1. LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE FOR REGULATORY BODIES
Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF)
Plenary 2015
LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE FOR REGULATORY BODIES
Stewart Magruder
Senior Nuclear Safety Officer
Regulatory Activities Section
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety

2. Contents Background Recent Conclusions
Safety Culture Initiatives at the IAEA
Development of Training Material
Support for Implementation
Summary
RCF- Safety Culture of the RB

3. Background
The concept of the safety culture was introduced in INSAG-1,1986
“ formal procedures must be properly reviewed and approved and must be supplemented by the creation and maintenance of a ‘nuclear safety culture’”
Definition of safety culture – introduced in INSAG-4,1991 and was revised in 2007
“Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receives the attention warranted by their significance”.
TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident - March 2011
Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna, Austria - June 2011
Nuclear Safety Action Plan to strengthen nuclear safety worldwide - September (12 Point Plan Actions)
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident – Report by the Director General 2015
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4. Recent Conclusions I1
“[…] major accidents in the nuclear and other high hazard industries most frequently derive from organizational and human factors. Several Contracting Parties reported adopting a systematic consideration of safety culture characteristics in inspection and oversight processes. Some regulatory bodies and licensees have in place specific safety culture programmes …….. These include periodic internal and external safety culture assessments.”
Summary Report of the 6th CNS Review Meeting (24 Mar – 4 Apr 2014)
Incorporation of safety culture into regulatory processes
Dialogue with licensees to enhance the understanding of safety culture aspects
Licensees’ commitment to perform self-assessments and independent peer assessments of safety culture on a regular basis.
Establishment of an enduring safety culture remains essential and regulatory bodies should take the necessary actions in this direction.
High level commitment of Member States to peer reviews (participation in the CNS and hosting IRRS)
Regulatory bodies should foster an environment that encourages licensees to invest in improvements beyond national requirements.
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5. Recent Conclusions I2
IAEA Report on Strengthening Nuclear Regulatory Effectiveness in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (2013 )
A systemic approach to safety needs to consider the interactions between human, organizational and technical factors. This approach needs to be taken through the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations.”
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident – Report by the Director General (2015)
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6. Implementation of Safety Culture Initiatives at the IAEA
Development of IAEA Safety Standards;
Development of Training Material on Safety Culture and Safety Culture Self-Assessment;
Technical Meeting on Integration of Safety Culture into Regulatory Practices and the Regulatory Decision Making Process;
Support for implementation of Standards and Training Material;
Self Assessment and Peer Review Missions for improvement.
Training and networking
Technical documents
Review missions
IAEA focus on newcomers even increased after Fukushima
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7. Safety reports, TECDOCs …
IAEA Safety Standards – Safety Culture
Principles for protecting people and environment
Requirements to be applied to meet the principles (shall)
Safety Fundamentals
Recommended ways of meeting the requirements (should)
Safety Requirements
Safety Guides
Safety reports, TECDOCs …
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8. TECDOC- Safety Culture for Regulatory Bodies - draft
Development of IAEA Safety Standards – Safety Culture
Under Publication
Quality Control
Quality Assurance
Quality Management
(Integrated)
Management
Systems
Time
Safety & Performance
GS-R-3
2006
GSR Part 2
2014
50-C-Q
1996
50-C-QA
Systemic approach
Under Publication
Under Publication
Under Publication
In preparation
How to Perform Safety Culture Self-Assessment - draft
How to Continuously Improve Safety Culture - draft
Draft GS-R Part 2
Guidelines for Self Assessment of Safety Culture for Regulatory Bodies - draft
This slide shows how the agency standards followed the evolution in this area.
How to Perform Safety Culture Self-Assessment - draft
How to Perform Safety Culture Self-Assessment - draft
TECDOC- Safety Culture for Regulatory Bodies - draft
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9. Development of IAEA Safety Standards – Safety Culture
“…Safety has to be achieved and maintained by means of an effective management system. ……... The management system also has to ensure the promotion of a strong safety culture…”
“…….management system is the recognition of the entire range of interactions of individuals at all levels with technology and with organizations.…..”
