECDU) Watermark Insertion / Extraction Host Image Watermark Image Watermarked Image Insertion Scheme 255 128 108 11 1 0 1 11111110 10000000 01101100 00001010 1 1 0 CA Based Hashing 0 1 11111110 10000001 01101100 00001011 254 129 108 11 11111111 10000000 01101100 00001011

27 CA Research Group (BECDU) Watermark Insertion / Extraction Host Image Watermark Image Watermarked Image Insertion Scheme Extraction Scheme Watermarked Image Watermark Image

28 CA Research Group (BECDU) Proposed Scheme Resists Holliman-Memon Attack Vector Quantization Attack Higher PSNR Watermarking Image Name Data in Bytes PSNR Values in dB unit P = 4P = 8MD5 Lena106407153.46353.78851.243 Concord148560454.02054.52751.318 Rabbit96445152.44452.72551.104

29 CA Research Group (BECDU) Current & Future Works on Watermarking Invisible Robust Watermarking - Survives Image Cropping & Compression Audio & Video Watermarking Application - Prevent Unauthorized Access & Forgery - Copyright Protection & Authentication

30 Thank you Niloy Ganguly n_ganguly@hotmail.com http://ppc.becs.ac.in


Download ppt "Cellular Automata Based Authentication (CAA ) Monalisa Mukherjee 1 Niloy Ganguly 2 P Pal Chaudhuri 1 1 Department of Computer Science & Technology, Bengal."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google