Download presentation
Presentation is loading. Please wait.
Published byHilda Booth Modified over 9 years ago
1
Llad Phillips1 Part I Strategies to Estimate Deterrence Part II Optimization of the Criminal Justice System
2
Llad Phillips2 Testing crime control
3
Llad Phillips3 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link
4
Llad Phillips4 Suicide AS A Proxy For Causes of Homicide
5
Llad Phillips5 FBI Vs. Vital Statistics
6
Llad Phillips6 Homicide Rate & Suicide Rate
7
Llad Phillips7 Schematic Model Causes Homicide Controls: Imprisonment rate Clearance ratio
8
Llad Phillips8 The story over time
9
Llad Phillips9 A Control Story: US _ _ Clearance ratio for homicide was falling from 1960 0n _ _ This could explain the rising homicide rate from 1965-1975 _ _ Imprisonment rate was pretty stable until 1980 when it started rising _ _ This could explain the falling homicide rate from 1995-2009
10
Llad Phillips10 Empirical Study of Certainty and Severity
11
Llad Phillips11 Empirical Study of Certainty, Severity, & Causality
12
Llad Phillips12 Outline _ Human Capital & Other News _ Studying for the Midterm _ Deterrence: _ Evidence pro _ Evidence con
13
Llad Phillips13 Human Capital news
14
Llad Phillips14 About 60% Of 9 th graders Get a diploma somewhere
15
Llad Phillips15 The high Hurdle? Algebra
16
Llad Phillips16 Studying For the Midterm _ http://econ.ucsb.edu/ http://econ.ucsb.edu/
17
Llad Phillips17
18
Llad Phillips18
19
Llad Phillips19
20
Llad Phillips20
21
Llad Phillips21
22
Llad Phillips22 Deterrence: conceptual issues _ _ Controlling for causality _ _ Simultaneity
23
Llad Phillips23 Source: Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice Expect Get
24
Llad Phillips24 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link Control for Causality
25
Llad Phillips25 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link Recognize Simultaneity
26
Llad Phillips26 News Over the Weekend _ Deep Recession high Unemployment rate Keynesian Economics drop money from a helicopter? Or invest in infrastructure? TransportationEnergyindependencegreen
27
Llad Phillips27 Greening the Earth _ Greening UCSB _ Rec-Cen
28
Llad Phillips28 Human development Index and Electricity Use
29
Llad Phillips29 Production Function
30
Llad Phillips30
31
Llad Phillips31
32
Llad Phillips32
33
Llad Phillips33 Policy Comment About Economic Development _ _ An Obama Keynesian strategy: invest in infrastructure _ _ Past investments in infrastructure _ _ Canals _ _ Railroads _ _ Paved roads _ _ Airways _ _ ?
34
Llad Phillips34 Cesare Marchetti “Fifty-Year Pulsation In Human Affairs” Futures 17(3):376-388 (1986) www.cesaremarchetti.org/archive/scan/ MARCHETTI-069.pdf www.cesaremarchetti.org/archive/scan/ MARCHETTI-069.pdf Cesare Marchetti “Fifty-Year Pulsation In Human Affairs” Futures 17(3):376-388 (1986) www.cesaremarchetti.org/archive/scan/ MARCHETTI-069.pdf www.cesaremarchetti.org/archive/scan/ MARCHETTI-069.pdf _ _ Example: the construction of railroad miles is logistically distributed
35
Llad Phillips35 90%10% 1859 1890 1921
36
Llad Phillips36 Cesare Marchetti
37
Llad Phillips37
38
Llad Phillips38 Cesare Marchetti: Energy Technology: Coal, Oil, Gas, Nuclear 52 years57 years56 years
39
Llad Phillips39 Cesare Marchetti
40
Llad Phillips40 Theodore Modis Figure 4. The data points represent the percentage deviation of energy consumption in the US from the natural growth-trend indicated by a fitted S-curve. The gray band is an 8% interval around a sine wave with period 56 years. The black dots and black triangles show what happened after the graph was first put together in 1988.[7] Presently we are entering a “spring” season. WWI occurred in late “summer” whereas WWII in late “winter”.
