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Access Control Chapter 5 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Define basic access control terminology. Describe physical building and computer security. Explain reusable passwords. Explain how access cards and tokens work. Describe biometric authentication, including verification and identification. Explain authorizations. Explain auditing. Describe how central authentication servers work. Describe how directory servers work. Define full identity management. 2 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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If attackers cannot get access to your resources, they cannot attack them This chapter presents a number of important access control tools, such as reusable passwords and biometrics We covered crypto before access controls because many access controls use cryptography However, not all access controls use crypto, and those that do usually use it for only part of their process 4 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 5 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Access Controls ◦ Firms must limit access to physical and electronic resources ◦ Access control is the policy-driven control of access to systems, data, and dialogues What is UCF’s policy regarding Nid Access Control? Cryptography ◦ Many access control tools use cryptography to some extent ◦ However, cryptography is only part of what they do and how they work 6 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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The AAA Protections ◦ Authentication—supplicant sends credentials to verifier to authenticate the supplicant ◦ Authorization—what permissions the authenticated user will have What resources he or she can get to What he or she can do with these resources ◦ Auditing—recording what people do in log files Detecting attacks Identifying breakdowns in implementation 7 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Beyond Passwords* ◦ Passwords used to be sufficiently strong ◦ This is no longer true thanks to increasing computer speeds available to hackers ◦ Companies must move to better authentication options But…. 8 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Credentials Are Based on one or more of: ◦ What you know (e.g., a password) ◦ What you have (e.g., an access card; Google Authenticator) ◦ What you are, or (e.g., your fingerprint) ◦ What you do (e.g., speaking a passphrase) 9 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Two-Factor Authentication ◦ Use two forms of authentication for defense in depth (Google Authenticator) ◦ Example: access card and personal identification number (PIN) ◦ Multifactor authentication: two or more types of authentication ◦ But this can be defeated by a Trojan horse on the user’s PC ◦ It can also be defeated by a man-in-the-middle attack by a fake website 10 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Individual and Role-Based Access Control ◦ Individual access control—base access rules on individual accounts ◦ Role-based access control (RBAC) Base access rules on organizational roles (buyer, member of a team, etc.) Assign individual accounts to roles to give them access to the role’s resources Cheaper and less error-prone than basing access rules on individual accounts 11 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Human and Organizational Controls ◦ People and organizational forces may circumvent access protections Shhhhhh, I keep re-using my e-mail password 12 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 13 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 ISO/IEC 27002’s Security Clause 9, Physical and Environmental Security Risk Analysis Must Be Done First ISO/IEC 9.1: Secure Areas ISO/IEC 9.2: Secure Equipment 14
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Securing the building’s physical perimeter ◦ Single point of entry ◦ No gaps into/out of building ◦ If using a reception area it must be constantly staffed Implementing physical entry controls ◦ All Access must be authorized Access should be justified, authorized, logged, and monitored ID badges should be worn Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 15
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 Securing public access, delivery, and loading areas ◦ These are sensitive zones within a building Limit access to internal employees No entry for delivery / pick-up personnel Incoming shipments need inspection and logging Outgoing shipments need to be separate from incoming Securing offices, rooms, and facilities ◦ Locate away from public access ◦ Do not list in internal maps or directories ◦ Limited access mechanisms (locks, key cards, etc.) Protecting against external and environmental threats ◦ Hazardous and combustible material should not be located in sensitive areas ◦ Back-ups and disaster recovery need to be located away from the building 16
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Creating rules for working in secure areas ◦ Special rules in place for those working in these areas No photographic, data recording equipment Should not be unsupervised Inspections of those entering and leaving area Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 17
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 Equipment siting and protection ◦ Siting means locating or placing ◦ Minimize access ◦ Minimize potential damage from water, smoke, vandalism, threats Supporting utilities (electricity, water, HVAC) Uninterruptible power supplies, electrical generators Frequent testing 18
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 Cabling security ◦ Wires should be placed underground or in walls ◦ Use Conduits if not possible ◦ Wiring closets should be locked and monitored Security during offsite equipment maintenance Permission for taking offsite Removal of sensitive information 19
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 Security of equipment off-premises ◦ Constant attendance except when locked securely ◦ Insurance Secure disposal or reuse of equipment ◦ Removal of all sensitive information Rules for the removal of property ◦ Requires proper authorization ◦ Limit who can authorize over a period of time ◦ Limit time property can be off-site ◦ Log removals 20
