1. The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms Suzanne Werner, Emory Univeristy, 1998 Presented by Steve Richter, April 30, 2013

2. 1. Introduction and Basic Assumptions While the end of war can inaugurate durable peace and cooperative relationships between former adversaries, termination of conflict often creates only temporary peace. – Werner seeks to outline conditions conducive to a lasting peace.

3. 1. Introduction and Basic Assumptions cont. For conflict to recur, at least one adversary must reverse a prior decision. A belligerent must challenge a previously accepted agreement. Explanation must consider that warring parties previously agreed to stop fighting.

4. 1. Introduction and Basic Assumptions cont. Most conflict within international system takes place among a small number of states that fight repeatedly – States that fight again can only do so if they have previously agreed to stop fighting. – A decision to resume conflict is a, “decision to reverse a prior decision.”

5. 2. Hypotheses for the Key to Instability and Resumption of Conflict 1-Failure to resolve the issues of the dispute – Highlights importance of issue resolution 2-Enforcing the settlement – Well-known problem of enforcement in anarchic environment 3-Renegotiating the terms – Considers belligerents’ incentives to change agreement and possible dangers of renegotiation

6. 2.1 Resolution of the Issues While all conflict settlements require mutual agreement, some decisions arise out of duress or compulsion. – These agreements do not directly address political issues in contention or may come at the expense of the weaker party. – These agreements may settle conflict, but do not resolve it. In fact, they may exacerbate dispute and solidify grievances.

7. 2.1 Resolution of the Issues: Hypotheses Agreements imposed on one side by the other are unlikely to last. Risks of recurrent conflict are greater if peace settlement is imposed rather than negotiated. Conditions that encourage or enable parties to focus on dispute and craft agreements encourage durable peace. Agreement is more likely if issues in dispute are not fundamental to belligerents’ identity or existence. Ability to realize decisive military victory influences propensity to address issues and reach agreement. Zartman, 1995

8. 2.1 Resolution of the Issues: Weaknesses Issue resolution is a better explanation for survival of peace rather than the end of peace. Hypothesis is based on “idealist” assumption that parties can reach settlement that results in permanent peace. Military stalemate may not yield agreement. – Hensel, 1994

9. 2.2 Enforcement of the Settlement Enforcement is difficult under anarchic system. Peace may fail and hostilities can resume if original settlement fails to protect against defection by one or both parties. While settlement may be preferred to war, belligerents may perceive gains by disregarding conditions or their implementation. Peace settlements are fragile and often resemble prisoner’s dilemma.

10. 2.2 Enforcement of the Settlement: Hypotheses Agreements are particularly vulnerable during implementation of settlement terms. But once parties have implemented conditions, honoring agreement only requires maintenance of status quo. Risks of recurrent conflict are less if war ends in an imposed settlement rather than negotiated settlement. Settlements are more likely to endure if third parties provide explicit security guarantees. Risks of recurrent conflict are less if a third party provides security guarantees. An explicit contract to dictate the nature and conditions of future relations will increase enforceability. Risks of recurrent conflict lessen if treaty exists to clarify conditions.

11. 2.2 Enforcement of the Settlement: Weaknesses Settlements are fundamentally flawed because they do not ensure compliance. Settlements that do arise are biased sample of all possible agreements.

12. 2.3 Incentives to Renegotiate Conflict may recur as a consequence of of a belligerent’s attempt to renegotiate terms. Assumes that initial conflict terminated when parties reached a mutual comprimise, “in the shadow of force.” If either side anticipates that new conflict will yield better outcome than the last, incentives exist to renegotiate terms.

13. 2.3 Incentives to Renegotiate: Hypotheses Change in distribution of power likely undermines durability of peace by creating incentives to renegotiate. Change in government likely undermines durability of peace by creating incentives to renegotiate and by impeding ability to do so peacefully. The risks of recurrent conflict decrease as the expected costs of failing to reach a new bargain increase.

14. 2.3 Incentives to Renegotiate: Weaknesses Does not fully explain why attempts to renegotiate sometimes result in violence. – Werner believes the renegotiation argument avoids problem of the first two explanations though: it does not assume that problem rests in flaws of the dispute settlement. – Rather, it implies that original agreement was acceptable and became untenable due to changes subsequent to the settlement. – Werner notes that all three problems may concurrently affect ability to reach settlement.

