1. THE LAW OF TORTS WEEK 1

2. THE LECTURE STRUCTURE Texts Definition, aims and scope of law of torts Intentional torts The tort of negligence – – Duty of care

3. TEXT BOOKS Dominic Villa Annotated Civil Liability Act Lawbook Co. Dominic Villa Annotated Civil Liability Act Lawbook Co. Blay, Torts in a Nutshell LBC 2010 Blay, Torts in a Nutshell LBC 2010 Richards, Ludlow and Gibson, Torts Law in Principle, 5th ed. Thomson Reuters Sappideen et al Torts Cases Commentary LBC Sappideen et al Torts Cases Commentary LBC Balkin and Davies, The Law of Torts Balkin and Davies, The Law of Torts Stuhmcke, Principles of Australian Tort Law Stuhmcke, Principles of Australian Tort Law Luntz and Hambly Torts Cases and Commentary Butterworths Luntz and Hambly Torts Cases and Commentary Butterworths

4. THE LAW OF TORTS DEFINITION: THE NATURE OF TORTS INTRODUCTION

5. WHAT IS A TORT? A tort is a civil wrong A tort is a civil wrong That (wrong) is based a breach of a duty imposed by law That (wrong) is based a breach of a duty imposed by law Which (breach) gives rise to a (personal) civil right of action for for a remedy not exclusive to another area of law Which (breach) gives rise to a (personal) civil right of action for for a remedy not exclusive to another area of law

6. Discussion/Question Tort and Crime Tort and Crime – How does a tort differ from a Crime?

7. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TORT AND A CRIME A crime is public /community wrong that gives rise to sanctions usually designated in a specified code. A tort is a civil ‘ private ’ wrong. A crime is public /community wrong that gives rise to sanctions usually designated in a specified code. A tort is a civil ‘ private ’ wrong. Action in criminal law is usually brought by the state or the Crown. Tort actions are usually brought by the victims of the tort. Action in criminal law is usually brought by the state or the Crown. Tort actions are usually brought by the victims of the tort. The principal objective in criminal law is punishment. In torts, it is compensation The principal objective in criminal law is punishment. In torts, it is compensation

8. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TORT AND A CRIME Differences in Procedure: Differences in Procedure: – Standard of Proof » Criminal law: beyond reasonable doubt » Torts: on the balance of probabilities

9. Question Are there any similarities between a tort and a crime? Are there any similarities between a tort and a crime?

10. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TORTS AND CRIME They both arise from wrongs imposed by law They both arise from wrongs imposed by law Certain crimes are also actionable torts; eg trespass: assault Certain crimes are also actionable torts; eg trespass: assault In some cases the damages in torts may be punitive In some cases the damages in torts may be punitive In some instances criminal law may award compensation under criminal injuries compensation legislation. In some instances criminal law may award compensation under criminal injuries compensation legislation.

11. TORT and CRIME The "roots of tort and crime" are "greatly intermingled". And it is not only the roots of tort and crime that are intermingled. The increasing frequency with which civil penalty provisions are enacted, the provisions made for criminal injuries compensation, the provisions now made in some jurisdictions for the judge at a criminal trial to order restitution or compensation to a person suffering loss or damage (including pain and suffering) as a result of an offence all deny the existence of any "sharp cleavage" between the criminal and the civil law. ( Per GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. In Gray v Motor Accident Commission ) The "roots of tort and crime" are "greatly intermingled". And it is not only the roots of tort and crime that are intermingled. The increasing frequency with which civil penalty provisions are enacted, the provisions made for criminal injuries compensation, the provisions now made in some jurisdictions for the judge at a criminal trial to order restitution or compensation to a person suffering loss or damage (including pain and suffering) as a result of an offence all deny the existence of any "sharp cleavage" between the criminal and the civil law. ( Per GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. In Gray v Motor Accident Commission )

12. TORTS DISTINGUISHED FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT A breach of contract arises from promises made by the parties themselves. A breach of contract arises from promises made by the parties themselves.

13. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TORT AND CONTRACT Both tort and breach of contract give rise to civil suits Both tort and breach of contract give rise to civil suits In some instances, a breach of contract may also be a tort: eg an employer ’ s failure to provide safe working conditions In some instances, a breach of contract may also be a tort: eg an employer ’ s failure to provide safe working conditions

14. Questions What are the objectives of tort law? What are the objectives of tort law?

15. THE OBJECTIVES OF TORT LAW Loss distribution/adjustment: shifting losses from victims to perpetrators Loss distribution/adjustment: shifting losses from victims to perpetrators Compensation: Through the award of (pecuniary) damages Compensation: Through the award of (pecuniary) damages – The object of compensation is to place the victim in the position he/she was before the tort was committed. Punishment: through exemplary or punitive damages. This is a secondary aim. Punishment: through exemplary or punitive damages. This is a secondary aim.

16. Question What interests are protected by the Law of Torts, and how are these interests protected? What interests are protected by the Law of Torts, and how are these interests protected?

17. INTERESTS PROTECTED IN TORT LAW Personal security Personal security – Trespass – Negligence Reputation Reputation – Defamation Property Property – Trespass – Conversion Economic and financial interests Economic and financial interests

18. SOURCES OF TORT LAW Common Law: Common Law: – The development of torts by precedent through the courts » Donoghue v Stevenson Statute: Statute: – Thematic statutes: eg Motor Accidents legislation » Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 – General statutes: eg Civil Liability legislation » The Civil Liability Act (NSW) 2002

19. LIABILITY IN TORT LAW Liability = responsibility Liability = responsibility Liability may be based on fault or it may be strict Liability may be based on fault or it may be strict Fault liability: the failure to live up to a standard through an act or omission. Fault liability: the failure to live up to a standard through an act or omission. Types of fault liability: Types of fault liability: NEGLIGENCE INTENTION FAULT LIABILITY

20. Intention in Torts Deliberate or wilful conduct Deliberate or wilful conduct ‘ Constructive ’ intent: where the consequences of an act are substantially certain: the consequences are intended‘ Constructive ’ intent: where the consequences of an act are substantially certain: the consequences are intended Where conduct is reckless Where conduct is reckless Transferred intent: where D intends to hit ‘ B ’ but misses and hits ‘ P ’ Transferred intent: where D intends to hit ‘ B ’ but misses and hits ‘ P ’

21. Negligence in Torts When D is careless in his/her conduct When D is careless in his/her conduct When D fails to take reasonable care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable injury to another and that party suffers damage. When D fails to take reasonable care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable injury to another and that party suffers damage.

22. STRICT LIABILITY No fault is required for strict liability No fault is required for strict liability

23. ACTIONS IN TORT LAW Trespass Trespass – Directly caused injuries – Requires no proof of damage Action on the Case/Negligence Action on the Case/Negligence – Indirect injuries – Requires proof of damage

24. THE DOMAIN OF TORTS Trespass Negligence Nuisance Defences Financial loss Conversion Defamation Breach of statutory duty Particular Duty Areas Concurrent liability Product liability Liability of public authorities Vicarious liability

25. INTENTIONAL TORTS INTENATIONAL TORTS Trespass ConversionDetinue

26. WHAT IS TRESPASS? Intentional act of D which directly causes an injury to the P or his /her property without lawful justification Intentional act of D which directly causes an injury to the P or his /her property without lawful justification The Elements of Trespass: The Elements of Trespass: – fault: intentional act – injury* must be caused directly – injury* may be to the P or to his/her property – No lawful justification

27. *INJURY IN TRESPASS Injury = a breach of right, not necessarily actual damage Injury = a breach of right, not necessarily actual damage Trespass requires only proof of injury not actual damage Trespass requires only proof of injury not actual damage

28. THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS: The ‘DNA’ Intentional act “x” element Direct interference with person or property Absence of lawful justification + + + = A specific form of trespass

29. SPECIFIC FORMS OF TRESPASS TRESPASS PERSON PROPERTY BATTERY ASSAULT FALSE IMPRISONMENT

30. BATTERY The intentional act of D which directly causes a physical interference with the body of P without lawful justification The intentional act of D which directly causes a physical interference with the body of P without lawful justification The distinguishing element: physical interference with P’s body The distinguishing element: physical interference with P’s body

31. THE INTENTIONAL ACT IN BATTERY No liability without intention No liability without intention The intentional act = basic willful act + the consequences. The intentional act = basic willful act + the consequences.