[Principle 3: Leadership and management for safety (SF-1)]
Requirement 1: Demonstration of leadership by senior management
Requirement 2: Demonstration of leadership for safety by managers at all levels
Requirement 13: Continuous improvement of safety culture
Requirement 14: Assessment of leadership and safety culture
[New Developments GS-R Part 2]
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10. Establishment of Nuclear Safety Infrastructure – Training Material
Training Material on IAEA Safety Culture Self-Assessment has been developed under Safety packages based on SSG-16 under Module 1- Legal Governmental and Regulatory Framework for Safety
Workshop (8a) - Leadership, Management for Safety and Safety Culture
Workshop (8b) - Safety Culture for Regulatory Bodies
Ambassador Workshop (2 Weeks)
Senior Management Workshop (3 Days)
Train the Trainer (1 Week)
Implemented at PNRA as a pilot project
Lessons Learned:
Training Material provided a better understanding of the safety culture concepts for staff at PNRA;
IAEA should have put more efforts in the promotion of the training material;
More regulators from Member States should have taken part in the pilot project;
Member States when undertaking a commitment to perform SCSA should ensure appropriate resources and time for completion of the project in a timely manner.
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11. Technical Meeting on Integration of Safety Culture….I1
The IAEA organized a Technical Meeting on Integration of Safety Culture into Regulatory Practices and the Regulatory Decision Making Process at Vienna, Oct. 2014:
Regulators from countries embarking on nuclear power program and those regulating only radiation facilities showed great interest on the importance of safety culture
IAEA Observation - Regulators regulating only radiation facilities should be encouraged to conduct SCSA
A common understanding and awareness was observed of regulators’ dual role – oversight of the licensees’ safety culture and the regulatory body’s internal safety culture and its impact on the licensee’s safety culture.
IAEA Initiative - IAEA developed a 3 days training material for senior management of the
RB create awareness of this issue
It was concluded that significant progress has been made on the topic during the last two to three years, as the concept of SC in the past focused for licensee SC and today there is a growing interest and awareness of SC by RBs. It would now be essential to take into account inter-organizational safety culture (including suppliers and vendors during all phases of the lifecycle, thereby looking at safety culture from an overall perspective and moving towards a “systemic view of safety culture”.
A pro-active role of the regulator in promoting and fostering safety culture of the licensee, in addition to legal and regulatory requirement, would be taking into account the «Intangible» aspects of culture: values, attitudes, basic assumptions in regulatory practices/processes.
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12. Technical Meeting on Integration of Safety Culture….I2
Safety culture continuous improvement is a big challenge for all regulators, specifically the newcomers who start from the beginning by establishing a management system and integrating measures to continuously strengthen safety culture into this system.
Conclusion of the TM:
Work needs to be initiated in collaboration with the Member States to address the
challenges and move forward into integrating safety culture into regulatory practices
and the decision making process.
Another concept of safety culture was also discussed, specifically the holistic approach to safety together with human and organizational factors aspects – protective security and nuclear security culture.
Taking into account that safety culture became an important topic after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the participants of the Technical Meeting observed that extensive activities and projects on safety culture are in progress in many countries and it is now a concrete “topic”. With this, the questions arise, is it going to be a “regular” topic for future? and what should be done to address this?
The participants questioned if the growing interest for this topic is long-term and would like to ensure it reflects the global interest and awareness in the whole nuclear industry.
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13. Support for implementation of Standards and Training Material
Development of the IAEA guidelines for the conduct of safety culture self-assessment by the regulatory bodies is progressing well; publication is expected in early 2016.
IAEA has initiated the development of a TECDOC, which will describe practices adopted by Member States for addressing safety culture within the regulatory bodies, including self-assessment.

14. Peer Review Missions for improvement
Self Assessment and
Peer Review Missions for improvement
Currently, the area of regulatory body’s safety culture is reviewed during the IRRS missions, as part of the module addressing the management system;
More effort will be put into IRRS to look in more depth at the area of safety culture;
IAEA is working on the development of a question set on safety culture to be used in the descriptive analysis of the self assessment methodology;
IAEA is aware of OECD/NEA efforts regarding safety culture for the regulatory bodies;
Further work needs to be done in the area of independent assessment of safety culture.