41
Llad Phillips41
42
Llad Phillips42
43
Llad Phillips43 Causality? Misery IndexOffense Rate Mystery Force
44
Llad Phillips44
45
Llad Phillips45 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link Control for Causality
46
Llad Phillips46
47
Llad Phillips47 1851 1945 1900 1930
48
Llad Phillips48
49
Llad Phillips49
50
Llad Phillips50 Part I Strategies to Estimate Deterrence
51
Llad Phillips51 Questions About Crime _ Why is it difficult to empirically demonstrate the control effect of deterrence on crime? _ What is the empirical evidence that raises questions about deterrence? _ What is the empirical evidence that supports deterrence?
52
Llad Phillips52 Evidence Against the Death Penalty Being a Deterrent _ Contiguous States _ Maine: no death penalty _ Vermont: death penalty _ New Hampshire: death penalty _ Little Variation in the Homicide Rate _ Source: Study by Thorsten Sellin in Hugo Bedau, The Death Penalty in America
54
Llad Phillips54 Isaac Ehrlich Study of the Death Penalty: 1933-1969 _ Homicide Rate Per Capita _ Control Variables _ probability of arrest _ probability of conviction given charged _ Probability of execution given conviction _ Causal Variables _ labor force participation rate _ unemployment rate _ percent population aged 14-24 years _ permanent income _ trend
55
Ehrlich Results: Elasticities of Homicide with respect to Controls Source: Isaac Ehrlich, “The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment
56
Llad Phillips56 Critique of Ehrlich by Death Penalty Opponents _ Time period used: 1933-1968 _ period of declining probability of execution _ Ehrlich did not include probability of imprisonment given conviction as a control variable _ Causal variables included are unconvincing as causes of homicide
57
Llad Phillips57 U.S. United States Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
58
Llad Phillips58 U.S. United States Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
59
Llad Phillips59 What is the Empirical Evidence that Supports Deterrence? _ Domestic violence and police intervention _ Experiments with control groups _ Traffic Black Spots _ Focused enforcement efforts
60
Llad Phillips60 Traffic Black Spots _ Blood Alley _ Highway 126 _ San Marcos Pass _ Highway 154
61
Llad Phillips61 San Marcos Pass Experiment _ Increase Highway Patrols _ Increase Arrests _ Total accidents decrease _ Injury accidents decrease _ Accidents involving drinking under the influence decrease
62
Llad Phillips62
63
Los Angeles Traffic Map
64
Llad Phillips64 Domestic Violence & Police Intervention
65
Llad Phillips65 1993-2005
66
Llad Phillips66 Female Victims of Violent Crime, 1973-2003
67
Llad Phillips67 Homicides of Intimates, 1976-2005
68
Llad Phillips68 Female Victims of Violent Crime _ In 1994 _ 1 homicide for every 23,000 women (12 or older) _ females represented 23% of homicide victims in US _ 9 out of 10 female victims were murdered by males _ 1 rape for every 270 women _ 1 robbery for every 240 women _ 1 assault for every 29 women
69
Victims of Lone Offenders* Annual Average Numbers
70
Llad Phillips70 United States Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
71
Llad Phillips71
72
Llad Phillips72 Average Annual Rate of Violent Victimizations Per 1000 Females
73
Llad Phillips73
74
Llad Phillips74 Declining Trends in Intimate Violence: Homicide
75
Llad Phillips75 Nonfatal Violent victimization Rates
76
Llad Phillips76 United States Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
77
Llad Phillips77 United States Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
78
Llad Phillips78 United States Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
79
Llad Phillips79
80
Llad Phillips80 Nonfatal intimate Victimization Rates By Age
81
Llad Phillips81
82
Llad Phillips82 Female victimization rates by relationship
83
Llad Phillips83
84
Llad Phillips84
85
Llad Phillips85
86
Llad Phillips86 Intimate homicides by weapon type
87
Llad Phillips87 Domestic Violence in California http://caag.state.ca.us/
88
Llad Phillips88
89
Llad Phillips89 Domestic Violence Rates in California: 1988-1998 1988: 113.6 per 100.000 1998: 169.9 per 100,000
90
Llad Phillips90 Domestic Violence in California 1988: 94% Male Arrests 1998: 83.5% Male Arrests
91
Llad Phillips91 Police Intervention with Experimental Controls _ A 911 call from a family member _ the case is randomly assigned for “treatment” _ A police patrol responds and visits the household _ police calm down the family members _ based on the treatment randomly assigned, the police carry out the sanctions
92
Llad Phillips92 Why is Treatment Assigned Randomly? _ To control for unknown causal factors _ assign known numbers of cases, for example equal numbers, to each treatment _ with this procedure, there should be an even distribution of difficult cases in each treatment group
93
Llad Phillips93 911 call (characteristics of household Participants unknown) Random Assignment code blue code gold patrol responds settles the household verbally warn the husbandtake the husband to jail for the night
94
Llad Phillips94 Part II Optimization of the Criminal Justice System
95
Llad Phillips95 Questions About Statistical Studies of Deterrence _ Do we know enough about the factors that cause crime? _ Can we find variables that will control for variation in crime generation? _ We have better measures for the factors that control crime than for the factors that cause crime. _ Unknown variation in crime generation may mask the effects of crime control.
