2. Themes and Disclaimer  The best since Vietnam?  Well led strategically.  Recovery start point (1999) was lower.  Current bar (nature of conflict) higher. Ÿ ‘Security provider’ and ‘security leader’ BUT …….

3. But …..  Limited experience of joint offensive combat operations.  Current deployments valuable, but …  Much in the ADF does not actually work! Ÿ 30 years of neglect (’72-’99) not yet compensated by ten years (‘99-’07) of more appropriate spending. What of next ten years?  Our weaknesses compared to demands of modern war – Ÿ Joint tactical combat operations and Ÿ ‘Generalship’ (running campaigns).  Rhetoric is dangerous

5. BIG - size GWOTOz/WP

6. Australian Government View of the Task (Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Chief of Defence Force) Plan military ops Find insurgent cells Destroy those cells Protect the Coalition and the Iraqi People Carry out other tasks as directed by the Commanding General MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations = Chief of Operations MNF-I = Multi National Force - Iraq

7. CHIEF OF OPERATIONS An American Experience. A war of necessity not a war of choice

8. 2003200420052006 Invasion “Missed Opportunity”? Learn Fight Build Institutions Elections, transition & fight Sectarian Violence V “Average counter-insurgency in 20 th C took 9 years” Surge – Comprehensive 20072008 Transition & Surprise? Learning and Attrition Start of an effective COIN Campaign? 2011?? JIM

9. A coalition of 28 nations under UNSCR 1546

10. IRAQI MILITARY ISFANAOZ

11. “A Terrorist is someone who has a bomb but does not have an Air Force” Complex Enemy LOAC - Mosques, Medical and Cultural

12. Sunni Insurgents Al Qaeda Terrorists Shia Militias Criminals

13. Enemy Tactic

14. “War Among the People”

15. CHIEF OF OPERATIONS Controlled operations of all forces across all of Iraq at the strategic level.

16. Three Block War (plus One?)

17. Whither the light infantry force structuring option, indeed The enemy had a say!

18. AL FALLUJAH -16 Districts w/in Perimeter

19. POLITICS IS A MEANS OF RECONCILING CONFLICT AMONG PEOPLE First Iraqi Election January 2005

20. SO WHAT??? SO WHAT???

21. White Paper White Paper defence policy is not defence capability, it is only words: –Self reliance –ANZUS –Warning Time –Balanced Force –DOA/Sea Air Gap Forty years of WP defence policy (words) produced the current defence force with all its problems.

22. Are we happy with the product of White Paper defence policy = the 2008 ADF : Quality of manpower Numbers in Army Special Forces Patrol Boats Surface combatants? Airlift Strategic Command Others??? Generalship Subs Intelligence Surface combatants Amphibious ships Fighters and F111 (Pilots) Anti-submarine Combined arms land force Infantry Armour Artillery Aviation Engineers Sustainment Stocks “War among the people” Numbers in RAAF and RAN Defence Industry

23. Can the ADF fight effectively in 2008? Does Australia, as a sovereign nation, have a defence capability that is more than individual, single Service, dislocated capabilities that are allocated to low combat areas under the control of US/UK commanders, and then directed to conduct only limited defensive operations? Conduct sophisticated ‘joint’ operations (combat and non-combat) in complex terrain (urban and littoral) involving sustained operations and sustained combat What should the ADF be able to do?

24. Will the ADF be able to fight effectively at end of DCP (2018)? The ADF in 2018 should be able to conduct sophisticated joint operations in complex terrain (urban and littoral) involving sustained combatIF The major items in the DCP are maintained RAAF and RAN receive manpower The enablers and connectors are also obtained “War among the people” capabilities are developed (Humint, Biometrics, CivMil, detention, police, TST) There is an intellectual investment in commanders and command There is a statement of what we want the ADF to do (concept of operations – the “HOW with WHAT”).

25. END