32. CAPACITY TO FORM THE INTENT D is deemed capable of forming intent if he/she understands the nature of (‘intended’) his/her act D is deemed capable of forming intent if he/she understands the nature of (‘intended’) his/her act -Infants -Infants » Hart v A. G. of Tasmania ( infant cutting another infant with razor blade) – Lunatics » Morris v Masden

33. THE ACT MUST CAUSE PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE The essence of the tort is the protection of the person of P. D’s act short of physical contact is therefore not a battery The essence of the tort is the protection of the person of P. D’s act short of physical contact is therefore not a battery The least touching of another could be battery The least touching of another could be battery – Cole v Turner (dicta per Holt CJ) ‘The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person’s body is inviolate’ ( per Goff LJ, Collins v Wilcock) ‘The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person’s body is inviolate’ ( per Goff LJ, Collins v Wilcock)

34. The Nature of the Physical Interference Rixon v Star City Casino (D places hand on P’s shoulder to attract his attention; no battery) Rixon v Star City Casino (D places hand on P’s shoulder to attract his attention; no battery) Collins v Wilcock ( Police officer holds D’s arm with a view to restraining her when D declines to answer questions and begins to walk away; battery) Collins v Wilcock ( Police officer holds D’s arm with a view to restraining her when D declines to answer questions and begins to walk away; battery)

35. SHOULD THE PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE BE HOSTILE? Hostility may establish a presumption of battery; but Hostility may establish a presumption of battery; but Hostility is not material to proving battery Hostility is not material to proving battery The issue may revolve on how one defines ‘hostility’ The issue may revolve on how one defines ‘hostility’

36. THE INJURY MUST BE CAUSED DIRECTLY Injury should be the immediate The Case Law: Injury should be the immediate The Case Law: – Scott v Shepherd ( Lit squib/fireworks in market place) – Hutchins v Maughan ( poisoned bait left for dog) – Southport v Esso Petroleum (Spilt oil on P’s beach)

37. THE ACT MUST BE WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION Consent is Lawful justification Consent is Lawful justification Consent must be freely given by the P if P is able to understand the nature of the act Consent must be freely given by the P if P is able to understand the nature of the act – Allen v New Mount Sinai Hospital Lawful justification includes the lawful act of law enforcement officers Lawful justification includes the lawful act of law enforcement officers

38. TRESPASS:ASSAULT The intentional act or threat of D which directly places P in reasonable apprehension of an imminent physical interference with his or her person or of someone under his or her control The intentional act or threat of D which directly places P in reasonable apprehension of an imminent physical interference with his or her person or of someone under his or her control

40. THE LAW OF TORTS THE LAW OF TORTS WEEK 2 ASSAULT FALSE IMPRISONMENT TRESSPASS TO LAND

41. TRESPASS:ASSAULT The intentional act or threat of D which directly places P in reasonable apprehension of an imminent physical interference with his or her person or of someone under his or her control The intentional act or threat of D which directly places P in reasonable apprehension of an imminent physical interference with his or her person or of someone under his or her control It is any act — and not a mere omission to act — by which a person intentionally — or recklessly — causes another to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence: It is any act — and not a mere omission to act — by which a person intentionally — or recklessly — causes another to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence:

42. The Gist of the Action The Gist of the Action … Assault necessarily involves the apprehension of injury or the instillation of fear or fright. It does not necessarily involve physical contact with the person assaulted: nor is such physical contact, if it occurs, an element of the assault. (Barwick CJ in The Queen v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 472 … Assault necessarily involves the apprehension of injury or the instillation of fear or fright. It does not necessarily involve physical contact with the person assaulted: nor is such physical contact, if it occurs, an element of the assault. (Barwick CJ in The Queen v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 472

43. THE ELEMENTS OF ASSAULT There must be a direct threat: There must be a direct threat: – Hall v Fonceca ( Threat by P who shook hand in front of D’s face in an argument) – Barton v Davis In general, mere words are may not actionable In general, mere words are may not actionable – Barton v Armstrong But mere silence as in silent telephone calls, may constitute an assault: R v Burstow; R v Ireland [1998] AC 147. But mere silence as in silent telephone calls, may constitute an assault: R v Burstow; R v Ireland [1998] AC 147. In general, conditional threats are not actionable In general, conditional threats are not actionable – Tuberville v Savage – Police v Greaves