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"algorithms used to command and control the International Space Station" were lost when an unencrypted NASA laptop computer was stolen in March 2011” NASA Inspector General Paul K. Martin ◦ "NASA has been slow to implement full-disk encryption on the notebook computers and other mobile computing devices it provides to its employees, potentially exposing sensitive information to unauthorized disclosure when such devices are lost or stolen. In fact... the OMB reported a Government- wide encryption rate for these devices of 54 percent. However, as of February 1, 2012, only 1 percent of NASA portable devices/laptops have been encrypted." Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 201021
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Terrorism ◦ Building setback from street ◦ Armed guards ◦ Bullet-proof glass Piggybacking ◦ Following an authorized user through a door ◦ Also called tailgating ◦ Psychologically difficult to prevent ◦ But piggybacking is worth the effort to prevent 22 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Monitoring Equipment ◦ CCTV ◦ Tapes wear out ◦ High-resolution cameras are expensive and consume a great deal of disk space ◦ Low-resolution cameras may be insufficient for recognition needs ◦ To reduce storage, use motion sensing 23 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Dumpster [TM] Diving ◦ Protect building trash bins that may contain sensitive information ◦ Maintain trash inside the corporate premises and monitor until removed Desktop PC Security ◦ Locks that connect the computer to an immovable object ◦ Login screens with strong passwords 24 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 25 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Reusable Passwords ◦ A password that is used multiple times ◦ Almost all passwords are reusable passwords ◦ A one-time password is used only once 26 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Difficulty of Cracking Passwords by Guessing Remotely ◦ Account is usually locked after a few login failures Password-Cracking Programs ◦ Password-cracking programs exist John the Ripper John the Ripper Run on a computer to crack its passwords or Run on a downloaded password file 27 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Password Policies ◦ Regularly test the strength of internal passwords ◦ Not using the same password at multiple sites ◦ Use password management programs ◦ Password duration policies ◦ Shared password policies (makes auditing impossible) ◦ Disabling passwords that are no longer valid 28 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Other Password Policies ◦ Lost passwords (password resets) Opportunities for social engineering attacks Automated password resets use secret questions (Where were you born?) Many can be guessed with a little research, rendering passwords useless Some questions may violate security policies 29 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Password Strength Policies ◦ Password policies must be long and complex At least 8 ??? characters long Change of case, not at beginning Digit (0 through 9), not at end Other keyboard character, not at end Example: tri6#Vial ◦ Completely random passwords are best but usually are written down 30 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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The End of Passwords? ◦ Many firms want to eliminate passwords because of their weaknesses ◦ Quite a few firms have already largely phased them out ◦ But… 32 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Fairy Wrens and Bronze Cukoos Fairy Wrens The problem: – bronze cukoo lays eggs in the wrens nest (weak perimeter controls) – cukoo eggs hatch first and chicks push out the wren eggs – cukoo’s are fed by wren parents, but… 33 BroodparasIteBroodparasIte
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Fairy Wren Solution Teach the un-hatched Chick a password Mothers sing a song with a unique note while incubating the eggs – Cukoos eggs are laid too late and can’t learn this note When begging calls are made as parent Wrens return with food if it contains the unique note (authentication) – Parent Wrens feed the chicks If begging calls don’t include unique note – Parent Wrens abandon the chicks/nets and start a new brood Colombelli-Negrel, Hauber, Robertson, Sulloway, Hoi, Griggio & Kleindorfer. 2012. Embryonic Learning of Vocal Passwords in Superb Fairy-Wrens Reveals Intruder Cuckoo Nestlings. Current Biology (2012) Colombelli-Negrel, Hauber, Robertson, Sulloway, Hoi, Griggio & Kleindorfer. 2012. Embryonic Learning of Vocal Passwords in Superb Fairy-Wrens Reveals Intruder Cuckoo Nestlings. Current Biology (2012) 34
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 35 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Access Cards ◦ Magnetic stripe cards ◦ Smart cards Have a microprocessor and RAM Can implement public key encryption for challenge/response authentication ◦ In selection decision, must consider cost and availability of card readers 36 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Tokens ◦ Constantly changing password devices for one-time passwords ◦ USB plug-in tokens 38 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Proximity Access Tokens ◦ Use Radio Frequency ID (RFID) technology ◦ Supplicant only has to be near a door or computer to be recognized Addressing Loss and Theft ◦ Both are frequent ◦ Card cancellation Requires a wired network for cancellation speed Must cancel quickly if risks are considerable 39 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Two-Factor Authentication Needed because of Ease of Loss and Theft ◦ PINs (Personal Identification Numbers) for the second factor Short: 4 to 6 digits Can be short because attempts are manual Should not choose obvious combinations (1111, 1234) or important dates ◦ Other forms of two-factor authentication Store fingerprint template on device; check supplicant with a fingerprint reader 40 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 41
