1. 4 Factors Influencing the Emergence of Collective Action: An empirical assessment of three coastal towns in Oman H.S. Al-Oufi Sultan Qaboos University, Department of Marine Science and Fisheries Sultanate of Oman

2. 5 Collective action refers to activities that require the coordination of efforts by two or more individuals (Sandler, 2001). Introduction Collective action The collective action consists of fishermen obeying the group rules and participating in collective effort to manage the coastal fish resources to further the well- being of the group. Applications of collective action: provision of public goods correction of externalities

3. 6 Coastal fisheries form vital parts of the livelihoods of large sections of the population (20 %) Characteristics: Small scale 30,000 fishermen 12,000 vessels Introduction Management system: State control CPR Oman Fisheries

4. 7 Inshore resources of the Sultanate have witnessed the symptoms of overfishing Introduction Preventing over-exploitation of coastal fisheries is of great importance for development policy in Oman Oman Fisheries

5. 8 Fisheries exploited by small-scale fishing communities are vulnerable to over-exploitation due to: poverty uncertainty of occupation open access nature of inshore fisheries high demands for fish (population growth) high demands for employment opportunities (population growth) Introduction

6. 9 Hardin (1968) “the Tragedy of the Commons” CPR users are individualistic and are unable to co-operate in their collective interest. Introduction StrategyCo-operateDefect Co-operate3, 3-1, 4 Defect4, -10, 0 * Fisherman 1 Fisherman 2 * Nash equilibrium

7. 10 Prisoner’s Dillemma Game Fisherman 2 Fisherman 1 StrategyCo-operateDefect Co-operate3, 3-1, 4 Defect4, -10, 0 Introduction In natural field setting: The game is played repeatedly by participants who communicate, negotiate, and care for their reputation allowing scope for collective action to avoid the tragedy of the commons

8. 11 Hardin (1968) suggested strong state control to provide measures to regulate resource user’s activities. Introduction 30 years State control to solve the problem of the commons failed (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Runge, 1986; Berkes, 1989 and Ostrom, 1990).

9. 12 Peak-recorded catches in 1988 in excess of 27,000 MT Landings declined to around 3,000 MT during 1990s & it is 2560 MT at present landings of S. commerson in Oman (1985-1998) Introduction Landings of S.commerson in Oman

10. 13 Co-operative means to manage CPR have achieved successful results in many parts of the world, e.g.: Senat Al-BaharOmanAl-Oufi, et al. (2000) Alanya fishery TurkeyBerkes (1986) Loften fisheryNorway Jentoft and Kristoffersen (1989) Artificial reef of Kerala IndiaKurien (1995) Introduction See also: Baland and Platteau, 1996; McCay and Acheson,1987; Dasgupta, 1996&2001; Ostrom, 1990

11. 14 Fisherman 2 Fisherman 1 Introduction Collective action StrategyCo-operateDefect Co-operate6, 61, 5 Defect5, 10, 0 IF: Individual benefit exceeds individual costs Summation technology applies 1 unit reduction in fishing effort contributed by each and every fisherman gives 5 units of benefits at a cost of 4 units

12. 15 Demands Support Individual choices to either cooperate or defect Phase 1 Retain status quo Change status quo Internal world Inputs Outputs Phase 2Phase 3 Conceptual framework: assessing the emergence of collective action Introduction

13. 16 Individual choices to either cooperate or defect Internal world 1. Economic factors Econ. dependence Perception of risk 2. Awareness of resources exploitation problems 3. Demographical factors Age Education Household size 4. Group size 5. Social Identity 6. Heterogeneity Factors influencing the emergence of collective action Introduction

14. 17 Data for this study was gathered from 194 vessel’s owners (skippers) in three coastal towns (Barka, Masn’a and Suwaiq) Fishermen from 27 villages were face to face interviewed using a pre-tested questionnaire Methodology

15. 18 Variables measured Economic dependence on fishing (%) Perception of risk - dept/asset (ratio) - no. of fishing gear owned (1-5) Awareness of resources status (1-3) Age (yrs) Education (yrs) Household size Group size (no. of fishers/village) Social identity - family involvement (0-5) - no. of years fishing (yrs) Group heterogeneity - income inequality (Gini coefficient) - part-time/full-time (ratio) Attitude towards cooperation (0-11) Methodology

16. 19 VariablesBarkaMasn’aSuwaiqAll sample Economic dependence on fishing (%) Perception of risk - dept/asset (ratio) - no. of fishing gear owned (1-5) Awareness of resources status (1-3) Age (yrs) Education (yrs) Household size Group size (no. of fishers/village) Social identity - family involvement (0-5) - no. of years fishing (yrs) Group heterogeneity - income inequality (Gini coefficient) - part-time/full-time (ratio) Attitude towards cooperation (0-11) 45.1 0.72 2.43 2.82 43.4 1.34 12.4 81.6 3.33 26.6 0.34 0.74 7.47 56.2 0.55 2.47 2.71 43.9 1.08 11.9 32.7 3.45 27.8 0.37 0.40 7.02 53.1 0.42 2.41 2.53 45.7 0.90 12.8 47.6 3.33 28.9 0.40 0.28 7.10 51.6 0.55 2.43 2.67 44.4 1.10 12.4 53.7 3.36 27.8 0.39 0.44 7.19 Mean values for the dependent and independent variables (N=194) Results

17. 20 Variables Pearson’s r tP-value Economic dependence on fishing (%) Perception of risk - dept/asset (ratio) - no. of fishing gear owned (1-5) Awareness of resources status (1-3) Age (yrs) Education (yrs) Household size Group size (no. of fishers/village) Social identity - family involvement (0-5) - fishing experience (yrs) Group heterogeneity - income inequality (Gini coefficient) - part-time/full-time 0.23* -0.33* -0.30* 0.32* 0.13 -0.14* -0.03 0.08 0.17* 0.06 1.01 -2.85* <0.05 >0.05 <0.05 >0.05 <0.05 >0.05 <0.05 Factors influencing the emergence of collective action Results

18. 21 1.Economic dependence fishermen who are more economically dependent on fishing show more willingness to cooperate in solving their common problem. 2.Perception of risk the higher the D/A ratio (less risk averse), the lower the fishermen's willingness to cooperate. A fisherman with a high debt to asset ratio will not take the offer of a cooperating game, as there is no guarantee that others will not defect and make him a "sucker". Results

19. 22 3. Social identity fishermen who consider themselves to have more social identity were significantly more likely to adopt a co-operative strategy 4. Awareness of resource exploitation problems fishermen who have high awareness of the likely factors that cause the resource to deplete show more willingness to cooperate to avoid further damage to their fishery. Results

20. 23 5. Group size there is no significant difference between fishermen's willingness to cooperate according to their group size the study ruled out the direct effect of group size as the main predictor of the success or failure of collective action. Results

21. 24 6. Heterogeneity Sources of heterogeneity (cultural division and difference in objectives and interests) are considered as causing a strong obstruction to collective action (higher mean scores for full- time fishermen) no statistically significant correlation between variation in income and fishermen cooperation optimal provision of a public good in a community of a given size is independent of income distribution Results

22. 25 Modelling cooperation The linear regression model chosen to test the relationship was: Cooperation= constant + ß 1 X 1 + ß 2 X 2 + ß 3 X 3 + ß n X n Where: ß 1 to ß n are the regression coefficients and X 1 to X n are the independent variables entered into the regression equation. Results

23. 26 PredictorsßBeta*R2R2 F Awareness of resources problems0.2430.2810.0919.77 P<0.05 Perception of Risk-0.731-0.2570.1416.76 P<0.05 Economic dependence on fishing0.0140.1810.2116.92 P<0.05 Social identity2.370.1690.2414.48 P<0.05 (Constant)2.94-- * Standardised Beta coefficients Stepwise multiple regression modeling fishermen’s cooperation (N=194) Results

24. 27 Thank you