44. The apprehension must be reasonable; the test is objective The apprehension must be reasonable; the test is objective The interference must be imminent The interference must be imminent – -Police v Greaves – Barton v Armstrong Zanker v Vartzokas ( P jumps out of a moving van to escape from D’s unwanted lift) THE ELEMENTS OF ASSAULT

45. Zanker v Vartzokas and the issue of imminence/immediacy The Facts: The Facts: – Accused gives a lift to victim and offers money for sex; victim refuses. – Accused responds by accelerating car, Victim tries to open door, but accused increases acceleration – Accused says to victim: I will take you to my mates house. He will really fix you up – Victim jumps from car then travelling 60km/h

46. Z a nker v Vartzokas : The Issues Was the victim’s fear of sexual assault in the future reasonable? Was the victim’s fear of sexual assault in the future reasonable? Was the feared harm immediate enough to constitute assault? Was the feared harm immediate enough to constitute assault?

47. Zanker v Vartzokas : The Reasoning Where the victim is held in place and unable to escape the immediacy element may be fulfilled. Where the victim is held in place and unable to escape the immediacy element may be fulfilled. The essential factor is imminence not contemporaneity The essential factor is imminence not contemporaneity The exact moment of physical harm injury is known to the aggressor The exact moment of physical harm injury is known to the aggressor It remains an assault where victim is powerless to stop the aggressor from carrying out the threat It remains an assault where victim is powerless to stop the aggressor from carrying out the threat

48. THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS Intentional act “x” element Direct interference Absence of lawful justification + + + = A specific form of trespass

49. SPECIFIC FORMS OF TRESPASS TRESPASS PERSON PROPERTY BATTERY ASSAULT FALSE IMPRISONMENT

50. The intentional act of D which directly causes the total restraint of P and thereby confines him/her to a delimited area without lawful justification The intentional act of D which directly causes the total restraint of P and thereby confines him/her to a delimited area without lawful justification The essential distinctive element is the total restraint The essential distinctive element is the total restraint

51. THE ELEMENTS OF THE TORT THE ELEMENTS OF THE TORT It requires all the basic elements of trespass: It requires all the basic elements of trespass: – Intentional act – Directness – absence of lawful justification/consent, and total restraint total restraint

52. RESTRAINT IN FALSE IMPRISONMENT The restraint must be total The restraint must be total – Bird v Jones (passage over bridge ) – Rudduck v Vadarlis – The Balmain New Ferry Co v Robertson Total restraint implies the absence of a reasonable means of escape Total restraint implies the absence of a reasonable means of escape – Burton v Davies (D refuses to allow P out of car) Restraint may be total where D subjects P to his/her authority with no option to leave Restraint may be total where D subjects P to his/her authority with no option to leave – Symes v Mahon (police officer arrests P by mistake)

53. FORMS OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT See the following Cases: See the following Cases: – Cowell v. Corrective Services Commissioner of NSW (1988) Aust. Torts Reporter ¶81-197. – Louis v. The Commonwealth of Australia 87 FLR 277. – – Murray v Ministry of Defence – Lippl v. Haines & Another (1989) Aust. Torts Reporter ¶80-302; (1989) 18 NSWLR 620. – Dickenson Waters

54. VOLUNTARY CASES In general, there is no FI where one voluntarily submits to a form of restraint In general, there is no FI where one voluntarily submits to a form of restraint – Herd v Werdale (D refuses to allow P out of mine shaft) – Robison v The Balmain New Ferry Co. (D refuses to allow P to leave unless P pays fare) – Lippl v Haines Where there is no volition for restraint, the confinement may be FI ( Bahner v Marwest Hotels Co.) Where there is no volition for restraint, the confinement may be FI ( Bahner v Marwest Hotels Co.)