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 42 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Biometric Authentication ◦ Authentication based on biological (bio) measurements (metrics). Biometric authentication is based on something you are (your fingerprint, iris pattern, face, hand geometry, and so forth) Or something you do (write, type, and so forth) ◦ The major promise of biometrics is to make reusable passwords obsolete 43 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Biometric Systems ◦ Enrollment (enrollment scan, process for key features, store template) Scan data is variable (scan fingerprint differently each time) Key features extracted from the scan should be nearly the same ◦ Later access attempts provide access data, which will be turned into key feature data for comparison with the template 44 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Biometric Systems ◦ Biometric access key features will never be exactly the same as the template ◦ There must be configurable decision criteria for deciding how close a match (match index) to require Requiring an overly exact match index will cause many false rejections Requiring too loose a match index will cause more false acceptances 45 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Errors versus Deception False Acceptance Rates (FARs) ◦ Percentage of people who are identified or verified as matches to a template but should not be False Rejection Rates (FRRs) ◦ Percentage of people who should be identified or verified as matches to a template but are not 47 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Vendor Claims for FARs and FRRs ◦ Tend to be exaggerated through tests under ideal conditions Failure to Enroll (FTE) ◦ Subject cannot enroll in system ◦ Examples: poor fingerprints due to construction work, clerical work, age, etc. 48 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Deception ◦ Errors: when subject is not trying to fool the system ◦ Deception: when subject is trying to fool the system Hide face from cameras used for face identification Impersonate someone by using a gelatin finger on a fingerprint scanner Etc. 49 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Deception ◦ Many biometric methods are highly vulnerable to deception Fingerprint scanners should only be used where the threat of deception is very low Fingerprint scanners are better than passwords because there is nothing to forget Fingerprint scanners are good for convenience rather than security 50 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Verification ◦ Supplicant claims to be a particular person ◦ Is the supplicant who he or she claims to be? ◦ Compare access data to a single template (the claimed identity) ◦ Verification is good to replace passwords in logins ◦ If the probability of a false acceptance (false match) probability is 1/1000 per template match, The probability of a false acceptance is 1/1000 (0.1%) 51 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Identification ◦ Supplicant does not state his or her identity ◦ System must compare supplicant data to all templates to find the correct template ◦ If the probability of a false acceptance (false match) probability is 1/1000 per template match, If there are 500 templates in the database, then the probability of a false acceptance is 500 * 1/1000 (50%) ◦ Good for door access 52 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Watch Lists ◦ Subset of identification ◦ Goal is to identify members of a group Terrorists People who should be given access to an equipment room 53 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Watch Lists ◦ More comparisons than validation but fewer than identification, so the risk of a false acceptance is intermediate ◦ If the probability of a false acceptance (false match) probability is 1/1000 per template match, If there are 10 templates in the watch list, then The probability of a false acceptance is 10 * 1/1000 (1%) 54 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Which Is Worse? ◦ It depends on the situation 55 SituationFalse acceptance False rejection Identification for computer access Security Violation Inconvenience Verification for computer access Security Violation Inconvenience Watch list for door access Security Violation Inconvenience Watch list for terroristsInconvenienceSecurity Violation Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Fingerprint Recognition ◦ Simple, inexpensive, well proven ◦ Most biometrics today is fingerprint recognition ◦ Often can be defeated with latent fingerprints on glasses copied to gelatin fingers ◦ However, fingerprint recognition can take the place of reusable passwords for low-risk applications 56 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Iris Recognition ◦ Pattern in colored part of eye ◦ Uses a camera (no light is shined into eye, as in Hollywood movies) ◦ Very low FARs ◦ Very expensive 57 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Face Recognition ◦ Surreptitious identification is possible (in airports, etc.) ◦ Surreptitious means without the subject’s knowledge ◦ High error rates, even without deception Hand Geometry for Door Access ◦ Shape of hand ◦ Reader is very large, so usually used for door access 58 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Voice Recognition ◦ High error rates ◦ Easily deceived by recordings Other Forms of Biometric Authentication ◦ Veins in the hand ◦ Keystroke recognition (pace in typing password) ◦ Signature recognition (hand-written signature) ◦ Gait (way the person walks) recognition 59 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Researchers at Japan’s Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology have developed a seat that can identify the user by the shape and heft of their buttocks. One of the advantages of the technology, according to the team, is that it’s less awkward than other forms of biometric technology. Doing a retina scan or using a fingerprint machine is intrusive, but sitting down has been normal for mankind since the evolution of the posterior. Source: The Register (12/27/2011)The Register 60
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 61 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Key Points from Chapter 3 ◦ Cryptographic systems have initial and message- by-message authentication ◦ MS-CHAP uses passwords for initial authentication ◦ Electronic signatures provide message-by-message authentication Key-Hashed Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) are fast and inexpensive Digital signatures with digital certificates are extremely strong but slow ◦ Chapter 3 did not mention that public key authentication with digital certificates are also good for initial authentication 62 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) ◦ Used to create and manage public-private key pairs and digital certificates Utilizes Certificate Authorities ◦ It is an integrated system consisting of: Software Encryption methodologies Protocols Legal agreements 3 rd party services ◦ Firms can be their own certificate authorities (CAs) ◦ But this requires a great deal of labor 63
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Generate Keys ◦ Keys of certain strength using certain cipher Generate Certificate ◦ Allocate to user ◦ Bind user to Keys Distribute Keys ◦ Private Keys to End-Users ◦ Public Keys on Certificates to Certificate servers (PKI server) Storage ◦ Need to store keys and certificates Revocation ◦ Invalidate Keys via Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) ◦ Respond to Online Certification Status Protocol (OCSP) ◦ Keys can also expire after a set period of time has elapsed Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 64
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Accepting of public keys Providing new digital certificates ◦ Prime Authentication Problem Must be very careful to authenticate individual with credentials before providing keys and certificates This can be the “weak link” Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 65
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) ◦ Provisioning Human registration is often the weakest link If an impostor is given credentials, no technology access controls will work Limit who can submit names for registration Limit who can authorize registration Have rules for exceptions Must have effective terminating procedures Supervisors and Human Resources department must assist 66
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 68 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Authorizations ◦ Authentication: proof of identity ◦ Authorization: the assignment of permissions (specific authorizations) to individuals or roles ◦ Just because you are authenticated does not mean that you should be able to do everything 69 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Principle of Least Permissions ◦ Initially give people only the permissions a person absolutely needs to do his or her job ◦ If assignment is too narrow, additional permissions may be given If assignment is too narrow, the system fails safely 70 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Principle of Least Permissions ◦ System has permissions A, B, C, D, E, and F Person needs A, C, and E If only given A and C, can add E later although user will be inconvenienced Errors tend not to create security problems Fails safely ◦ This will frustrate users somewhat 71 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Giving Extensive or Full Permissions Initially Is Bad ◦ User will almost always have the permissions to do its job ◦ System has permissions A, B, C, D, E, and F Person needs A, C, and E If only given all and take away B and D, still has F Errors tend to create security problems 72 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Giving Extensive or Full Permissions Initially Is Bad ◦ Assignments can be taken away, but this is subject to errors ◦ Such errors could give excessive permissions to the user ◦ This could allow the user to take actions contrary to security policy ◦ Giving all or extensive permissions and taking some away does not fail safely 73 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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“Although the … has taken steps to safeguard the information and systems that support its mission, it has not effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect those systems. Many of the deficiencies relate to the security controls used to regulate who or what can access the bureau’s systems (access controls). For example, the bureau did not adequately: control connectivity to key network devices and servers; identify and authenticate users; limit user access rights and permissions to only those necessary to perform official duties; encrypt data in transmission and at rest; monitor its systems and network; or ensure appropriate physical security controls were in place. Without adequate controls over access to its systems, the bureau cannot be sure that its information and systems are protected from intrusion.“ 74 U.S. Census Bureau GAO 13-63 (Feb. 2013) U.S. Census Bureau GAO 13-63 (Feb. 2013)
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 75 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Auditing ◦ Authentication: who a person is ◦ Authorization: what a person may do with a resource ◦ Auditing: what the person actually did 76 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Logging ◦ Events ◦ On a server, logins, failed login attempts, file deletions, and so forth ◦ Events are stored in a log file 77 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Log Reading ◦ Regular log reading is crucial or the log becomes a useless write-only memory ◦ Periodic external audits of log file entries and reading practices ◦ Automatic alerts for strong threats 78 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 Logging ◦ Records actions of an account owner on a resource(s) ◦ Stored in a log file ◦ Unless logs are reviewed they are useless ◦ Logs should be reviewed by external auditors occasionally ◦ Logging systems should provide for real-time alerts ◦ LogRythm LogRythm 79
