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1 Financial Model Risks Tony Dardis June 26 2009.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Financial Model Risks Tony Dardis June 26 2009."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Financial Model Risks Tony Dardis June 26 2009

2 Agenda + How well did your financial model do in 2008? + Lessons learned? + General tips and techniques for good scenario generation 2

3 How well did your financial model do in 2008?

4 Global Interest Rates: Gov. Bond Yields 4

5 Global Interest Rates 5 + Globally, risk-free yield curves fell significantly in the fourth quarter of 2008. + This increased the cost of insurer’s long-term investment guarantees + This impact was felt in every major life insurance market + 10-yr swap spreads in major developed economies have recently been negative + This is unprecedented

6 Global Equity Markets 6

7 7 + 2008 global equity market returns were close to or worse than typical 99.5% equity stress test assumptions –Virtually no diversification benefit between major global equity markets –Impact on insurance company capital was universal, but particularly marked in countries with significant unhedged equity exposures such as Canada and Japan –Equity falls also resulted in reductions in the present value of future asset-related fees + e.g. for unit-linked or VA business + Realised equity volatility was also at very high levels –e.g. realised daily S&P 500 volatility between October 1 st and November 25 th was in excess of 80%pa, which included several daily returns of ~10% magnitude –VA delta hedging programs do not work well in these conditions. This impact was clearly apparent in US Q4 earnings reports

8 USD Credit Spreads: Historical Perspective 8

9 Credit spreads 9 + Long-term investment-grade credit spreads in 2008 were at extreme levels from historical perspective –AAA spreads at unprecedented levels –BBB spreads were last at these levels in 1932 + This generated mark-to-market losses well beyond typically assumed 99.5% stress tests + Again, this impact was global and negative for insurance groups

10 1-month Option-Implied Equity Vols: Historical Perspective 10

11 Options 11 + Long-term option-implied volatilities for long-term interest rates more than doubled during 2008 in several major economies + Long-term option-implied equity volatilities proportionally increased by over 50% + Yet again, this was universally negative for the global insurance sector from a market risk-based perspective + Yet again, the experienced changes likely exceeded firms’ 99.5% stress test capital assessments

12 Global Financial Market Conditions 12 + At the start of the year, the 2008 market experience would have looked like a ‘perfect storm’ extreme global stress test that was beyond 99.5% confidence levels –Significant falls in long-term interest rates –Equity market falls at 99.5% stress test levels + Virtually no diversification benefit across equity markets –Unprecedented increases in credit spreads –Doubling of long-term option-implied equity and long-term interest rate volatilities + This naturally had a significant negative impact on market risk- based assessments of 2008 profits and ongoing capital adequacy + It has prompted firms to re-consider.... –their business models with relation to how they write and price long-term investment guarantees, and how they manage the resultant market risk exposures –how they are modeling financial market risk – the concept of “model risk” + It has also prompted policymakers to consider re-defining market- based, risk-based measures of profitability and capital requirements

13 Where did your models fall?: example RW calibration at end-June 08 13 3-month rate 10-yr spot rate

14 Lessons learned?

15 + Areas that you may wish to revisit in your models –Equity fat tails and skew –Lack of diversification in market downturns –Credit risk –Risks left behind by a delta hedge + Other aspects –Senior management buy-in of models

16 Equity fat tails and skew 16

17 Lack of diversification in market downturns + Bivariate Lognormal + Stochastic Volatility 17

18 Credit risk 18

19 What needs to be captured in a credit model? + A good credit risk model should be arbitrage-free, fully integrated with the other financial market risks that are being modeled (thus correlated with equities and interest rates), and provide a framework to describe: – issuer rating changes & defaults (spread to cover default risk) – “credit risk premium” (additional spread to compensate for uncertain return) + Starting point: real-world credit transition matrix –Assuming a Markov process, enables us to readily determine survival probabilities over the years and hence spreads (by bond rating and maturity) to cover default risk (“break-even spread”) + Moving to risk-neutral –In practice, actual spreads are larger than break-even - the credit risk premium –The credit risk premium clearly is not something that is constant over time + Stochastic spreads –Transition matrix (and hence rating changes/defaults) can be modeled as a stochastic process –Credit risk premium can be modeled as a stochastic process 19

20 Risks left behind by a delta hedge + Prior to the events of 2008, many companies did not fully understand what a delta hedging strategy was leaving on the table + RW modeling of a delta hedge creates very demanding ESG requirements: Real-World Scenarios –Equity scenarios need to consistently model the risk factors that matter to the performance of a hedging strategy: + Variations in short-term underlying equity volatility (Gamma) + Variations in option-implied equity volatility (Vega) –The experience of Q4 2008 highlights how significant these risks can be for delta- hedging strategies –Real-world scenarios need to be capable of capturing these risks to provide robust assessment of the risks left behind Market-Consistent Scenarios –May require ‘inner’ simulations for projection of future hedge positions –These scenarios need to be consistent with the corresponding ‘outer’ simulation + Interest rates, option-implied volatilities + Need automated calibration processes 20

21 Delta-Hedging and Gamma Losses in Recent Market Environment 21

22 Real-world projection of option- implied volatility: Vega Risk 22 + Joint modeling of underlying real-world equity returns and real- world stochastic evolutions of the option-implied equity volatility surface is important for delta-hedging risk assessment

23 Other aspects: senior management buy-in of models + Natural reluctance to accept the results from models that are contrary to experience and intuition –Often an obstacle to getting senior management buy-in to a model –There may be transition aspects to consider (e.g., how to manage a big one-off impact on capital) + Senior management often don’t understand enough about models –Need to have an understanding of the questions that the model is trying to answer –Need to have a deep understanding of the complexities of the underlying products that the company is issuing –Need to understand model limitations + Judgment will always be required, e.g., assumptions setting –Senior management needs to be able to give input to this process

24 General tips and techniques for good financial risk modeling

25 General tips and techniques for good financial risk modeling (1) + Integrated Approach – Consistent with good ERM, scenario generation should model all risks within a single framework and recognize the interrelationships between risks + Flexibility - A more complex model isn’t necessarily a better model –It depends on the application. A consistent framework is needed that can be applied across an organization, but you need flexibility and options to meet the requirements of the specific application (e.g., the modeling choices you make for daily hedging will be different to what you use for reserving) –Also touches on “model risk” – depending on the application you may not want to rely on just one model (e.g., hedging)

26 General tips and techniques for good financial risk modeling (2) + Transparency - A model is not a good model if it’s a “black box” + Dynamic assumptions – Many models fell down in 2008 because assumptions/correlations were static –Models generally overstated the level of diversification benefit that would be available – in distressed markets, correlations approach 1.

27 General tips and techniques for good financial risk modeling (3) + How much is enough? – A decision has to made as to how many scenarios are enough –Depends on the application, and the company’s asset/liability profile –American Academy of Actuaries’s Modeling Efficiency Work Group – has identified many different potential techniques for building more “efficient” models, including usage of scenario reduction techniques –Need to look at the actual metric you are calculating (not just at the scenarios) – calculate the standard error of that metric and identify the limiting point


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