55. WORDS AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT In general, words can constitute FI In general, words can constitute FI

56. KNOWLEDGE IN FALSE IMPRISONMENT The knowledge of the P at the moment of restraint is not essential. The knowledge of the P at the moment of restraint is not essential. – Merring v Graham White Aviation – Murray v Ministry of Defense

57. OTHER FORMS OF TRESPASS TRESPASS PERSON PROPERTY BATTERY ASSAULT FALSE IMPRISONMENT

58. TRESPASS TO PROPERTY LAND GOODS/CHATTELS

59. TRESPASS TO LAND The intentional act of D which directly interferes with the plaintiff’s exclusive possession of land The intentional act of D which directly interferes with the plaintiff’s exclusive possession of land

60. THE NATURE OF THE TORT Land includes the actual soil/dirt, the structures/plants on it and the airspace above it Land includes the actual soil/dirt, the structures/plants on it and the airspace above it Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et inferos Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et inferos – Bernstein of Leigh v Skyways & General Ltd – Kelson v Imperial Tobacco

61. The Nature of D’s Act: A General Note...[E]very invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing.... If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him ( Entick v Carrington (1765) 16 St Tr 1029, 1066)...[E]very invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing.... If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him ( Entick v Carrington (1765) 16 St Tr 1029, 1066)

62. THE NATURE OF D’S ACT The act must constitute some physical interference which disturbs P’s exclusive possession of the land The act must constitute some physical interference which disturbs P’s exclusive possession of the land – Victoria Racing Co. v Taylor – Barthust City Council v Saban – Lincoln Hunt v Willesse

63. THE NATURE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S INTEREST IN THE LAND P must have exclusive possession of the land at the time of the interference exclusion of all others P must have exclusive possession of the land at the time of the interference exclusion of all others

64. THE NATURE OF EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION Exclusive possession is distinct from ownership. Exclusive possession is distinct from ownership. Ownership refers to title in the land. Exclusive possession refers to physical holding of the land Ownership refers to title in the land. Exclusive possession refers to physical holding of the land Possession may be immediate or constructive Possession may be immediate or constructive The nature of possession depends on the material possessed The nature of possession depends on the material possessed

65. EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION : CO-OWNERS In general, a co-owner cannot be liable in trespass in respect of the land he/she owns; but this is debatable where the ’trespassing’ co-owner is not in possession. ( Greig v Greig ) In general, a co-owner cannot be liable in trespass in respect of the land he/she owns; but this is debatable where the ’trespassing’ co-owner is not in possession. ( Greig v Greig ) A co-possessor can maintain an action against a trespasser (Coles Smith v Smith and Ors)¯ A co-possessor can maintain an action against a trespasser (Coles Smith v Smith and Ors)¯

66. THE POSITION OF TRESPASSERS AND SQUATTERS A trespasser/squatter in exclusive possession can maintain an action against any other trespasser A trespasser/squatter in exclusive possession can maintain an action against any other trespasser – – Newington v Windeyer (1985)

67. THE POSITION OF LICENSEES A licensee is one who has the permission of P to enter or use land (belonging to P) A licensee is one who has the permission of P to enter or use land (belonging to P) A licensee is a party not in possession, and can therefore not sue in trespass A licensee is a party not in possession, and can therefore not sue in trespass A licensee for value however may be entitled to sue (E.R. Investments v Hugh) A licensee for value however may be entitled to sue (E.R. Investments v Hugh)

68. THE TRESPASSORY ACT Preventing P’s access Waters v Maynard) Preventing P’s access Waters v Maynard) The continuation of the initial trespassory act is a trespass continuing trespass The continuation of the initial trespassory act is a trespass continuing trespass Where D enters land for purposes different from that for which P gave a license, D’s conduct may constitute trespass a b initio (Baker v Crown) Where D enters land for purposes different from that for which P gave a license, D’s conduct may constitute trespass a b initio (Baker v Crown)

69. THE POSITION OF POLICE OFFICERS Unless authorized by law, police officers have no special right of entry into any premises without consent of P. But see Halliday v Neville Unless authorized by law, police officers have no special right of entry into any premises without consent of P. But see Halliday v Neville A police officer charged with the duty of serving a summons must obtain the consent of the party in possession ( Plenty v. Dillion ) A police officer charged with the duty of serving a summons must obtain the consent of the party in possession ( Plenty v. Dillion )

70. Police Officers; The Common Law Position The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all forces of the Crown. It may be frail- its roof may shake- the wind may blow through it- the rain may enter- but the King of England cannot enter- all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. So be it- unless he has justification by law’. ( Southam v Smout [1964] 1QB 308, 320. The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all forces of the Crown. It may be frail- its roof may shake- the wind may blow through it- the rain may enter- but the King of England cannot enter- all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. So be it- unless he has justification by law’. ( Southam v Smout [1964] 1QB 308, 320.

