1. NOTE: To change the image on this slide, select the picture and delete it. Then click the Pictures icon in the placeholder to insert your own image. PUTTING SOCIAL DILEMMAS INTO SOCIAL CONTEXT Marilynn Brewer ICSD June 2015

2. BASIC PREMISE: Humans are a group-living species

3. What is a social group?  Unit of interdependence mutually acknowledged  Non groups… - spatial aggregates - social categories - social networks - markets  Groups as psychological transformation

4. Homo Economicus or Homo Socians?  Group psychology as transformation of self (from “I” to “We”)  Collective rationality (Colman, et al., 2008)  Team reasoning (Bacharach 1999)  Collective self-regulation (Sassenberg, 2009; Fishbach et al., 2011; Y. Kashima, 2015)  Group-based trust (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009)  Cooperation dilemma or coordination problem? (Thomas et al., 2014)

5. Implications for Collective Decision Making in the Lab  Minimal groups - Default utilities  SVO (Balliet et al., 2009)  - integrated model (van Lange, 1999; Shank et al., 2015) utility =.2 (individual outcome) +. 5 (collective outcome) +.3 (equality)  deliberative vs heuristic decision making (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012)

6. Implications for Collective Decision Making in the Lab  Situational cues to group identity, shared understandings  - communication  - simultaneous decisions  - shared feedback  - social identity manipulations  Situation x SVO interactions (B rucks & Van Lange, 2007; DeCremer & Van Vugt, 1999: deKwaadsteniet et al., 2008)

7. Room 1 Room 2 Sender A Responder B Experimenter Triples amount sent Mean amount sent = $5.50 Illustration 1: Trust Game (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002)

8. Room 1 Room 2 Sender A Responder B Experimenter Triples amount sent Sender C Responder D Mean sent = $2.60

9. Room 1 Room 2 Sender A Responder B Experimenter Triples amount sent Sender C Responder D

10. Amount Sent as a Function of Exchange Condition (U.S. participants)

11. Illustration 2: Resource Dilemma (Brewer & Kramer, 1986) Resource Pool S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 “Replenishment” rate = 0.9 – 1.1

12. Resource Dilemma: Large Group Resource Pool S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S19 S20

13. Experimental Design Individual Identity Collective Identity Small Group (n = 8) Large Group (n = 32)

14. Experimental Results (Take per trial) Individual Identity Collective Identity Small Group (n = 8) Large Group (n = 32) 8.15 7.04

15. Experimental Results (Take per trial) Individual Identity Collective Identity Small Group (n = 8) Large Group (n = 32) 6.22 8.15 6.00 7.04

16. Group Size (OR: Why a dyad is not a group…)  Small groups vs large groups: not just a matter of scale  - no consistent size effects in lab studies (e.g., Zelmer, 2003; Balliet & Van Lange, 2013)  - 2 different from 3 to 8 (Grujic, 2012; Nosenzo, 2015)  - small (4 – 8) not significantly different from large (30, 40, 100…) (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Marwell & Ames, 1979; Lipford, 1995; Isaac et al., 1994)

17. Group Size (OR: Why a dyad is not a group…)  “Core configurations” *  -dyads (n = 2)  - task groups (n = 3 to 7)  - demes, communities (n = 50 to 200)  - macrodemes (n = 300 to 1000 and beyond…) *adapted from Caporael (1997)

18. Core Configurations: Bases of Cohesion, Trust  Dyads: relational ties; personalized trust  Task groups: shared understandings; common focus of attention; role-based trust  Demes: common bond identity; reputation-based trust; informal sanctions  Macrodemes: symbolic identity; markers: shared narratives, styles, language; depersonalized trust; formal sanctions

19. Core Configurations: Coordination Mechanisms  Dyads: synchronization, reciprocity  Task groups: tacit coordination; mutual monitoring; self- regulation  Demes: descriptive norms, imitation; indirect reciprocity; division of labor/roles  Macrodemes: proscriptive norms; formal rules, regulations; institutions

20. Implications: Social Dilemmas in the Real World  Alignment of Interdependence Structure and Group Identity  - managing local resources (deme level)  - managing national resources (macrodeme level)  - managing global resources (???)  Superordinate versus subgroups

21. Implications for Laboratory Experiments  Which group psychology?  Discontinuities in the lab…  Communication effect larger for groups >2 (Balliet, 2010)  “Bad apple” effect: 1 low contributor in 4-person group lowered cooperation rates more than 2 defectors in 8- person group (Kerr et al., 2009)

22. Implications: Expanding our Experimental Paradigms  Distal (open) public goods  - intergenerational dilemmas (Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009)  Intergroup dilemmas (Bornstein, 2003; Halevy et al., 2008)  Nested dilemmas (Wit & Kerr, 2002; Blackwell & McKee, 2003; Buchan et al., 2009)

23. The Nested Public Goods Dilemma (Buchan et al., 2009)  Multi-level PGD  3-Choice (Personal vs. Local vs. World)

24. Contribution Choices (10 tokens)  Self: 1 = 1  Local group (n = 4): 1 x2 (/4 ) MPCR =.50  Worldwide group (n = 12) 1 x3 (/12) MPCR =.25

25. Ending on a Positive Note… Globalization Global Identity World Contribution