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15. Conclusions
Additional IAEA guidance for regulators in the area of safety culture is under development
Regulatory bodies should consider conducting self-assessments of safety culture on a regular basis
Peer reviews (e.g. IRRS ) should put more emphasis and exchange information on regulatory body’s safety culture
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16. TM on Regulatory Oversight of HOF
Culture of an organization influences human behaviour through the values, beliefs and assumptions held by the personnel
Other Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) may positively or adversely influence the performance of humans and organizations
HOF are related for instance to:
Organization of an activity, workload, working hours
Work management and supervision
Layout of the workplace and physical environment
Equipment, tools, aids, procedures
Communication...
HOF are critical for safe operation, directly or indirectly, and should not be separated from technical aspects
Whereas the culture of an organization influences human behaviour through the values, beliefs and assumptions held by the personnel of the organization, there are also other factors that may positively or adversely influence the performance of humans and organizations. Human and organizational factors are those factors which may positively or adversely influence the performance of humans and organizations. In the case of nuclear facilities these factors have a direct or an indirect effect on safety.
The term human and organizational factors are often misused to describe the lack of performance of humans and organizations to avoid risks, failures, and errors. Safe behaviour is not only the absence of human errors, human performance in many situations has a positive contribution to detect, prevent and mitigate adverse circumstances.
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17. TM on Regulatory Oversight of HOF
At various regulatory forums, participants noted room for improvement in the regulatory assessment capabilities of licensees’ programmes in the area of HOF and in the conduct of oversight, including inspection
Regulatory bodies should widen the scope of their classical oversight approach from a rather technical focus to also cover HOF
Technical Meeting on Regulatory Oversight of Human and Organizational Factors | 14 – 18 December 2015
The principal objectives of regulatory oversight are to provide a high level of assurance that all activities performed by the licensee at all stages of the licensing process of a nuclear facility have been executed safely and meet the safety objectives and licence conditions. The regulatory body should ensure that HOF are properly managed by the licensee given their contribution to safety, including their significant contribution to events at nuclear facilities.
It has been noted at various regulatory forums, including the Sixth Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2014 and the International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Transforming Experience into Regulatory Improvements in 2013, and in the findings of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) review missions (e.g. those conducted under the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)) that there is room for improvement in the current regulatory assessment capabilities of licensees’ programmes in the area of HOF and in the conduct of oversight, including inspection.
Based on exchanges with countries with mature nuclear power programmes as well as with countries embarking on such programmes for the first time, the IAEA was made aware of the importance of sharing Member States’ experiences related to the regulatory oversight of HOF. This is why it has been decided to organize a meeting to contribute to the achievement of this goal.
RCF plenary meeting

18. TM on Regulatory Oversight of HOF
To assist Member States in understanding:
Importance of and Regulatory Strategies for HOF Oversight
Regulatory approaches and methods to verify that the licensee effectively manages HOF
Other provisions to promote the positive contribution of HOF to safety and to mitigate possible adverse effects
To provide an opportunity for participants to share and discuss their experience related to the effective oversight of HOF
Results to be used for preparing a publication on the regulatory oversight of HOF (Priority identified by the CSS)
The programme of the meeting will include presentations by participants from Member States and discussion on national regulatory practices, including various inspection methods, provisions and regulatory oversight programmes, and the experience gained by the regulatory bodies in this area. This meeting will be an opportunity to determine key elements and good practices to be considered for the regulatory oversight of HOF in order to identify the aspects that should be covered by the proposed new IAEA publication on this topic.
The participants are encouraged to give presentations through which they can share experiences and current practices in the area of regulatory oversight of HOF. In order to maximize the benefit of the meeting for all participants. Participants who plan to give a presentation should submit an abstract or draft presentation to the Scientific Secretary of the meeting by 15 November 2015.
The programme will include: PRESENTATIONS by participants and DISCUSSION on national regulatory practices, including various inspection methods, provisions and regulatory oversight programmes, and the experience gained by the regulatory bodies in this area.
This meeting will be an opportunity to determine key elements and good practices to be considered for the regulatory oversight of HOF in order to identify the aspects that should be covered by the proposed new IAEA publication on this topic. This topic has been identified as one of the priorities by the Commission of Safety Standards.
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19. TM on Regulatory Oversight of HOF
Technical meeting on Regulatory Oversight of Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Facilities and Activities
VIC, Room M0E03
14 – 18 December 2015
Contact: