1. Districting / redistricting

2. Issues Who draws the lines? – State leg, congress, local... What criteria? Partisan strategy Minority representation

3. Partisan strategy (partisan gerrymander) Maximize dominant party advantage – If party controls state leg + gov. – Packing cram other party voters into few districts, so they have no influence in most – Cracking spread other party voters across many districts they can’t win

4. Incumbent strategy (bipartisan gerrymander) Maximize seats safe for incumbents (all) Might be default if neither party controls gov + leg

5. Criteria Equal population +/- 10% (depends on state) Contiguous – RCW: “if common land border or connected by ferry, highway, bridge, tunnel” – coincide with boundaries of local political subdivisions and communities of interest” – Number of counties and municipalities divided should be as small as possible

6. Criteria Compact Communities of interest – identify (concentrated people with shared interests) – represent – do not divide (as best possible)

7. Criteria Protect incumbents – in practice, and in law Minority representation – in practice, and in law Competitive elections (not an explicit goal in most states)

8. Who Draws? State (and local) legislature State Courts State (and local )commission – Independent – Bi-partisan – non-partisan

9. Who Draws? Legislature – 37 states do state leg districts; 43 do congressional districts – Gov. can veto in most states – 2/3 req in CT, ME

10. Who Draws? Commissions (political) – AR, CO, HI, MO, HJ, OH, PA – elected officials can be on commission ‘Independent’ Commissions (6 states) – no legislators or other electeds, WA no lobbyists

11. Who draws? Independent Commission (AK, AZ, CA, ID, MT, WA) – WA (2 Ds, 2 Rs, one non-voting moderator) – CA: lottery -> 20Rs, 20Ds, 20 ‘other’ then 3 Ds, 3 Rs, 2 others, they pick 6 more (14) – 9 votes to pass map

12. Who draws? Independent Commission (AK, AZ, CA, ID, MT, WA) – expectation they will be less strategic re: partisan goals – All states with ind. commission adopted via voter initiative legislators / parties don’t want to give up authority over districting

13. Who Draws? Initiatives & referendums Courts – legislatures often gridlock over plans – litigate – miss deadlines

14. Districting Why care? – most important part of elections – elected officials pick their voters, vs voters pick elected officials – ‘gerrymandering’ and electoral competition Do districting practices make elections non competitice

15. Districting Incumbents don’t lose – How much is ‘incumbent advantage’ due to safe one party districts? – How much is due to other factors campaign finance pork barrel politics name recognition representatives serving well

16. Districting gerrymandering vs. self-selection How difficult is it to – 1) partisan gerrymander – 2) create competitive districts 50% D voters & 50% R voters

17. Redistricting vs districting At least every 10 years, districts are redrawn – populations shift – growth

18. State Legislative Redistricting Before the 1960s, states rarely redrew district boundaries Before the 1960s, states rarely redrew district boundaries Populations shifted however Populations shifted however Malapportionment—unequal representation Malapportionment—unequal representation In 1962, the Supreme Court established “ one person, one vote ” In 1962, the Supreme Court established “ one person, one vote ” Reapportionment revolution Reapportionment revolution

19. Redistricting Reapportionment and re-districting: how often? Reapportionment and re-districting: how often? – States may redraw districts as often as they like following League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)

20. Minority Representation Why value, what effects Descriptive –legislature mirrors population Substantive –legislature approves policies in group’s interest

21. Minority Representation Why value? Fairness –history of explicit disenfranchisement Empowerment –Trust –Participation –Contacting representatives

22. Minority Representation Descriptive Representation How facilitate via elections? Voting Rights Act Amendments –registration without representation? –maximize opportunities for real representation? –since 1970s, Act used to challenge local election systems that ‘dilute’ minority representation

23. Minority Representation Majority Minority Districts – Local “at-large” elections original target – “sweep effect” group w/ 40% could lose all seats – Gingles v. Thornberg, 1986 “at-large” illegal if: – minority group politically cohesive – minority could be a majority in potential district – majority votes as block against minority

24. Minority Representation Majority Minority Districts –State legislative plans, congressional plans, can be challenged if not providing adequate minority representation under VRA

25. Minority Representation Racially polarized voting – in parts of US, this has been a fact of life – southern parts of the US, in particular majority minority – do the math: if white majority won’t vote for minority candidates.....

26. Racially Polarized Voting Voters of different racial or ethnic groups have different candidate preferences. Voting in opposition, rather than in coalition Since more white voters, minority candidates will usually lose Actual voting patterns determine if voting is racially polarized Look at precinct data

27. Racially polarized voting Exists in WA, –but no minority group (?) large enough to challenge for m/m US House district –m/m State leg district? –Local challenges successful (Yakima)

28. Minority Representation When US House districts plans suspect Minority / Majority Districts – Remedy: Minority / Majority Districts 1990 US Congress Redistricting – Maximize number of majority / minority districts in US House, state legislatures – Bush Dept. of Justice, Latino and African American litigants in synch

29. Minority Representation Majority Minority Districts –once estimated that district must be at least 65% minority to guarantee election of minority candidate Congress elected in 1992 –first since new system –record number of African Americans, Latinos

30. Minority Representation Majority Minority Districts Partisan consequences –Overwhelmingly safe Democratic seats –Mostly in South, Southwest –Demise of Democratic voters in “influence districts” –Surrounding districts more competitive for GOP –1992 Bad election overall for Dems (9 seat loss)

31. Minority Representation Majority Minority Seats Partisan Consequences? –1994 ‘Republican Revolution’ –GOP gain 54 seats many gains in southern states some in formerly majority Dem districts. –GOP assumed control of US House / Senate

32. Minority Representation Challenges to Majority Minority Districts: –‘Unfair’ to white voters –trade-off, loss of substantive representation –“Bizarre” contours to districts difficult to draw, at times

33. North Carolina as Example 1991 State leg plan, 1 minority CD –state 22% African American, 12 districts –‘proportionality’ = at least 2 seats (2.64) Population more concentrated in North Dem state legislature changed plan to add 2nd minority district

34. North Carolina 12th CD, 1992, 64% Black WSJ: “political pornography”

35. North Carolina as Example Shaw v. Reno (1993) –legal challenge to NC 12th CD map when a State concentrates a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding "traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions" the State is drawing a racial gerrymander that is subject to strict scrutiny

36. North Carolina as Example Shaw v Reno 1993 ‘By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority- minority districting is sometimes said to counteract’

37. North Carolina as Example Shaw v. Reno 1993 not – race-based redistricting not always unconstitutional – states did need to comply with Section 2 and Section 5 of Voting Rights Act – but – but...race can’t be main factor, district must be compact

38. North Carolina 12 CD, 1997; 52% white New map, another lawsuit

39. North Carolina as Example Cromartie v. Hunt, 1998 –complaint alleged that the new 1st and 12th congressional districts are unjustified racial gerrymanders. The new 12th, was "fruit of the poisonous tree"--the poisonous tree being the old 12th and the poison being its racially gerrymandered origins

40. North Carolina as Example Cromartie v. Hunt, 1998 12th of 1997 was noncompact and showed evidence that race was the predominant factor in its design. The Court noted that as the district wound through certain counties and towns, the deciding factor in which precincts it picked up along the way seemed to be race rather than party.

41. Third Time’s a Charm? NC 12th CD, 1998 More compact, but not quite...

42. NC 12th CD post 2000 census, 47% white, 45% Black Represented by Mel Watt (D) since 1993

43. Partisan View of Law? Shaw case –two judges appointed by Democrats and one by a Republican. –ruled against complaint three times to uphold a plan. –Each time the Republican dissented. Cromartie case –two Republican appointees and one Democratic appointee. –ruled 2-1 in favor of complaint, with the Democratic appointee dissenting

44. Minority Representation Future of Majority Minority Districts Minority litigants sensitive to partisan consequences (substantive rep.) –in 2001, tables turned re: GOP vs. Dems –2011 /12, same Compactness –depends on segregation What about groups that are geographically dispersed –Latinos?

45. Minority Representation Alternatives to Majority Minority Districts Cumulative Voting –A remedy in several VRA cases at state and county levels in TX, SD, AL, NC

46. Minority Representation Cumulative Voting How it works –‘modified at-large’ system –multi-member districts –Voter casts votes equal to number of seats being selected –voter can ‘plump’ all votes to one candidate, spread votes around...

47. Minority Representation Semi-proportionate –threshold of exclusion = 1/(m + 1) –2 seats up = 33% –3 seats up = 25% –4 seats up = 20% –5 seats up = 17% –6 seats up = 15 %

48. Minority Representation assume 3 seats up, 10,000 voters (30,000 votes) If ‘at large,’ 65% white voters, 35% Latino voters 6500 white voters, 3500 Latino if racially polarized voting if racially polarized voting....

49. Minority Representation Standard Voting 3 seat example (3 seats, 10,000 voters. 65% Anglo, 35% Latino) Ethn.namevotes for seat 1: WA6,000 elected LF3,500 WH 500 seat 2 WB4,000 elected LD3,500 WE2,500 seat 3: WC 6,500 elected LG 3,500

50. Minority Representation CV, 3 seat example 10,000 X 3 votes Ethn.namevotes for WA7,500 elected WB6,500 elected WC5,000 WX 250 WH 0 LF8,000 elected WE 250 LG2,500

51. Cumulative Voting Evidence –more candidates –more campaigning –more turnout –more minority representation

52. Minority Representation Cumulative Voting Minority representation w/o the acrimony? Not automatic Not ‘tokenism’ Cross-racial coalitions?

53. Minority Representation Obama 2008: Is racially polarized voting a thing of the past? If so, how defend majority-minority districts? Any evidence that we are ‘beyond race?’