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 80 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Microsoft uses KERBEROS 1. Supplicant sends credentials 2. If successful, Kerberos sends Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) 3. Supplicant wants to connect to host (verifier) ◦ Presents TGT 4. Kerberos sends supplicant Service Ticket (ST) 5. Supplicant sends ST to Host / Verifier 6. Host uses its symmetric key to decrypt ST providing a session key to use with supplicant 7. Supplicant uses Kerberos symmetric key (sent along with ST) to decrypt Host / Verifier session key 8. Ongoing communication between Supplicant and Host using symmetric session key Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 82
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5.1 Introduction 5.2 Physical Access and Security 5.3 Passwords 5.4 Access Cards and Tokens 5.5 Biometric Authentication 5.6 Cryptographic Authentication 5.7 Authorization 85 5.8 Auditing 5.9 Central Authentication Servers 5.10 Directory Servers and Identity Management Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Store information about: ◦ People ◦ Equipment ◦ Software ◦ Databases Information stored: ◦ Authentication ◦ Authorization ◦ Auditing ◦ Additional information Data is stored hierarchically ◦ Top Level = organization ◦ Organizational Unit Central Authentication Servers Directory Servers ◦ Lightweight Data Access Protocol (LDAP) Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 201086
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89 Domains are Controlled by Domain Controllers Domains are Controlled by Domain Controllers The Corporation Is Divided Into Microsoft Domains The Corporation Is Divided Into Microsoft Domains Each Domain Controller Runs Kerberos and AD Each Domain Controller Runs Kerberos and AD A Domain Can Have Multiple Domain Controllers A Domain Can Have Multiple Domain Controllers Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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90 Not Shown: There Can Be a Forest of Trees Not Shown: There Can Be a Forest of Trees There Can Be a Tree of Domains There Can Be a Tree of Domains Domain Controllers in Parent and Child Domains Do Partial Replication Domain Controllers in Parent and Child Domains Do Partial Replication Domain Controllers in a Domain Do Total Replication Domain Controllers in a Domain Do Total Replication Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Trust ◦ One directory server will accept information from another Trust Directionality ◦ Mutual A trusts B and B trusts A ◦ One-Way A trusts B or B trusts A, but not both 91 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Trust Transitivity ◦ Transitive Trust If A trusts B and B trusts C, then A trusts C automatically ◦ Intransitive Trust If A trusts B and B trusts C, This does NOT mean that A trusts C automatically 92 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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93 Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2013 A Metadirectory Server Synchronizes Multiple Directory Servers A Metadirectory Server Synchronizes Multiple Directory Servers
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Federated Identity Management Assertions vs. Authentication Supplicant authenticates within company A than sends assertion to company B Company B accepts assertion if it trusts Company A Assertions contain: ◦ Authentication Supplicant has been authenticated with company A ◦ Authorizations What can suppliant access ◦ Attribute(s) Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) ◦ XML vocabulary used to send AAA Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 94
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95 In Federated Identity Management, Business Partners Do Not Access Each Other’s Databases. Instead, They Send Assertions About a Person. The Receiver Trusts the Assertions. In Federated Identity Management, Business Partners Do Not Access Each Other’s Databases. Instead, They Send Assertions About a Person. The Receiver Trusts the Assertions. Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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96 Types of Assertions: Authentication, Authorizations, Attributes. Assertions Are Standardized by SAML. SAML Uses XML for Platform Independence. Types of Assertions: Authentication, Authorizations, Attributes. Assertions Are Standardized by SAML. SAML Uses XML for Platform Independence. Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Definition ◦ Identity management is the centralized policy- based management of all information required for access to corporate systems by a person, machine, program, or other resource 99 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Benefits of Identity Management ◦ Reduction in the redundant work needed to manage identity information ◦ Consistency in information ◦ Rapid changes ◦ Central auditing ◦ Single sign-on ◦ Increasingly required to meet compliance requirements ◦ At least reduced sign-on when SSO is impossible 100 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Identity ◦ The set of attributes about a person or nonhuman resource that must be revealed in a particular context Subordinate to a particular person Manager of a department Buyer dealing with another company Manager responsible for a database ◦ Principle of minimum identity data: only reveal the information necessary in a particular context 101 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Identity Management ◦ Initial credential checking ◦ Defining identities (pieces of information to be divulged) ◦ Managing trust relationships ◦ Provisioning, reprovisioning if changes, and deprovisioning 102 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Identity Management ◦ Implementing controlled decentralization Do as much administration as possible locally This requires tight policy controls to avoid problems ◦ Providing self-service functions for non-sensitive information Marital status, etc. 103 Copyright Pearson Prentice Hall 2013
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Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall
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