96
Llad Phillips96 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link
97
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control 1 2 3
98
Source: Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice
99
control Causal factors
100
Expenditures per Capita Offenses Per Capita Crime Control Technology South Dakota North Dakota 2500 Index crimes per 100,000 people $100 $0 0
101
Llad Phillips101 Optimization of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) _ Minimize damages to victims plus the costs of control, subject to the crime control technology _ damages to victims per capita = loss rate per offense * offense rate per capita _ Costs of control = per capita expenditures on CJS _ Total cost = damages + expenditures
102
Expenditures per Capita Offenses Per Capita Crime Control Technology South Dakota North Dakota 2500 Index crimes per 100,000 people $100 Total cost = expenditures per capita $200 $0 0
103
Expenditures per Capita Offenses Per Capita Crime Control Technology South Dakota North Dakota 2500 Index crimes per 100,000 people $100 Total cost = expenditures per capita Total cost = damages to victims $200 $0 0 5000 Index offenses per 100,000 people = 0.05 per capita
104
Llad Phillips104 Expenditures per Capita Offenses Per Capita Crime Control Technology South Dakota North Dakota 0.025 Index crimes per capita $100 Total cost = expenditures per capita Total cost = damages to victims 0.050 Total cost = $200 per capita = damages to victims = loss rate*0.05 so loss rate = $4,000 per Index Crime in South Dakota $200 $0 0
105
Source: Phillips: Lecture One
106
Llad Phillips106 Expenditures per capita Offenses Per Capita 2500 Index crimes per 100,000 people $100 Total cost = expenditures per capita Total cost = damages to victims Family of Total Cost Curves High Low
107
Llad Phillips107 Expenditures per Capita Offenses Per Capita Crime Control Technology South Dakota North Dakota 2500 Index crimes per 100,000 people $100 Total cost = expenditures per capita Total cost = damages to victims
108
Llad Phillips108 Application of the Economic Paradigm _ Specify the feasible options _ the states of the world: Crime control technology _ Value the options _ loss rate per offense _ Optimize _ Pick the lowest cost point on the crime control technology
109
That’s all folks!
110
Crime Generation 1. variation of offense rate per capita with expected cost of punishment 2. Shift in the relationship with a change in causal factors Offense rate per capita Expected cost(severity) of punishment crime generation function
111
Crime Generation 1. variation of offense rate per capita with expected cost of punishment 2. Shift in the relationship with a change in causal factors Offense rate per capita Expected cost(severity) of punishment crime generation function High causal conditions Low causal conditions
112
Production Function for the Criminal Justice System (CJS) 1. Variation in expected costs of punishment with criminal justice system expenditure per capita Expected costs of punishment Criminal Justice System expenditures per capita production function
113
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control
114
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function
115
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0
116
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
117
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
118
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
119
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
120
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1 2 2
121
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1 2 2 3
122
per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1 2 2 3
123
Llad Phillips123 Female Victims of Violent Crime
124
Llad Phillips124
125
Llad Phillips125
126
Llad Phillips126
127
Long Swings in the Homicide Rate in the US: 1900-1980 Source: Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice
128
Llad Phillips128 United States Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ Long Swings in The Homicide Rate
129
Llad Phillips129
Similar presentations
© 2025 SlidePlayer.com. Inc.
All rights reserved.