71. REMEDIES Ejectment Ejectment Self help: Self help: – Self redress is a summary remedy, which is justified only in clear and simple cases, or in an emergency…the courts have confined the remedy by way of self redress to simple cases such as an overhanging branch, or an encroaching root, which would not justify the expense of legal proceedings, and urgent cases which require an immediate remedy. ( – Self redress is a summary remedy, which is justified only in clear and simple cases, or in an emergency…the courts have confined the remedy by way of self redress to simple cases such as an overhanging branch, or an encroaching root, which would not justify the expense of legal proceedings, and urgent cases which require an immediate remedy. ( Burton v Winters [1993] 3 All ER 847)

72. REMEDIES Recovery of Possession Recovery of Possession Award of damages Award of damages – – Parramatta CC v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293 – – Campbelltown CC v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501 Injunction Injunction

73. TRESPASS TO PROPERTY LAND GOODS/CHATTELS

74. TRESPASS TO PROPERTY LAND GOODS/CHATTELSGOODS/CHATTELS Personal propertyPersonal property

75. TRESPASS TO GOODS/CHATTEL The intentional/negligent act of D which directly interferes with the plaintiff’s possession of a chattel without lawful justification The intentional/negligent act of D which directly interferes with the plaintiff’s possession of a chattel without lawful justification The P must have actual or constructive possession at the time of interference. The P must have actual or constructive possession at the time of interference.

76. DAMAGES It may not be actionable per se (Everitt v Martin) It may not be actionable per se (Everitt v Martin)

77. CONVERSION The act of D in relation to another’s chattel which constitutes an unjustifiable denial of his/her title The act of D in relation to another’s chattel which constitutes an unjustifiable denial of his/her title

78. CONVERSION: Who Can Sue? Owners Owners Those in possession or entitled to immediate possession Those in possession or entitled to immediate possession – Bailees* – Bailors* – Mortgagors* and Mortgagees*( Citicorp Australia v B.S. Stillwell) – Finders ( Parker v British Airways; Armory v Delmirie )

79. ACTS OF CONVERSION Mere asportation is no conversion Mere asportation is no conversion – Fouldes v Willoughby The D’s conduct must constitute an unjustifiable denial of P’s rights to the property The D’s conduct must constitute an unjustifiable denial of P’s rights to the property – Howard E Perry v British Railways Board Finders of lost property Finders of lost property – Parker v British Airways Destruction of the chattel is conversion Destruction of the chattel is conversion – Atkinson v Richardson; ) Taking possession Taking possession Withholding possession Withholding possession

80. ACTS OF CONVERSION Misdelivery ( Ashby v Tolhurst (1937 2KB) ; Sydney City Council v West ) Misdelivery ( Ashby v Tolhurst (1937 2KB) ; Sydney City Council v West ) Unauthorized dispositions in any manner that interferes with P’s title constitutes conversion ( Penfolds Wines v Elliott ) Unauthorized dispositions in any manner that interferes with P’s title constitutes conversion ( Penfolds Wines v Elliott )

81. DETINUE Detinue: The wrongful refusal to tender goods upon demand by P, who is entitled to possession It requires a demand coupled with subsequent refusal ( General and Finance Facilities v Cooks Cars (Romford) Detinue: The wrongful refusal to tender goods upon demand by P, who is entitled to possession It requires a demand coupled with subsequent refusal ( General and Finance Facilities v Cooks Cars (Romford)

82. DAMAGES IN CONVERSION AND DETINUE In conversion, damages usually take the form of pecuniary compensation In conversion, damages usually take the form of pecuniary compensation In detinue, the court may in appropriate circumstances order the return of the chattel In detinue, the court may in appropriate circumstances order the return of the chattel Damages in conversion are calculated as at the time of conversion; in detinue it is as at the time of judgment Damages in conversion are calculated as at the time of conversion; in detinue it is as at the time of judgment – The Mediana – Butler v The Egg and Pulp Marketing Board – The Winkfield – General and Finance Facilities v Cooks Cars (Romford)