15. 3. Data Analysis Methods Werner uses hazard model to evaluate hypotheses. – Hazard models relate the time that passes before some event occurs to one or more covariates that may be associated with that quantity of time. Each peace dyad is based on annual assessment. – This results in one record per peace-dyad per one- year period. Any year in which one member of a peace-dyad is not independent was omitted. – Affects states occupied by victors after war.

16. 4. Operationalization 4.1 Spatial and Temporal Domain – Werner identifies dyads previously at war between 1816 and 1992 by the Correlates of War data of Small and Singer, 1982 – Dyad previously at war becomes a peace-dyad if states were on opposing sides and militaries engaged in war. – States that did not participate in greater conflicts(WWI, WWII) at the same time or that did not confront each other directly are not included.

17. 4. Operationalization cont. 4.2 Duration of Peace and Censored Cases – Peace terminates if a belligerent threatens or uses force against the other. Werner uses Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Jones, Bremer, Singer, 1996). – Peace terminates only if one belligerent actually uses force against the other. Werner uses MID data and hostility levels of 1-5 to code conflicts. – Peace is not merely use of force but occurrence of war. War defined as at least 1,000 battle deaths and have hostility level of 5. – Dyad is censored if dispute did not occur before end of 1992.

18. 4. Operationalization cont. 4.3 Independent Variables – Issue Resolution: Argument anticipates that risk of of recurrent conflict is higher after imposed settlement and territorial issue, lower after mediation attempt, and uncertain after military stalemate. – Enforcement: Werner codes for imposed settlements, imposed regime change, and third-party guarantee to determine if risk decreases. – Renegotiation: Change in relative power and leadership change are measured.

19. 5. Results 5.1 Issue Resolution – Evidence provides weak support for this hypothesis. – Territory is only variable that significantly affects risk of recurrent conflict. Settlements of this issue are more likely to fail than others. – Variable is statistically significant only when peace terminates with the threat or use of force. – Imposed settlement, mediator, and stalemate variables are not statistically significant.

20. 5. Results 5.2 Enforcement – Only mixed support for variables emphasized by enforcement argument. – Implementation stage does not seem to be particularly dangerous; once agreement is implemented, peace seems to become institutionalized and unlikely to fail. But when peace ends, these dyads leave data set so hazard rate may only appear to decline. – Imposed settlements last longer than negotiated ones is somewhat supported. Deposing loser’s government strongly enhances durability of peace. – Remaining hypotheses not supported: No evidence that peace treaties reduce risk of recurrent conflict.

21. 5. Results: Werner’s key to the source of conflict! 5.3 Renegotiations – Changes in relative power significantly increase instability. (+ in each data set) – Changes in relative power not only encourage belligerents to challenge settlement, but also hamper efforts to renegotiate peacefully. – Unexpected and fundamental changes also increase risk of conflict, but anticipated changes do not have significant effect. – Expected costs have significant effect on risk. As the costs of the last war increase, the risk of new conflict decreases.

22. 6. Discussion Empirical results consistently support renegotiation hypothesis. Problems: – Weak results for other hypotheses may be a consequence of data or research design. – Circumstances vs. direct effects – Possible bias from case selection. – Some variables may have multiple effects.

23. 7. Conclusions Maintenance of peace agreements between belligerents and successful renegotiation is fundamental to preventing conflict.

24. 7. Conclusions cont. Little evidence that settlements fail because issues are not resolved. – Territorial conflicts are not more likely to lead to another war, but are prone to additional low-level conflict. Mixed evidence to support enforcement argument. – Peace not at greater risk after conflict compare to years later. – Evidence indicates that treaties and guarantors do not reduce risk and may even increase risk of failure of a settlement.

25. 7. Conclusions cont. Werner sees strongest evidence for renegotiation argument. – Changes in distribution of power consistently increase risk that peace breaks down. This includes violent leadership changes. – Settlements of costly wars are more likely to endure than settlements of less costly war. – Werner concludes that efforts to establish peace must persist as belligerents attempt renegotiation.