1. Rights-based Management and Buybacks in International Tuna Fisheries Introduction Introduction Rights-based management systems Rights-based management systems Mechanics of MCS systems Mechanics of MCS systems EPO tuna fisheries EPO tuna fisheries Capacity reduction in the EPO Capacity reduction in the EPO Costs of a vessel buyback in the EPO Costs of a vessel buyback in the EPO Buyback design considerations Buyback design considerations

2. Fisheries Management Restrict catches to levels that are sustainable and for which the value of the catch is greater than harvesting costs Restrict catches to levels that are sustainable and for which the value of the catch is greater than harvesting costs Should take account of other costs that fishing imposes on society Should take account of other costs that fishing imposes on society Introduction

3. Fisheries Management Restrictions on total catch, fishing effort, closed seasons – fishers struggle against authority and usually win the battle but lose out. Restrictions on total catch, fishing effort, closed seasons – fishers struggle against authority and usually win the battle but lose out. Allocation of harvest rights – areas, quotas - incentives to maximize values of rights aligned with conservation Allocation of harvest rights – areas, quotas - incentives to maximize values of rights aligned with conservation Introduction

4. General conclusions of FAO project 1. Moratorium on the entry of additional large scale vessels, 2. Allocation criteria and mechanisms for new participants, 3. Participation by all tuna fishing nations and entities in RFMOs, 4. Improved monitoring of tuna fishing fleet and its activity. 5. Collection of information on activity of vessels that are currently not monitored. 6. Closed regional vessel registers, and global vessel register, 7. Buybacks or similar incentives to reduce any over capacity, 8. Rights of and incentives for participants in the fishery. 9. Transparency and participation of stakeholders.

5. Rights based management systems Examples within national jurisdictions Individual transferable quotas Individual transferable quotas Territorial use rights Territorial use rights Limited entry Limited entry

6. Rights based management systems Characteristic of property rights exclusivity exclusivity duration duration security security transferability transferability The more developed these characteristics are the more the interest of the rights holders are aligned with conservation of the stocks

7. Application to tuna fisheries Extensive movements –› limited entry or quota systems and management by RFMOs Extensive movements –› limited entry or quota systems and management by RFMOs Excess fleet capacity in most tuna fisheries Excess fleet capacity in most tuna fisheries Rights based management systems

8. Particular issues for rights based management to whom do rights belong to whom do rights belong how are the rights initially allocated how are the rights initially allocated who maintains a record of the rights who maintains a record of the rights what system is used to ensure fishers do not exceed their rights what system is used to ensure fishers do not exceed their rights Rights based management

9. Allocations by RFMOs to individuals or cooperatives? Allocation to states considered best practice Allocation to states considered best practice Examples of allocation to individuals Examples of allocation to individuals –AIDCP DMLs allocated to individual vessels –IATTC limited entry rights to individual vessels Neither is a strong property right Neither is a strong property right Rights based management systems

10. Mechanics of MCS with RBMS Limited Entry List (register) of those entitle to fish List (register) of those entitle to fish Records or inspections of compliance with any controls on investment in capacity increases. Records or inspections of compliance with any controls on investment in capacity increases.

11. Mechanics of MCS with RBMS Quota systems Register of quota(s) held by individual Register of quota(s) held by individual System to compare catch to quotas System to compare catch to quotas Quota balancing systems Quota balancing systems

12. Mechanics of MCS with RBMS Key role of Registers of rights holders Key role of Registers of rights holders Similar to registers of shareholdings in companies Similar to registers of shareholdings in companies Requires unambiguous rules concerning any changes Requires unambiguous rules concerning any changes Important for those who maintain register be arms-length from rights holders Important for those who maintain register be arms-length from rights holders

13. EPO tuna fisheries example

14. Purse seine vessel with a carrying capacity of 2000t of tuna frozen in brine. A modern longline vessel with a carrying capacity of 400t of ultra low temperature frozen tuna EPO tuna fisheries

15. W W W W Guatemala: Villagran, Perez, Guatemala: Villagran, Perez, Sanchez, Jolon, Lopez. El Salvador Salaverria, Sui, Barahona Costa Rica: Mug, Andraka Mug, Andraka Segura Segura Panama: Mituhasi, Pacheco Colombia: Barreto, Zapata Colombia: Barreto, Zapata Ecuador: Hara, Rendon, Parrales Peru: Valqui, De Paz, Kelez, Calderon Nicaragua: Urteaga

16. EPO tuna fisheries Growth of fleet size

17. A buyback to reduce the EPO fleet size Could a buyback be effective? (no replacement) Could a buyback be effective? (no replacement) Resolution C-02-03 Resolution C-02-03 Currently no capacity limit for longline Currently no capacity limit for longline –but EPO quotas and global scrapping Even with capacity limit - effort creep – specify rights more completely Even with capacity limit - effort creep – specify rights more completely EPO tuna fisheries

18. Choice of reductions in PS and LL. EPO tuna fisheries.

19. EPO tuna fisheries Financing a P-S buyback Some guesses at cost of PS buyback Some guesses at cost of PS buyback To reduce to RPOA capacity of 158,000 m 3 – need reduction of 70,000 m 3 To reduce to RPOA capacity of 158,000 m 3 – need reduction of 70,000 m 3 Recent sales of 1200 m 3 vessels $5-8.5 million Recent sales of 1200 m 3 vessels $5-8.5 million Purchasing 59 vessels between $300-500 million Purchasing 59 vessels between $300-500 million Less expensive to buy places on the RVR Less expensive to buy places on the RVR

20. EPO tuna fisheries Financing a buyback As well as active vessels governments have rights to add about 54,000 m 3 As well as active vessels governments have rights to add about 54,000 m 3 Cost $6-13 million – but more than 50% not associated with individual right – governments could write off. Cost $6-13 million – but more than 50% not associated with individual right – governments could write off.

21. Considerations in designing a buyback Section 6 of paper, but Dale’s presentation will cover in more detail.

22. Conclusion Overcapacity of tuna fleets is difficult to solve with current approaches Overcapacity of tuna fleets is difficult to solve with current approaches Buybacks coupled with rights-based management seems a better approach Buybacks coupled with rights-based management seems a better approach Purpose of paper is to stimulate discussion which we hope will be a step in the road to better management and conservation Purpose of paper is to stimulate discussion which we hope will be a step in the road to better management and conservation