83. THE LAW OF TORTS Action on the Case for Indirect Injuries

84. INDIRECT INTENTIONAL INJURIES INDIRECT INTENTIONAL INJURIES ACTION ON THE CASE FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES OR NERVOUS SHOCK ACTION ON THE CASE FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES OR NERVOUS SHOCK ACTION ON THE CASE REFERS TO ACTIONS BASED ON INJURIES THAT ARE CAUSED INDIRECTLY OR CONSEQUENTIALLY ACTION ON THE CASE REFERS TO ACTIONS BASED ON INJURIES THAT ARE CAUSED INDIRECTLY OR CONSEQUENTIALLY

85. INDIRECT INTENTIONAL INJURIES: CASE LAW Bird v Holbrook (trap set in garden) Bird v Holbrook (trap set in garden) – D is liable in an action on the case for damages for intentional acts which are meant to cause damage to P and which in fact cause damage (to P)

86. THE INTENTIONAL ACT The intentional may be deliberate and preconceived( Bird v Holbrook ) The intentional may be deliberate and preconceived( Bird v Holbrook ) It may also be inferred or implied; the test for the inference is objective It may also be inferred or implied; the test for the inference is objective Wilkinson v Downton Wilkinson v Downton Janvier v Sweeney Janvier v Sweeney

87. Action on the Case for Indirect Intentional Harm: Elements D is liable in an action on the case for damages for intentional acts which are meant to cause damage to P and which in fact cause damage to P D is liable in an action on the case for damages for intentional acts which are meant to cause damage to P and which in fact cause damage to P The elements of this tort: The elements of this tort: – The act must be intentional – It must be one calculated to cause harm/damage – It must in fact cause harm/actual damage Where D intends no harm from his act but the harm caused is one that is reasonably foreseeable, D’s intention to cause the resulting harm can be imputed/implied Where D intends no harm from his act but the harm caused is one that is reasonably foreseeable, D’s intention to cause the resulting harm can be imputed/implied

88. THE SCOPE OF THE RULE The rule does not cover ‘pure’ mental stress or mere fright The rule does not cover ‘pure’ mental stress or mere fright The act must be reasonably capable of causing mental distress to a normal* person: The act must be reasonably capable of causing mental distress to a normal* person: – Bunyan v Jordan – Stevenson v Basham – – Carrier v Bonham

89. IS THERE ROOM FOR EXTENDING THE SCOPE The normal person in Wilkinson v Downton The normal person in Wilkinson v Downton The normal/reasonable person: The gender/race debate The normal/reasonable person: The gender/race debate

90. The Scope of Intentional Torts to the Person Trespass: Trespass: – Battery, – False Imprisonment – Assault Action on the case ( Wilkinson v Downton ) Action on the case ( Wilkinson v Downton )

91. ONUS OF PROOF In Common Law, he who asserts proves In Common Law, he who asserts proves Traditionally, in trespass D was required to disprove fault once P proved injury. Depending on whether the injury occurred on or off the highway ( McHale v Watson; Venning v Chin ) Traditionally, in trespass D was required to disprove fault once P proved injury. Depending on whether the injury occurred on or off the highway ( McHale v Watson; Venning v Chin ) The current Australian position is contentious but seems to support the view that in off highway cases D is required to prove all the elements of the tort once P proves injury The current Australian position is contentious but seems to support the view that in off highway cases D is required to prove all the elements of the tort once P proves injury – Hackshaw v Shaw – Platt v Nutt – See Blay; ‘Onus of Proof of Consent in an Action for Trespass to the Person’ Vol. 61 ALJ (1987) 25 – But see McHugh J in See Secretary DHCS v JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) 1992 175 CLR 218

92. IMPACT OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY ACT Section 3B Civil liability excluded from Act Section 3B Civil liability excluded from Act (1) The provisions of this Act do not apply to or in respect of civil liability (and awards of damages in those proceedings) as follows: (a) civil liability in respect of an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death or that is sexual assault or other sexual misconduct – the whole Act except Part 7 (Self-defence and recovery by criminals) in respect of civil liability in respect of an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death